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Résumé 
 
La Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption, adoptée en 2003, est 
le premier outil international criminalisant la corruption de façon aussi détaillée. 
Ce mémoire tente d'évaluer sa portée en analysant les dispositions concernant la 
prévention, la criminalisation, la coopération internationale et le recouvrement 
d'avoirs. Il tente d’évaluer la pertinence et l'efficacité de la Convention en 
illustrant ses défis en matière de conformité, pour ensuite étudier d'autres outils 
internationaux existants qui lui font compétition. Malgré sa portée élargie, il est 
débattu que la Convention souffre de lacunes non négligeables qui pourraient 
restreindre son impact à l'égard de la conduite d'États Membres. 
 
Mots-clés : droit international, anti-corruption, Convention des Nations Unies 
contre la corruption, mise en œuvre, conformité 
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Abstract 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (adopted in 2003) is 
the first global in-depth treaty on corruption. This work attempts to assess its 
significance by analyzing its provisions, in particular concerning the areas of 
prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset recovery. It then 
seeks to assess its relevancy and effectiveness by giving an overview of the 
Convention's main compliance challenges, as well as other existing initiatives that 
tackle corruption. Although the Convention innovates in many respects, it is 
argued that it also suffers from weaknesses that cannot be overlooked, preventing 
it from having a real impact on States' behavior. 
 
Keywords : international law, anti-corruption convention, United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, review mechanism, compliance 
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Introduction 
“Little did we suspect that our own people […] would be as corrupt as the 
apartheid regime1” 
 
‘Corruption’ stems from the Latin word corruptus, meaning ‘to break’2. Although 
corruption is a difficult concept to define, it is widely assimilated to “the abuse of 
public office for private gain3”. It is argued that to even attempt to define a vast 
concept such as corruption will inevitably encounter legal and political difficulties, 
and that defining specific types of corruption offers less challenges4.  
 
The United Nations considers this issue by offering a "multi-layered5" definition 
of corruption in its Anti-Corruption Toolkit6. According to the UN, the more 
common types of corruption are grand corruption, petty corruption, passive and 
active corruption. Whereas petty corruption often refers to an exchange of small 
amounts of money or minor favors (such as grease or facilitation payments), grand 
corruption involves high-ranking officials and is “distinguished by the scale of 
wealth appropriated and the seniority of public officials involved7”. The following 
passage differentiates between both types of corruption:  
                                                 
1 Robert Guest, The Shackled Continent, Pan Books, Basingstoke and Oxford, 2005 at 232 (citing 
Nelson Mandela) [Guest]. 
2 Colin Nicholls et al., Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
and New York, 2006 at 1 [Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office]. 
3 Margaret Beare, Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and 
Corruption, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2003 at 89 [Beare]. 
4 Nicholas A. Goodling, "Nigeria's Crisis of Corruption: Can the UN Global Programme Hope to 
Resolve this Dilemma?", (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 997 at 1001 
[Goodling]. 
5 Ibid. at 1002. 
6 UNODC, Anti-corruption toolkit, 3rd Edition, United Nations, Vienna, 2004.  
7 Simeon Aisabor Igbinedion, “A Critical Appraisal of the Mechanism for Prosecuting Grand 
Corruption Offenders Under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, (2009) 6 
Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, 56 at 58 [Igbinedion]. 
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"The most critical difference between grand corruption and petty 
corruption is that the former involves the distortion or corruption of 
the central functions of Government, while the latter develops and 
exists within the context of established governance and social 
frameworks.8" 
 
Active and passive corruption are often used to refer to the offering or acceptance 
of a bribe9. Although corruption is universally considered reprehensible and is 
criminalized around the world10, difficulties remain in the lack of a consensus in 
defining corrupt behavior11. Extrapolating on this argument, it is suggested that 
“while all cultures eschew corruption, culture remains a critical differentiator as 
opinions vary on what conduct falls inside and outside of that label12”. In other 
words, what may be considered an improper transaction in one country may be 
acceptable in another13. In order to successfully create a consensus among varying 
State opinions, international treaties must consider the many possible definitions 
of corruption14. 
 
                                                 
8 UNODC, supra note 6 at 10. 
9 Ibid. at 11. 
10 Philip M. Nichols, “The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion”, (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal, 627 at 629 [Nichols]. 
11 Stephen R. Salbu, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony”, (1998-1999) 
20 Michigan Journal of International Law, 423 at 422 [Salbu, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a 
Threat to Global Harmony”]; Barbara Crutchfield George and Kathleen A. Lacey, “A Coalition of 
Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks and NGOs: A Pivotal 
Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives”, (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal, 
547 at 554 [George & Lacey]. 
12 Salbu, ibid. at 423; George & Lacey, ibid. at 555 (The existence of this divergence is even said to 
have fuelled a “symbiotic relationship” often arising between developing and industrialized 
countries, whereby the latter profit from corrupt transactions). 
13 Joongi Kim and Jong Bum Kim, “Cultural Difference in the Crusade Against International 
Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses In Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (1997) 6 Pacific Rim 
Law and Policy Journal, 549 at 557 [Kim & Kim]. 
14 Ibid. at 557. 
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Corruption is more and more perceived as a cause of underdevelopment and 
poverty: "[c]orruption is now seen as a cause of poverty, not merely a consequence 
[…]. It is no longer possible to justify corruption and oppression on the ground 
that they are part of the culture15". It is suggested that corruption is a result of 
imposing western economic and political models onto developing societies: "it can 
be best described as a result of Western Structures being applied to cultures with 
very different traditions of political and economic organization16". Others argue 
that corruption prevails wherever wide discretionary powers are left in the hands 
of one individual, regardless of the prevalent political or social model17. Whatever 
the cause of corruption may be, the importance of putting a global anti-corruption 
convention in place is obvious when one considers its devastating consequences.  
 
It is argued that three particular consequences flow from corruption: “diminished 
economic development and growth, increased social inequalities and a discredited 
government and rule of law18”. Many developing countries rely on foreign direct 
investment as a sure method of obtaining investment. Corruption however deters 
such investment by acting as an added cost or tax for investors19. Government 
spending then becomes inefficient and public funds are often diverted away from 
                                                 
15 Claes Sandgren, “Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law”, (2005) 39 The 
International Lawyer, 717 at 717 [Sandgren]. 
16 Andrea D. Bontrager Unzicker, “From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization Brings a 
Multilateral Agreement Against Foreign Bribery”, (1999-2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, 655 at 657 [Bontrager Unzicker]. 
17 Dimitri Vlassis, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption Origins and Negotiation 
Process”, (2002) UNAFEI, 66 Resource Material Series, 126-131 at 126 [Vlassis]. 
18 Patrick X. Delaney, “Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders”, (2007) 47 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 413 at 9 [Delaney]. 
19 Ibid. at 10. 
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needed areas, leading to poor infrastructure, health systems and education 
systems20: "[c]orruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds 
intended for development, undermining a government's ability to provide basic 
services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign direct 
investment.21".  
 
Corruption also has far reaching social and political consequences: persistent 
corruption erodes social equality, disadvantaging the vulnerable and poor. It also 
often results in an extensive distrust of political authorities, in developing and 
developed Nations alike22. Furthermore, corruption threatens the rule of law and is 
more and more connected to organized crime, terrorism, drug and human 
trafficking23: “the rule of law is dependent not only on formal rules, but also on 
cultural and institutional supports [that] are eroded through a culture of corruption, 
as institutions become tainted and the trust of citizens diminishes24”. The benefits 
in trying to prevent and reduce corruption are vast and cannot be ignored: 
 
"By reducing corruption, the quality of life for every person will 
improve; it allows society to make real progress, it establishes a 
foundation for future growth, and enables society to maintain 
provisions which, hopefully, will prevent any serious regression25". 
                                                 
20 Vlassis, supra note 17 at 126. 
21 Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Statement On The Adoption By The General 
Assembly Of The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, New York, October 31st 2003, 
available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/secretary-general-
speech.html [Date consulted: July 19th 2010].  
22 Delaney, supra note 18 at 11. 
23 Enery Quinones, “L’évolution du droit international en matière de corruption: La Convention de 
l’OCDE”, (2003) 49 Annuaire français de droit international, 563 at 563 [Quinones]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Gerald E. Caiden, "A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating Corruption", (2003-2004) 
10 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade & Trade in the Americas, 269 at 273 [Caiden]. 
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The issue of corruption received unprecedented attention in recent years and is a 
testament to the urgency of the battle against corruption26. The priority assigned to 
the adoption of effective instruments to combat corruption is revealed by the 
following five international anti-corruption instruments created within a short 
period of time27: the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions28, the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption29, the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption30, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption31, and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime32. These agreements will be analyzed alongside the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption33, which rests at the center of our analysis. 
 
This thesis attempts to assess the relevancy and effectiveness of the UNCAC. The 
                                                 
26 Rajesh R. Babu, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Critical Overview”, 
(2006) Asian African Legal Consultative Organization, New Delhi, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891898 at 2 [Babu]. 
27 These instruments were adopted between 1996 and 2003. 
28 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, December 17th 1997, available 
at: http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html [Date 
consulted: February 16th 2011] [OECD Anti-Bribery Convention or OECD Convention]. 
29 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention against Corruption, March 29th 
1996, available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html [Date consulted: 
February 16th 2011] [IACAC]. 
30 African Union, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 11 July 
2003, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493fe36a2.html [Date consulted: February 
16th 2011] [AU Corruption Convention or CPCC]. 
31 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 27 January 1999, available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/173.htm [Date consulted: February 16th 2011] 
[Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention or CLCC].  
32 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
A/RES/55/25 (2001) [UNCTOC]. 
33 UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, A/58/422 (2003) 
[UNCAC]. 
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first part of this work offers an overview of the measures adopted by the 
Convention as well as the language used in its relevant provisions. The provisions 
which will be examined include preventive measures, anti-bribery and bribery 
related provisions, international cooperation measures and the more innovative 
asset recovery provisions.  
 
The second part of this thesis illustrates two different types of challenges faced by 
the UNCAC: compliance challenges and existing multilateral anti-corruption 
treaties. While we argue that compliance is a measure of the Convention’s 
effectiveness, relevancy is measured by the need for the adopted treaty. In our 
opinion, the UNCAC cannot be qualified as relevant if it has no purpose. Giving 
an overview of other existing multilateral agreements meant to tackle corruption 
will help evaluate the need for a global anti-corruption convention. Given the 
lengthy task that is the fight against corruption, short-term results should not be the 
only measure in assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption tools. If the 
Convention is however unable to sustain compliance in the long run, then it 
cannot, in our view, be considered an effective tool. 
 
 
Part I - Analysis of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption 
“[The United Nations Convention against Corruption] is balanced, strong and pragmatic, 
and it offers a new framework for effective action and international cooperation.34” 
 
The battle against corruption has not only become more urgent, it has also become 
more obvious as the extent of its reach has become growingly apparent35. Not only 
does corruption impoverish economies, threaten democracy and undermine the 
rule of law, it channels terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking36. These 
far reaching consequences clearly indicate that the war against corruption cannot 
be fought at the national level alone37. Corruption is without a doubt a problem of 
international interest as it touches developed and developing countries alike and 
respects no borders. 
 
The UNCAC is a product of this heightened consciousness of corruption as a 
growing and indiscriminate threat. In fact, the question of a convention against 
                                                 
34 Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, supra note 21. 
35 In recent years, growing public interest has encouraged international organizations, private 
organizations and governments to commission numerous studies illustrating the effects and more 
concretely, the scale of the problem. See for example Transparency International’s annual 
“Corruption Perception Index” released in 1995, which ranks more than 150 countries, 
www.transparency.org/tools/measurement [Date consulted: March 12th 2009]. Transparency 
International (hereafter “TI”) was founded in 1993 and is a global civil society organization whose 
main goal is to tackle issues relating to corruption. TI has over ninety locally established national 
chapters. Considered a global network, these local chapters fight corruption in a number of ways, 
by bringing together relevant information from government, civil society, business and the media 
in order to promote transparency in elections, in public administration, in procurement and in 
business. TI also uses advocacy campaigns to convince governments to implement anti-corruption 
reforms (www.transparencyinternational.com).  
36 UNODC, Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption, Second edition, New 
York, 2005 at V.   
37 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, “The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective 
Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International Law”, (2000) 34 The 
International Lawyer, 149-178 at 152 [Kofele-Kale, “The Right to a Corruption-Free Society”]. 
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corruption was initially debated during the negotiations for the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime38, adopted in November of 
200039. It was agreed that even though corruption was inherent to the matters 
included in the UNCTOC and should be dealt with40, it was also far too complex a 
problem to be exhaustively covered by the Convention.  Limited provisions on 
corruption were included with the understanding that a separate treaty was to be 
envisaged in order to appropriately tackle the vast issue of corruption41. To that 
end, the General Assembly stated in 2001 that “an effective international legal 
instrument against corruption, independent of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime42” was necessary. Member States agreed 
that preserving the “spirit achieved during the negotiation process for the 
UNCTOC43” and basing the negotiation process on shared objectives and views as 
to the scope of the future convention were all crucial in guarantying the success of 
the treaty.  
 
The General Assembly established the “Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of 
a Convention against Corruption” in the summer of 2001 in Vienna, at the United 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 The UNCTOC entered into force on September 29th of 2003.  
40 Furthermore, it was also decided that corruption constitutes a crime in which organized criminal 
groups engage to fund their activities and therefore could not be overlooked in the UNCTOC. 
41 Vlassis, supra note 17 at 127. 
42 UN General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, G.A. Res. 55/61, U.N. 
GAOR, 55th Session (2001) at Agenda Item 105. See also François Vincke, “L’anti-corruption 
après la Convention de Mérida”, (2005) 85 Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 351-386 at 
363 [Vincke]. 
43 Vlassis, supra note 17 at 128. 
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Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s headquarters (hereafter “UNODC44”) and 
proceeded to develop terms of reference enabling the widest participation of 
Governments45. Apart from highlighting key issues of concern, the existing 
multilateral anti-corruption tools served as a foundation for the consensus to begin 
negotiations on a new global instrument46.  
 
A preparatory meeting for the negotiation of the convention against corruption was 
held in December of 2001 in Buenos Aires, where representatives of fifty-eight 
States gathered to discuss its contents47. The purpose was for the participating 
States to make proposals regarding various provisions to be included in the 
                                                 
44 The UNODC is now what used to be called the United Nations Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention. 
45 UN General Assembly, supra note 42, at points 5,6, and 7 respectively. An Intergovernmental 
open-ended expert group was convened and asked to prepare a draft of the terms of reference to 
serve as a basis for the negotiation of the future convention against corruption. The General 
Assembly requested that the Ad Hoc Committee consider the following as main elements for the 
drafting of the Convention: definitions; scope; protection of sovereignty; preventive measures; 
criminalization; sanctions and remedies; confiscation and seizure; jurisdiction; liability of legal 
persons; protection of witnesses and victims; promoting and strengthening international 
cooperation; preventing and combating the transfer of funds of illicit origin derived from acts of 
corruption, including the laundering of funds, and returning such funds; technical assistance; 
collection, exchange and analysis of information; and mechanisms for monitoring implementation. 
46 Philippa Webb, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global Achievement or 
Missed Opportunity?”, (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law, 191-229 at 192 [Philippa 
Webb]. Among existing anti-corruption tools were the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 
IACAC, and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention. 
47 The following States were present: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic 
of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire. See 
Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention 
against Corruption, A/AC.261/2, Buenos Aires, 4-7 December 2001 at 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/adhoc-committee-session1.html [Date 
consulted: February 13th 2011]. 
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Convention and to set a basis for further discussions and negotiations48.  Four 
issues particularly held the Parties attention during this meeting: asset recovery, 
private sector corruption, treaty implementation, and political corruption. 
Following these preparatory efforts, negotiations started in the first quarter of 2002 
and were conducted over the course of seven negotiating sessions, between 
January 21st 2002 and October 1st 2003. The Convention was finally signed in 
Merida, in December of 200349. Entering into force in December of 200550, the 
UNCAC already had 140 signatures and 50 ratifications by April of the following 
year51. 
 
                                                 
48 Lisa Landmeier et al., “Anti-Corruption International Legal Developments”, (2002) 36 The 
International Lawyer, 589 at 590 [Landmeier]. 
49 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 205. 
50 In accordance with Article 68(1) of Resolution 58/4 (UN General Assembly, United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 2003, A/58/422), the UNCAC entered into force 
ninety days after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification. 
51 The following States are Parties to the UNCAC (they have either ratified the Convention or 
acceded to it): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Georgia, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe. The full text of the Convention is available in the Annex of this work. It is also 
available electronically at the following website: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html.  
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The Convention attempts to create global anticorruption standards and obligations. 
With 148 Parties, the Convention’s claim to universality, some argue, positions it 
as the leading international anti-corruption tool52. In fact, the list of Parties 
includes States that have not yet ratified any other international treaty dealing with 
corruption53. Furthermore, because the Convention has been adhered to by a more 
diverse and a higher number of international players than any other anti-corruption 
instrument, it is more likely to create an international framework for cooperation 
in investigations and prosecutions, therefore rendering it more effective in 
practice. It is also considered the most detailed of any international anti-corruption 
treaty, containing seventy-one articles: “the UN Convention is by far the broadest 
in scope, as well as the most detailed, complex, and far-reaching of any of the 
anticorruption treaties to date”54.  
 
An analysis of the Convention and the negotiation process leading up to its 
adoption are necessary steps in order to study its relevancy and effectiveness.  As 
is often the case, the negotiation rounds demonstrate those areas of the Convention 
deemed to be controversial, the concessions made, and the differing positions 
among Member States regarding the inclusion of certain offences. These issues are 
important in determining its effectiveness and will be highlighted throughout our 
                                                 
52 Lucinda A. Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: The Globalization of 
Anticorruption Standards”, Conference of the International Bar Association, International 
Chamber of Commerce, and OECD, “The Awakening Giant of AC Enforcement” London, England 
4-5 May 2006 at 3 [Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”]. 
53 For example, the People’s Republic of China ratified the UNCAC on January 13th 2006. 
54 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 3. 
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overview of the Convention. Furthermore, a clear understanding of the UNCAC's 
many provisions on corruption is also necessary in order to fully assess its 
contribution to the existing legal anti-corruption framework. 
 
The purpose of the UNCAC is threefold:  
 
“(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat 
corruption more efficiently and effectively; 
(b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and 
technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against 
corruption, including in asset recovery; 
(c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of 
public affairs and public property.55” 
Four main areas can be identified in the Convention, each divided into separate 
chapters: preventive measures, criminalization, international cooperation, and asset 
recovery56. These issues are the Convention's founding pillars57: 
 
 “At the core of the negotiating process was the desire of all 
delegations to find an appropriate balance in the new instrument, in 
order to make sure that adequate and proportionate attention was 
devoted to prevention, criminalization, international cooperation 
and asset recovery.58”  
 
This section will not only give a brief overview of the Convention’s content, it will 
also try to give a preliminary assessment as to whether or not it has any “teeth59” 
                                                 
55 UNCAC, art. 1. 
56 Ibid., Chapters II, III, IV and V. 
57 UNODC Update, V.03-89343, December 2003, p.3, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/newsletter_2003-12-01_1.pdf [Date consulted: February 2nd 2011]. 
58 Vlassis, supra note 17 at 130. 
59 General Assembly Approves International Treaty Against Corruption, UN News Service, 31 
October 2003 (quoting Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC’s Executive Director). See also Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, 1995 at 29 [Chayes & 
Chayes] (the expression refers to a form of coercive enforcement). 
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by attempting to interpret the language used. As will be demonstrated, the 
obligations imposed upon the State Parties by the Convention are drafted using 
terms that vary from highly discretionary to mandatory. 
 
 
Chapter I - Preventive Measures 
 
The multifaceted nature of corruption and the need to eliminate it in a sustainable 
manner (as opposed to a short term fix) require the pursuit of extensive preventive 
measures60. Where such measures are lacking, reliance is habitually placed on 
defined offences and sanctions in cases of violation. However, this type of 
approach does not serve as a strong deterrent in practice61, but rather as a band-aid 
to a bleeding wound. Prevention is therefore necessary in order to deny criminal 
activity its breeding ground and to cut off corruption before it can take root. The 
UNCAC’s provisions on preventive measures are applicable to both the public and 
private sectors62. In this respect, the Convention goes much further than previous 
anti-corruption treaties, such as the AU Corruption Convention and the IACAC63.   
 
                                                 
60 Ben W. Heineman and Fritz Heimann, “The Long War Against Corruption”, (2006), Volume 85, 
Issue 3 Foreign Affairs, 75 at 77 [Heineman & Heimann]. 
61 Indira Carr, “The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a Real Difference to the 
Quality of Life of Millions?”, (2006) 3 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, 3 at 40 
[Carr]. 
62 Thomas R. Snider and Won Kidane, “Combating Corruption Through International Law in 
Africa: A Comparative Analysis”, (2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal, 691 at 718 [Snider 
& Kidane]. 
63 UNCAC, arts.5-14; Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 
at 5. 
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Among the UNCAC’s preventive public sector measures is the requirement that 
Member States ensure the existence of independent anti-corruption bodies capable 
of implementing, coordinating and overseeing anti-corruption policies:  
 
“1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental 
principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or 
bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as: 
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this 
Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the 
implementation of those policies; 
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of 
corruption. 
2. Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in 
paragraph 1of this article the necessary independence, in accordance 
with the fundamental principles of its legal system, to enable the 
body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free 
from any undue influence. The necessary material resources and 
specialized staff, as well as the training that such staff may require to 
carry out their functions, should be provided…64” 
 
The importance of such bodies or agencies cannot be stressed enough: they are the 
intermediary between governments and public opinion, making their political 
independence that much more important65. If they are neither transparent nor held 
accountable to the public, their impact becomes trivial. The result is similar in 
situations where anti-corruption agency employees dare not criticize government 
conduct for fear of being removed or demoted66. In light of these concerns, the 
UNCAC requires that State Parties confer upon these agencies the necessary 
independence in order to ensure the absence of any undue influence67.  
 
                                                 
64 UNCAC, ibid., art.6. 
65 Jeremy Pope and Frank Vogl, “Making Anticorruption Agencies More Effective”, (2000) 37 
Finance and Development, 6-9 at 6 [Pope & Vogl]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 UNCAC, art.6(2). 
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At first glance the article seems to be phrased in legally binding terms. However, 
the use of the stringent term “shall” is offset by the phrase “in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its legal system”. In light of this clause, opinions 
regarding the mandatory versus permissive quality of the language are divided68. 
In our opinion, it is quite clear that the provision contains a “qualifying clause69”, 
allowing for a potential escape route for Member States. What at first glance may 
seem as a result oriented obligation may prove to be deceiving; the result in each 
case will be different and subject to each Member State’s existing legal structure, 
which may cause uneven implementation among Parties. The following passage 
explains this unevenness in the field of international penal law:  
 
“[B]eaucoup d’instruments internationaux laissent pour leur mise 
en œuvre une marge importante. On y trouve souvent des 
formulations du genre : «chaque partie adoptera les mesures 
législatives et autres qui s’avéreraient nécessaires pour faire en 
sorte que… », qui visent à l’équivalence fonctionnelle plutôt qu’à 
l’uniformité […] Il n’est donc pas surprenant que les initiatives 
internationales en matière pénale soient mises en œuvre d’une 
façon hétérogène qui reflète en général les différentes traditions 
juridiques et institutionnelles dont relèvent les systèmes nationaux 
de justice criminelle70.” 
 
The most controversial public sector measure created by the UNCAC is related to 
the oversight of campaign finance71. It calls upon Member States to enhance 
                                                 
68 Indeed, some authors consider that the provision is written in mandatory terms (see Snider & 
Kidane, supra note 62 at 707), whereas others maintain it is permissive in nature (see Low, “The 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 5; Philippa Webb, supra note 46 
at 206). 
69 Philippa Webb, ibid. at 206 (the author states that “[t]hese qualifying clauses provide a potential 
escape clause for reluctant legislators”). 
70 Peter Hägel, “L’incertaine mondialisation du contrôle – La France et l’Allemagne dans la lutte 
contre la corruption et le blanchiment”, (2005) 29 Déviance et Société,  243 at 250 [Hägel]. 
71 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 5. 
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transparency in the funding of political parties and of candidates for elected 
office72. However novel in its nature, the obligation has a discretionary quality, 
allowing members to “consider” taking measures with respect to political funding:  
 
“2. Each State Party shall also consider adopting appropriate 
legislative and administrative measures, consistent with the 
objectives of this Convention and in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prescribe criteria 
concerning candidature for and election to public office. 
3. Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this 
Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of 
its domestic law, to enhance transparency in the funding of 
candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the 
funding of political parties.73” 
 
Other preventive public sector requirements include provisions concerning the 
establishment of transparent public procurement systems74, public financing 
accountability measures75, merit-based systems for the selection of civil servants76, 
and the application of codes of conduct for public officials77. The clause “in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system” is present in all of 
these articles, once again affording Member States a certain level of discretion. 
 
Provisions relating to the judiciary as well as prosecution strive to prevent 
“opportunities for corruption”, using very broad language: 
 
“Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial 
role in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance 
                                                 
72 UNCAC, art.7(3). 
73 Ibid., art.7(2), (3). 
74 Ibid., art.9. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., art.7. 
77 Ibid., art.8. 
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with the fundamental principles of its legal system and without 
prejudice to judicial independence, take measures to strengthen 
integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among 
members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules with 
respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary.78” 
 
Other articles call on Member States to enhance transparency in their public 
administration and to ensure the public’s participation in decision-making 
processes79. These obligations are also written in general terms, giving Member 
States latitude to interpret their obligations as they wish80. 
 
Private sector corruption was most definitely a hot topic of discussion during the 
negotiations among Member States, as previous international treaties had remained 
silent on this matter81. Regional instruments had however already gone in this 
direction, for example in Europe and Africa82. Given the fact that the line between 
the public and private sectors is becoming increasingly blurred as a result of 
outsourcing and privatization, the rapid growth of the private sector in some 
countries83 and the growing influence of multinational corporations, it would have 
been negligent to refuse to criminalize corruption in both sectors84. The adoption 
                                                 
78 Ibid., art.11. Emphasis added. 
79 Ibid., arts.10 and 13. 
80 Carlos Fernandez De Casadevante Y Romani, Sovereignty and Interpretation of International 
Norms, Springer, Madrid, 2007 at 42 [Fernandez De Casadevante Y Romani] (due to the absence 
of specific obligations, they are described as “good will obligations” and characterized as having a 
significant margin for discretionary or subjective interpretation. The provisions have a “low value 
of enforceability” for Member States); Vincke, supra note 42 at 364.  
81 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 213.  
82 See the European Union Joint Action on Corruption in the Private Sector, 98/742/JHA (1995) at 
arts.2-3 [Joint Action], as well as the AU Corruption Convention at art.4. 
83 This is the case for example in China, see the Asian Development Bank’s Annual Report from 
2006: www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Annual_Report/2006/ADB-AR2006-East-Asia.PDF [Date 
consulted: March 23rd 2009].  
84 Irwin Arieff, UN Anti-Corruption Pact Raises Last-Minute Alarms, Reuters, June 29th 2003 
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of anti-corruption measures in the private sector in the UNCAC, similar to those 
applicable to the public sector, recognizes the gradual convergence of both 
sectors85. 
 
The preventive measures that are focused on the private sector pertain to auditing 
and accounting standards as well as to the enforcement of penalties (whether civil, 
administrative or criminal). Although the terminology used in these provisions is 
broad, at least an important number of measures are proposed. However, countries 
are once again called upon to uphold such measures without prejudice to the 
fundamental principles of their national law86. More forceful language is used 
regarding tax deductions. In effect, Article 12(4) of the Convention requires that 
Member States prohibit the tax deductibility of expenses that constitute bribes: 
 
“4. Each State Party shall disallow the tax deductibility of expenses 
that constitute bribes, the latter being one of the constituent 
elements of the offences established in accordance with articles 15 
and 16 of this Convention and, where appropriate, other expenses 
incurred in furtherance of corrupt conduct.”87  
 
Also in the private sector, anti-money laundering measures (hereafter “AML”) 
take the UNCAC further than prior international instruments88. Whereas previous 
instruments focused on the criminalization of AML, the Convention calls for 
preventive measures such as the creation of national regulatory regimes for banks 
                                                                                                                                      
[Arieff] (comments made by Jeremy Pope of Transparency International).  
85 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 215. 
86 UNCAC, art.12. 
87 Ibid., para.4. 
88 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 6. 
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and non-bank financial institutions89 regarding customer identification, record-
keeping and reporting of suspicious activity90. The language which imposes these 
obligations is mandatory: “[each] state party shall: institute a comprehensive 
domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial 
institutions […]91”. Nevertheless, the establishment of a financial intelligence unit 
equipped to collect and analyze information potentially linked to money 
laundering is written in more permissive language, the Convention calling on 
Member States to “consider” the creation of such units92. This same wording is 
used in requiring the implementation of measures to detect cross-border cash and 
negotiable instrument movements as well as to ensure that financial institutions 
assess the originators’ or ordering parties’ true identity93. 
 
Having created a number of measures aimed at preventing corruption, the 
Convention then tackles the heart of the issue with a detailed list of specific 
offences in the following Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Non-bank financial institutions include insurance companies, mortgage providers, credit unions 
and money service businesses. They provide banking services without meeting the legal definition 
of a bank. They are therefore not regulated by the same framework as banks. 
90 UNCAC, art.14 (1) a). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., para. b). 
93 Ibid., para. (2), (3). 
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Chapter II - Criminalization and Law Enforcement 
 
The UNCAC's Chapter entitled “Criminalization and Law Enforcement” 
constitutes the core of the Convention and defines various offences as well as 
provisions detailing their application and enforcement94. This section will attempt 
to analyze articles under the Convention which focus on offences such as bribery, 
embezzlement, money laundering, and bribery-related crimes, as well as the 
measures set out to enforce them.  
 
Section I - Criminalization 
 
There is a wide array of opinions on what constitutes public corruption, and some 
are more inclusive or broad than others. There is indeed a lack of uniformity 
among international instruments regarding the scope of the crime, and the often 
broad or unspecific language allows for differing interpretations. This complicates 
harmonization efforts, as Member States will have differing interpretations of the 
offence, causing them to apply different legal standards and solutions. It has 
however been widely maintained that public corruption refers almost exclusively 
to bribery and it is viewed as the “most identified form of corruption95”. In fact, 
past international anti-corruption tools have relied on bribery as the standard 
                                                 
94 Ibid., arts.15-42. 
95 Ruth Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific: The Potential Impact of the UN Convention 
Against Corruption on Pacific Island States”, (2005) 2 New Zealand Yearbook of International 
Law, 207-277 at 225 [Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”]. 
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offence of public corruption96. It can be contended that bribery has over time 
become almost synonymous with corruption. This unfortunate outcome restricts 
the scope and reach of anti-corruption tools, ignoring other activities enabling 
personal enrichment through the misuse of authority and which therefore fall 
under the breadth of corruption97.  
 
The UNCAC innovates by criminalizing corruption in its wider meaning98, 
including bribery but also other bribery-related offences such as embezzlement99, 
trading in influence100, abuse of functions101, illicit enrichment102, money 
laundering103, and obstruction of justice104. 
 
i. Anti-Bribery Provisions 
 
According to experts105, there are three principal justifications for criminalizing 
                                                 
96 Such as the IACAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention. 
97 Peter J. Henning, “Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption 
Conventions and United States Law”, (2001) 18 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 793 at 796 [Henning]. 
98 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, “Change or the Illusion of Change: Against Official Corruption in Africa”, 
(2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review, 697 at 723 [Kofele-Kale, “Change or the 
Illusion of Change”]. 
99 UNCAC, arts.17 and 22. 
100 Ibid., art.18. 
101 Ibid., art.19. 
102 Ibid., art.20. 
103 Ibid., art.23. 
104 Ibid., art.25. 
105 Guy Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, (2001) 72 International Review of 
Penal Law, 892-937 at 894 [Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”]; Henning, 
supra note 97 at 803. 
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bribery at the domestic and international levels106. The first justification offered is 
the need to uphold the integrity of public administration as it influences the 
public’s view of society. Indeed, society’s trust in governance mechanisms is 
essential in fostering the democratic society model. This ‘need’ creates a beneficial 
cycle in that the public nature of the officials’ job plays a role in preventing bribe 
taking. For instance, the risk of removal from office may in some cases prevent the 
acceptance of a bribe107. A second justification in defense of criminalizing bribery 
is the need to protect the proper functioning of public administration. Although 
this principle sounds similar to the first, it refers to efficiency rather than integrity 
(whereas efficiency refers to the internal functioning of public administration, 
integrity refers to the appearance of proper functioning)108. Finally, safeguarding 
fair competition and transparency are paramount in ensuring that government 
funds are not allocated to undeserving bidders109.   
 
                                                 
106 The criminalization of bribery may seem obvious at first glance; however it is not a given in 
some cultures that have a more lenient view of bribery. Some authors suggest that criminalizing all 
forms of bribery amounts to cultural imperialism and is an “unwarranted intrusion into the culture 
and affairs of other nations” (Delaney, supra note 18 at 20).  Precision and nuance are given to this 
argument in the following passage: “The problem is not that some cultures embrace bribery and 
corruption – indeed, no culture appears to do so. Rather, the difficulty of blanket global rules and 
assessments rests in more subtle differences in particularized applications of the generic anti-
bribery norm, particularly given countervailing social functions of the same gratuities in one 
culture that would be considered unacceptable in another. That is, the world very likely could 
converge on a set of conceptual standards for theoretically defining corruption. It probably cannot 
agree on the application of the standards in a wide variety of subtly differentiated cases […]” 
(Steven R. Salbu, “Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative 
Global Village”, (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law, 233 at 241 [Salbu, “Extraterritorial 
Restriction of Bribery”]).  See also Henning, supra note 97 at 794, n. 5. 
107 Stephen R. Salbu, “A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change and Transnational 
Bribery”, (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal, 657 at 676 [Salbu, "A Delicate Balance”]. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 894. 
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The most commonly accepted definition of bribery is “the abuse of public office 
for private gain110”. The term ‘abuse’ refers to the supply and demand sides of 
bribery111. The supply side concerns the offering of a bribe, whereas the demand 
side refers to its acceptance or request112. Within the UNCAC, both the bribery of 
national and foreign public officials is criminalized113, and both offences are 
defined using mandatory terms114:  
 
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally:  
(a) the promise, offering or giving, (...) directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act 
or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties.115” 
 
The specific actions that are criminalized are the offering, giving, promising, 
acceptance, and solicitation of any “undue advantage”116. Unfortunately the 
Convention does not define the notion of “undue advantage”. It is however agreed 
that it covers any type of advantage, whether material or immaterial, monetary or 
                                                 
110 Beare, supra note 3 at 89. 
111 Also commonly referred to as active and passive bribery (see Stessens, “The International Fight 
Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 901). 
112 UNCAC, art.15 a) and b) (See also Salbu, “A Delicate Balance”, supra note 107 at 671). 
113 Ibid., arts.15 and 16. 
114 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 7. 
115 UNCAC, art.15. Emphasis added. This article criminalizes the bribery of national public 
officials, touching domestic law. The offence is defined identically at Article 16 (with the 
necessary adjustments) for the bribery of foreign public officials and of public international 
organizations. 
116 UNCAC, ibid., arts.15, 16 and 21. 
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non-pecuniary117. Previous national and multilateral instruments criminalizing 
bribery distinguished pecuniary benefits from favors and other types of 
advantages118. It can therefore be argued that the Convention encompasses a wider 
array of advantages, as it “clearly refers to something to which the recipient 
concerned was not entitled119”. The bribe must be carried out in the individual’s 
official capacity, “in the exercise of his or her official duties”120. The illicit 
advantage need not be destined to the official, but any third party, whether a 
person or an entity, such as a family member or an organization of which the 
official is a member121.  
 
The provision criminalizing the bribery of national public officials uses strongly 
binding terms: the Parties to the Convention must adopt legislative measures 
targeting supply and demand bribery122. An important concern with regard to the 
article’s application is the definition of “public official” as defined in Article 2(a) 
of the Convention123. It is a semi-autonomous definition in that it defines the 
notion regardless of domestic law, but in addition it allows for the consideration of 
local definitions:  
 
                                                 
117 Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 904; Martin Polaine, 
“Criminalizing the Bribery of National and Foreign Public Officials”, (2005) Background Paper, 
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, 3rd Master Training Seminar, 
Pakistan, 14-17 February 2005 at 14 [Polaine]. 
118 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 720. For example, the FCPA, the IACAC and the AU 
Corruption Convention. 
119 Polaine, supra note 117 at 14. 
120 UNCAC, arts.15 and 16. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., art.15. 
123 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 8. 
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“[…] (i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative 
or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or elected, 
whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, 
irrespective of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who 
performs a public function, including for a public agency or public 
enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic 
law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of 
that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a “public official” 
in the domestic law of a State Party. However, for the purpose of 
some specific measures contained in Chapter II of this Convention, 
“public official” may mean any person who performs a public 
function or provides a public service as defined in the domestic law 
of the State Party […]124” 
 
The definition applies to all government branches, namely the legislative, 
executive, administrative, and judicial branches. The officials need not be 
permanently employed or remunerated in order to fall under the scope of the 
definition125. Unfortunately the Convention does not define the term “public 
enterprise”, meaning that its interpretation will be left to the discretion of each 
Member State. 
 
The bribery of foreign public officials as well as those of public international 
organizations is covered in Article 16 of the Convention: 
 
“1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when 
committed intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign 
public official or an official of a public international organization, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself 
or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in 
order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in 
relation to the conduct of international business. 
2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal 
offence, when committed intentionally, the solicitation or 
                                                 
124 UNCAC, art.2 (a)(iii). Emphasis added. 
125 Ibid., para.(i). 
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acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public 
international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the 
exercise of his or her official duties.126” 
 
The supply and demand sides of bribery have both been criminalized in respect to 
foreign public officials, but the two offences are not treated equally. The supply 
side requires criminalization using the terms “shall adopt”, whereas the demand 
side need only be “considered” as an offence127. The choice of terms reflects the 
influence of jurisdictional issues: the demand side, holding foreign countries 
accountable, is criminalized using more discretionary terminology.  
 
Many international instruments have focused merely on the supply aspect of 
bribery128. Reasons for the sparse criminalization of passive bribery in the past 
have had more to do with legal issues such as enforcement, implementation, and 
jurisdiction, rather than political or social considerations. It is more feasible to 
control the offering of a bribe through extra-territorial legislation than it is to 
control the actions of a foreign official: 
 
“Transnational laws that attack the demand side of bribery are 
feasible, but jurisdictional impediments create additional hurdles 
that are not applicable to supply-side legislation regulating domestic 
firms. Outlawing foreign officials’ acceptance of bribes would 
require multilateral treaties that confer the necessary jurisdictional 
authority. However, these efforts would prove frustrating. Those 
nations that would participate in that kind of treaty arrangement 
                                                 
126 Ibid., art.16. Emphasis added. 
127 Ibid., paras.1-2. 
128 David A. Gantz, “Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery”, (1997-1998) 18 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 457 at 480 [Gantz]. There are however 
multilateral instruments that criminalize both the supply and demand sides of bribery, such as the 
AU Corruption Convention and the IACAC. 
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would probably be committed to fighting corruption, making 
extraterritorial intervention unnecessary. In contrast, those nations 
that refuse to participate may lack a commitment to fight 
transnational corruption. 129” 
 
The ‘jurisdictional impediment’ mentioned in the above citation refers to the lack 
of enthusiasm on the part of States towards initiatives aimed at criminalizing the 
actions of another country’s public officials, as this would clearly impede 
sovereignty130.  
 
Before the adoption of the UNCAC, it had been argued that legislators should 
consider drafting passive bribery provisions to complement the already existing 
provisions against supply-side bribery131. The following explanation may help to 
understand why the UNCAC's provisions are not more stringent in regards to the 
solicitation of bribes: “corruption is like adultery: ninety percent of it is a matter of 
opportunity. If you eliminate the opportunities, you eliminate the crime132”. 
                                                 
129 Salbu, “A Delicate Balance”, supra note 107 at 685. 
130 Sovereignty is defined as the power of a State over its territory, government, and people. It is 
limited by its physical borders (Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 228). A more complete definition 
explains the extent and sacredness of this concept: “[…] la souveraineté territoriale, en assurant à 
chaque État le droit de choisir et de développer librement son système politique, social, 
économique et culturel, constitue la plus haute expression de la liberté et de l’indépendance 
politique des peuples et des nations et commande conséquemment non seulement le respect absolu 
du principe de l’inviolabilité des frontières mais aussi du principe de non-ingérence: aucun État n’a 
le droit d’intervenir directement ou indirectement, pour quelque motif que ce soit, dans les affaires 
intérieures ou extérieures d’un État et ce principe exclut non seulement la force armée, mais aussi 
toute autre forme d’ingérence, comme des mesures coercitives de caractère politique ou 
économique, qui serait attentatoire à la personnalité de l’État.” (Jean-Maurice Arbour et Geneviève 
Parent, Droit International Public, Éditions Yvon Blais, Montréal, 2006 at 265 [Arbour & Parent]). 
Some examples of legislative application of this principle can be seen in the African Union’s 
Constitutive Act at Article 4, the Charter of the Organization of American States at Article 21 and 
in the UNCAC at Article 4.  
131 Authors such as Stephen R. Salbu and Guy Stessens shared this opinion. See Salbu, “A Delicate 
Balance”, supra note 107 at 678; Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra 
note 105 at 903. 
132 Gantz, supra note 128 at 480. 
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Although this may be logical in theory, it is our belief that a persistent demand for 
bribery will encourage its illicit counterpart. Indeed, many acts of bribery are 
initiated by public officials133. The reason for this is simple. The officials are the 
ones with the upper hand, with the position of power. It is therefore more likely 
that they would be the ones to broach the subject of bribes134. 
 
Similar to previous conventions135, the UNCAC’s definition of what constitutes a 
foreign public official is completely autonomous, as it does not call for State 
Parties to consider domestic law. In comparing the definitions of ‘public official’ 
and ‘foreign public official’, it is clear that the latter is broader because it contains 
no reference to national law. For instance, a foreign public official could be 
prosecuted in a situation where, if it were a matter of internal or national conduct, 
the act would not be punishable136. Such an outcome could have serious far-
reaching implications for State sovereignty. However, in addition to the fact that 
the bribery of foreign public officials is phrased in a non-mandatory manner, it is 
unlikely to apply to the demand aspect of bribery because the definition disregards 
domestic law137. Simply put, it is difficult to conceive that a foreign public official 
should be punished for passive corruption when the reproached conduct is not 
                                                 
133 Salbu, “A Delicate Balance”, supra note 107 at 686 (the author suggests this as a speculative 
argument). 
134 Taking this argument further, some argue that highly corrupt officials purposely instigate a 
feeling of uncertainty in order to increase the offer of bribes (see Nichols, supra note 10 at 632). 
135 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention also contains an autonomous definition of foreign public 
official, ensuring that the offence is prosecuted regardless of local law definitions and providing for 
a lower burden of proof on the prosecuting party. See Stessens, “The International Fight Against 
Corruption”, supra note 105 at 911.  
136 Stessens, ibid.. 
137 UNCAC, art.16(2). 
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prohibited in the official’s own country138. 
 
The meaning of “foreign public official” is stated as:  
 
“[…] any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative or 
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; 
and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, 
including for a public agency or public enterprise; […]139”  
An “official of a public international organization” is held to be: “an international 
civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an organization to act on 
behalf of that organization140”. This development reflects the fact that public 
international organizations have a significant economic impact in developing 
countries, through development projects and humanitarian aid141. Other tools such 
as the AU Corruption Convention and the IACAC omitted to include this category 
of individuals142.  
 
The debate on private sector corruption during the UNCAC’s negotiation process 
highlighted strong opposing opinions. More and more public oriented activities are 
being transferred to the private sector through outsourcing and privatization, 
blurring the line between sectors. This convergence not only calls for anti-
corruption measures, but may potentially create fraud or bribery opportunities in 
the very act of transferring substantial budgets and regulatory powers from one 
                                                 
138 Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 912.  
139 UNCAC, art.2 b). 
140 Ibid., para.(c). 
141 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 733. 
142 Ibid. 
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sector to another143. Furthermore, multinational corporations have a significant 
economic influence that must be included in any international anti-corruption 
strategy if it is to be effective144.  
 
During the UNCAC's negotiation, the European Union held strong in its drive to 
include a private-to-private provision, backed by the Group of Latin America and 
Caribbean States who stated that “adopting a limited approach would adversely 
affect the implementation of the future convention145”. These States were of the 
opinion that targeting only the public sector would have a detrimental effect on the 
Convention’s success and ability to tackle public corruption: “Tolerance of private 
corruption inevitably makes it more difficult to prevent and combat public 
corruption146”. On the other hand, the United States’ opinion against the inclusion 
of a purely private sector provision was forceful, despite their own existing 
national legislation regarding bribery in the private sector as applying to private-
to-public situations147. The fear was that “extending the treaty to the private sector 
could create a private right of action opening the door to lawsuits in foreign courts 
[...]148”. A compromise was reached where private-to-private corruption was 
                                                 
143 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 212; Babu, supra note 26 at 19; Vlassis, supra note 17 at 156; 
Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 914. 
144 Ibid. at 213. 
145 Report From the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption 
Fourth Session Vienna, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption, A/AC.261/9 (2003) at 3; Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 213. 
146 Antonio Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and its Impact on 
International Companies”, Chair of Economics and Ethics, Research Paper No 656, October 2006 
at 9 [Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”]. 
147 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) nationally criminalizes private-to-public bribes paid 
abroad (see infra note 356). See also Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 213. 
148 Arieff, supra note 84. 
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ultimately criminalized, but was not phrased in mandatory terms149. 
 
In the past, the phenomenon of private corruption has been commonly dealt with 
through civil law proceedings, not criminal law150. Within the UNCAC, private 
sector bribery is criminalized in Article 21. The obligation is however framed in 
non-binding language: 
 
“Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures […]: 
(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in any 
capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself 
or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her 
duties, act or refrain from acting; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for 
a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for 
another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, 
act or refrain from acting.151” 
 
Both the supply and demand sides are criminalized, although using non-mandatory 
wording152. Nevertheless, it is believed that many countries might still adopt such 
measures by following the examples of the Council of Europe and the European 
Union153. Furthermore, many States that have undergone significant privatization 
have come to realize that bribery in the private sector should be criminalized on 
the same level as public sector bribery154. 
                                                 
149 UNCAC, art.21 (this refers to the terms “shall consider adopting”). 
150 Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 914. 
151 UNCAC, art.21. Emphasis added. 
152 Ibid., paras (a) and (b). 
153 Art.7 of The Council of Europe Corruption Convention requires the criminalization of 
commercial bribery and the EU has decided that States should do the same. See Joint Action, supra 
note 82. 
154 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 10. 
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ii. Other Bribery related Provisions 
 
The UNCAC criminalizes bribery related offences in both the public and private 
sectors, such as trading in influence, the abuse of functions or position, illicit 
enrichment, embezzlement, and the laundering of proceeds of crime155. 
 
a) Trading in Influence 
 
Trading in influence refers to the act of paying public officials in order to 
influence the decision-making process inherent to their functions. In such cases, 
the influence is used to obtain an undue advantage for a third party: “the offence 
involves using ones’ real or supposed influence to obtain undue advantage for a 
third person from an administrative or public authority of that State156”. 
 
In an attempt to deal with what may be described as “background corruption157”, 
Article 18 criminalizes trading in influence using discretionary terms and 
considers supply and demand in parallel: 
 
“Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, 
when committed intentionally: 
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other 
person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that 
the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed 
influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public 
authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original 
                                                 
155 UNCAC, arts.18, 19, 20, 22, and 23. 
156 Babu, supra note 26 at 12. 
157 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 342. 
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instigator of the act or for any other person; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other 
person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or 
herself or for another person in order that the public official or the 
person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to 
obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State 
Party an undue advantage.158” 
This provision is considered controversial because of its wide scope; it may apply 
to lobbying, as it targets transactions carried out with “any other person”159. 
Although the provision's application may be wide, it is framed in non-mandatory 
terms. 
 
b) Abuse of Functions 
 
The abuse of functions is described in Article 19 of the Convention as “the 
performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public 
official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an 
undue advantage”160. In this scenario, there is no exchange between individuals, 
contrary to the act of bribery161. The provision uses non-mandatory language 
stating that each Member State “shall consider adopting” these measures, making 
it a discretionary offence.  
 
It should be stressed that this prohibition applies only to public officials and that it 
                                                 
158 Emphasis added. 
159 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 9. 
160 This provision criminalizes one aspect of the demand side of bribery, as it applies exclusively to 
public officials. 
161 Carr, supra note 61 at 23. 
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therefore does not directly touch companies or their employees162. Article 19 of 
the UNCAC has a larger application than the bribery provisions, as it also 
condemns acts where a public official intentionally attempts or seeks to gain an 
undue advantage by using his or her position, even without ever receiving the 
advantage163. The approach is noteworthy in view of the fact that the provision’s 
requirements are independent to those included in the Convention’s anti-bribery 
provisions: "[t]his approach is distinguishable because it requires a violation of 
law independent of the violation of the same anti-bribery provisions that are the 
sources of responsibility under the solicitation provision164".  
 
c) Illicit Enrichment  
 
Article 20 of the Convention creates an offence in situations where there is a 
significant increase in the assets of a public official that cannot be justified by his 
or her income:  
 
“Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its 
legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a 
criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, 
that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he 
or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful 
income.165” 
 
The subject of illicit enrichment has provoked much debate in the context of 
                                                 
162 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 10. 
163 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 342. 
164 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 726. 
165 Emphasis added. 
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previous conventions such as the AU Corruption Convention and the IACAC, in 
that the offence tends to shift the burden of proof to the defendant166. This gives 
investigative authorities an advantage by requiring that they prove only a 
substantial increase in assets, making it easier for inexperienced law enforcement 
officers to investigate and prosecute such cases167. Preferring the common assets 
disclosure requirement found in the Asset Recovery Chapter of the Convention, 
one author criticizes this type of provision168: 
 
“It is highly doubtful that compromising the fundamental principle 
of the presumption of innocence in the interest of combating 
unexplained material gains by government officials is a desirable 
course. This is particularly true in Africa where, as the AU 
Corruption Convention suggests, the crime of corruption is directly 
linked with the rule of law and good governance. In fact, it directly 
conflicts with the principles enshrined under recognized universal 
human rights instruments as well as the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. The implementation of this provision as 
written in the domestic sphere should not be encouraged, because it 
might mean prescribing a remedy that is worse than the ailment.169” 
 
However, other experts believe that the restriction imposed on individual rights 
may be legitimate, as long as the breach is proportionate to the seriousness of the 
problem170. As corruption is a grave social problem, shifting the burden of proof 
onto the defendant can be deemed an appropriate response. Some countries raised 
constitutional difficulties with this provision during negotiations, which may 
                                                 
166 Carr, supra note 61 at 23. 
167 Ibid., at 24. When considering the absence of resources and technical expertise in many 
developing countries, this advantage is considerable.  
168 Referring to provisions similar to art.52(5) of the UNCAC. 
169 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 729. 
170 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, “Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in Combating 
Economic Crimes”, (2006) 40 The International Lawyer, 909 at 944 [Kofele-Kale, “Presumed 
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36
explain why the text of the provision starts with the phrase “[s]ubject to its 
constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system171”. 
 
d) Embezzlement 
 
The “embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public 
official” is an offence created by article 17 of the Convention. As with the 
provisions criminalizing bribery, embezzlement in the public sector is phrased 
using mandatory wording: 
 
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed 
intentionally, the embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit 
of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds 
or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public 
official by virtue of his or her position.172” 
 
The Convention contains an equivalent offence in respect to embezzlement in the 
private sector, although it has a non-mandatory quality using the terms “shall 
consider” as opposed to “shall adopt”173. Both provisions regarding embezzlement 
and diversion of property apply only to domestic actions and do not concern 
transnational corruption per se174.  
 
 
                                                 
171 UNCAC, art.20. Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 23. 
172 UNCAC, ibid., art.17. 
173 Ibid., art. 22. 
174 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 726. 
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e) Money Laundering 
 
Money laundering is generally defined as “the recycling of criminally derived 
funds through normal financial system operations with a view to making the funds 
available for future legitimate (or illegitimate) use175”. In simpler terms, it is “a 
process which obscures the origin of money and its source176”. Although the term 
is widely used, there are many definitions, perhaps due to differences in State 
policies, priorities or academic perspectives177. It is also defined as “the process of 
manipulating legally or illegally acquired wealth in a way that obscures its 
existence, origin or ownership for the purpose of avoiding law enforcement178”. 
Because legislation differs considerably among jurisdictions, money laundering 
cannot be effectively tackled on a unilateral or bilateral basis179. An international 
instrument enhances the harmonization of tools allowing for the crime to be 
tackled more effectively180.  
                                                 
175 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 242. The Financial Transactions 
and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (an independent financial intelligence agency created in 
2000) refers to the following definition: “any act or attempted act to disguise the source of money 
or assets derived from criminal activity”. Furthermore, it illustrates three recognized stages in the 
laundering process: (1) “placement” which involves placing the proceeds of crime in the financial 
system, (2) “layering” which involves converting the proceeds of crime into another form and 
creating complex layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail and the source and 
ownership of funds, and finally (3) “integration” which involves placing the laundered proceeds 
back into the economy to create the perception of legitimacy. See FINTRAC’s website: 
http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/guide/Guide1/1-eng.asp#221 [Date consulted: July 
16th 2008]. 
176 Barry A. K. Rider, “Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption”, (2007) 10 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 5-32 at 15 [Rider]. 
177 Heba Shams, “The Fight Against Extraterritorial Corruption and the Use of Money Laundering 
Control”, (2001) 7 Law and Business Review of the Americas, 85 at 108 [Shams]. 
178 Ibid. at 109. 
179 Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance – The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000 at 246 [Shelton]. 
180 Okogbule gives an example of a common Nigerian money-laundering scheme whereby public 
officers incorporate companies and use them as beneficiaries of fake contracts. Many millions of 
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As an offence, money laundering was criminalized for the first time in 1986 by the 
United States and the United Kingdom181. On an international level, the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances182 first criminalized money laundering in 1988, setting the framework 
for future global instruments183.  
 
The Vienna Convention of 1988 does not expressly use the terms “money 
laundering”, but rather refers to each underlying element of the crime184. 
Interestingly, the definition of the elements is similar to that of the UNCAC’s, 
apart from the fact that it applies only to property derived solely from drug 
trafficking offences185. Because the offence applies only to drug-related crimes, 
the Vienna Convention of 1988 is limited in scope. It does however cover many 
‘manipulations’ of property “whether to conceal its origin, location, disposition, 
movement, ownership or any other rights186”. Moreover, the criminalization of 
money laundering has evolved beyond the limited scope of drug-related offences 
                                                                                                                                      
naira are transferred from the government treasury to their bank accounts, located in Nigeria and 
abroad (See also Daniel K. Tarullo, “The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention”, (2003-2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law, 665 at 53 
[Tarullo]). 
181 Shams, supra note 177 at 112. 
182 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 19 December 1988, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997af90.html [Date consulted: February 16th 2011] 
[Vienna Convention of 1988]. The Convention has 185 Parties, including the United States, China, 
Russia, Canada, and India. 
183 Bruce Zagaris, “Trends in International Money Laundering From a US Perspective”, (2001) 35 
The International Lawyer, 839 at 840 [Zagaris]. 
184 Vienna Convention of 1988, art.3; Shams, supra note 177 at 112. 
185 UNCAC, art.23; Shams, ibid. 
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since the 1988 Convention187. Indeed, money laundering has been the target of 
more recent international tools, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 
UNCTOC and the UNCAC. The latter however defines the offence as an aspect of 
corruption, using a multifaceted approach188: 
 
“[…] corruption is very often exercised for the purpose of securing 
economic or even pecuniary gains. […] Pursuing the proceeds of 
corruption and confiscating them, if carried out effectively, can 
reduce the incentive to act corruptly. This is premised on a belief 
that the individual’s economic behaviour is rational and based on a 
balance of interest and risk189. 
 
This multifaceted approach is an important development due to the global change 
in crime control policy190, which more and more affects the profitability of 
criminal activity such as transnational organized crime.  
 
Within the UNCAC, not only is concealment covered by the provision concerning 
the laundering of crime proceeds191, it is criminalized in its own right, albeit using 
non-binding language and without prejudicing the Convention’s anti-money 
laundering provision (Article 23): 
 
“Without prejudice to the provisions of article 23 of this 
Convention, each State Party shall consider adopting such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a 
criminal offence, when committed intentionally after the 
                                                 
187 Ibid. at 113. 
188 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 241. 
189 Shams, supra note 177 at 117. 
190 Referring to the political situation following the September 11th attacks: “The political 
environment has led to a more vigorous and extensive anti-money laundering regime as great 
urgency is given to requirements to know your customers and exercise due diligence, and to freeze 
and confiscate terrorist funds” (in Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 
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commission of any of the offences established in accordance with 
this Convention without having participated in such offences, the 
concealment or continued retention of property when the person 
involved knows that such property is the result of any of the 
offences established in accordance with this Convention.192” 
 
Article 23, which prohibits money laundering, is divided into two parts. The first, 
which refers to the transfer of property and its concealment, is strictly binding in 
its phrasing whereas the second, concerning the use of property and participation, 
is subject to the basic concepts of the State Party’s legal system: 
 
“Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when 
committed intentionally: 
(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such 
property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person 
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade 
the legal consequences of his or her action; 
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to 
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; 
 
(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: 
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the 
time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime; 
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, 
attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling 
the commission of any of the offences established in accordance 
with this article. […]193” 
 
The second paragraph confers upon States a measure of discretion in interpreting 
their legal obligations and refers to the ‘use of property’ that is not qualified within 
the Convention. Any type of proceeds of crime use should therefore be considered 
                                                 
192 Ibid., art.24. Emphasis added. 
193 Ibid., art.23. Emphasis added. 
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an independent offence, subject to the Member States’ interpretation194. Whether it 
constitutes an indictable offence is left to the discretion of the Parties to the 
Convention195.  
 
f) Obstruction of Justice 
 
Obstruction of justice refers to “the use of physical force, threats or 
intimidation196” in order to obtain false evidence or testimony, or in order to 
interfere with official duties relating to the commission of offences under the 
Convention. The terms used are mandatory: “[e]ach State Party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences […]197”.  
 
The criminalization of this offence is unusual in a corruption convention, as it is 
generally criminalized locally. This type of provision has not been widely 
integrated in previous international or multilateral anti-corruption instruments, 
such as the OECD Convention, the IACAC and the AU Corruption Convention. Its 
goal within the UNCAC might be to strengthen the investigation and prosecution 
process of alleged corruption cases198. 
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196 UNCAC, art.25. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Carr, supra note 61 at 21. 
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g) Participation, Attempt, and Preparation 
 
The participation in all of the offences criminalized by the Convention is strictly 
prohibited as follows: 
 
“1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in 
accordance with its domestic law, participation in any capacity such 
as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in an offence established in 
accordance with this Convention […].199” 
 
The Convention also provides for incomplete crimes200, namely the attempt and 
preparation of offences201. They are in both cases phrased using discretionary 
terms. The following paragraphs allow for the adoption of such measures: 
 
“2. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in 
accordance with its domestic law, any attempt to commit an offence 
established in accordance with this Convention. 
3. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in 
accordance with its domestic law, the preparation for an offence 
established in accordance with this Convention.202” 
 
The need to distinguish between the attempt and the preparation of bribery 
offences may stem from the differences between national laws, as not all countries 
                                                 
199 UNCAC, art.27(1). Emphasis added. 
200 Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law, 4th Edition, Carswell, Toronto, 2001 at 696 [Stuart]. 
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the anticipated commission of a crime. They are preventive in nature.  
201 UNCAC, art.27(2) and (3). 
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criminalize both aspects203.  
 
Section II - Interpretive and Law Enforcement Measures 
 
Along with the list of specific offences which we detailed above, Chapter III of the 
UNCAC also includes interpretive and law enforcement measures. These 
provisions add important practical measures that should help in promoting 
harmonization among national anti-corruption laws204. 
 
i. General Law Enforcement Considerations 
 
This section groups together certain provisions that are of a more general nature. 
They refer to basic concepts of criminal law, such as sanctions, intent, liability, 
and the statute of limitations.  
 
a) Intent 
 
In the realm of transnational criminal activity, one of the major problems in 
prosecuting offences is the difficulty of obtaining evidence coupled with the heavy 
burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution205. The presumption of innocence 
                                                 
203 Carr, supra note 61 at 24; Polaine, supra note 117 at 11. For example, in the Republic of Korea, 
bribing attempts on foreign public officials are not criminalized. 
204 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 12. 
205 Abdullahi Y. Shehu, “Combating Corruption in Nigeria: Bliss or Bluster?”, (2005) 12 Journal 
of Financial Crime, 69-87 at 82 [Shehu] (Requirements relating to burden of proof also hinder the 
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requires that the prosecuting counsel prove that the accused intended his or her 
actions and their consequences206. Within the UNCAC, intent is a required element 
in the offence of bribery as it is for all of the other offences created207.  
 
The interpretation of the fault element or mens rea of the crime will vary in 
different legal systems208. For instance, in the common law tradition, corruption 
requires specific intent. In other words, the intent to commit the act is required (in 
this case the offering or accepting of a bribe) as well as for the action's 
consequences (in this case the intent to act upon the given or accepted bribe)209. In 
other jurisdictions, specific intent is not required210, lightening the burden of proof 
for the prosecution. In this respect, the UNCAC is the first anti-corruption 
convention that clearly stipulates how intent is to be construed, diminishing the 
debate on whether a subjective or objective test is to be applied211. In order to 
soften the burden of proof resting on the prosecution, the Convention allows for 
reliance on inferential evidence: “knowledge, intent or purpose required as an 
element of an offence established in accordance with this Convention may be 
inferred from objective factual circumstances212”. Given that the burden is slightly 
                                                                                                                                      
possibility of speedy trials. Furthermore, it is contended that anti-corruption efforts in most 
countries have been affected by evidentiary difficulties: “Among the challenges of proof are issues 
of how funds were stolen from the public treasury in one country and stashed in another 
jurisdiction with completely different legal systems”). 
206 Shams, supra note 177 at 113. 
207 UNCAC, arts.15 to 27. 
208 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 227. 
209 Polaine, supra note 117 at 17. This is the case in Canada in relation to the bribery of officials. 
See art.120 of the Criminal Code of Canada. 
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lightened, this provision should considerably help the prosecution of offences 
under the Convention213.  
 
b) Sanctions 
 
Although the Convention lists many offences, the sanctions which attach to each 
offence are far from exhaustive214. The UNCAC stipulates in Article 30, “each 
Party shall make the commission of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention liable to sanctions that take into account the gravity of that 
offence215”. However, it is unclear how the concept of gravity should be 
construed216: does it refer to the gravity of the act itself or to its consequences? 
The answer will vary with the interpretation given by each Member State. In fact, 
considering that sentencing policies vary greatly among countries, it is 
understandable that this area of the law has thus far not been harmonized217.  
 
One of the principle provisions dealing with sanctions has proven to be quite 
controversial and touches the issue of immunities218. Article 30 of the UNCAC 
stipulates: 
 
                                                 
213 Shehu, supra note 205 at 83 (The importance of the burden of proof cannot be overstated: “The 
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“Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and 
constitutional principles, an appropriate balance between any 
immunities or jurisdictional privileges accorded to its public 
officials for the performance of their functions and the possibility, 
when necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting and 
adjudicating offences established in accordance with this 
Convention.219” 
From this particular wording, it appears that the Convention grants Member States 
a very wide discretion regarding immunities and privileges, which, considering 
their role in hindering the prosecution of officials in the past may prove to be a 
significant barrier to the removal and punishment of corrupt officials220. 
 
c) Statute of Limitations 
 
Even though State Parties may not be required to nationally criminalize all of the 
offences stated in the UNCAC (as some are phrased in discretionary terms and 
others in mandatory terms), should they decide to do so, they are required to 
establish a long statute of limitations period221. The language of the relevant 
provision (Article 29) is somewhat flexible, in that it allows countries to assess 
when to provide for a longer period, using the terms “where appropriate”: 
 
“Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its 
domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to 
commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance 
with this Convention and establish a longer statute of limitations 
period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations 
where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of 
justice.222” 
                                                 
219 UNCAC, art.30(2). Emphasis added. 
220 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 13. 
221 UNCAC, art.29. 
222 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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It is therefore up to each State to decide what is “appropriate”. Furthermore, there 
is no guidance provided as to what should be considered a long period223. 
 
d) Jurisdiction 
 
The UNCAC’s provision on jurisdiction is of broad significance as it applies to all 
criminalization articles under the Convention, and is consistent with similar 
provisions adopted by previous anti-corruption agreements, such as the OECD 
Convention224. In regards to both conventions, parties are asked to merely consult 
with one another when determining the appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution225. 
Article 42 of the UNCAC confers jurisdiction whether the offence is committed on 
the State’s territory, whether the offence is committed by or against a national of 
the State Party or against the State itself226. However, since many of the offences 
under the Convention are capable of being committed in more than one 
jurisdiction, the provision may not have been adequately drafted and should have 
anticipated this scenario227. In money laundering cases in particular, assessing the 
location of the crime is complex and can lead to the investigation and prosecution 
of a crime in two countries. 
 
                                                 
223 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 13. 
224 Ibid., at 15. 
225 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, art.4. 
226 UNCAC, art.42, paras.1-2. 
227 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 15. 
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In assessing the effectiveness of the UNCAC, the actual wording of the provisions 
criminalizing specific acts of corruption is of the utmost interest. However, other 
aspects need to be considered for they will undoubtedly impact the Convention's 
ability to eradicate corrupt practices.  
 
ii. Investigation and Procedural Aspects 
 
Anti-corruption tools typically suffer from enforcement difficulties in part because 
of investigation shortcomings and because of the concealed nature of the crimes228.  
 
The successful prosecution of cases depends highly on leads provided by 
informants (sometimes referred to as whistleblowers229) who, because of the 
sensitive nature of the information they possess, are often threatened and 
intimidated230. Unfortunately, the UNCAC must face these difficulties and to that 
end, it has anticipated measures to protect witnesses, experts, victims, and 
reporting individuals, thus aiding them in coming forward with information231. 
States are called upon to either “consider incorporating232” into their domestic 
legislation appropriate measures in order to protect reporting persons or to 
establish measures “in accordance with [their] domestic legal system and within 
                                                 
228 Carr, supra note 61 at 25. 
229 Ibid. at 26, n. 53. 
230 Ibid. at 25. 
231 UNCAC, arts.32-33. 
232 Ibid., art.33. 
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[their] means233”. The reason for the discretionary quality of the phrasing is 
perhaps explained by the costs and resources needed to implement such 
measures234, particularly in those countries facing high levels of corruption and 
who will therefore need to provide for the protection of more individuals235. In 
addition, these countries are most often some of the poorer developing 
countries236. 
 
Another measure that may prove to be costly for Member States concerns the 
obligation to establish enforcement bodies. In order to ensure that State Parties can 
effectively prosecute and investigate offences under the Convention, Member 
States must establish independent and specialized anti-corruption enforcement 
bodies, subject to the fundamental principles of their legal systems. Emphasis is 
put on the importance of independence and the need for cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies237. The degree of autonomy conferred upon such authorities 
is however left to the discretion of each State, to be determined through relevant 
national legislation238. This provision was placed in the Convention's chapter on 
                                                 
233 Ibid., art.32. 
234 Carr, supra note 61 at 27. 
235 This assumption is based on the premise that a higher number of corruption cases causes a 
higher number of informants. This is undoubtedly a simple reasoning because it does not factor in 
environmental considerations such as social pressure, culture, and poverty. 
236 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index Report, Transparency International 
Secretariat, Berlin, 2007. In 2007, Transparency International’s yearly Corruption Perception Index 
Report assessed that the countries facing the 10 lowest scores were the following: Somalia, 
Myanmar, Iraq, Haiti, Uzbekistan, Tonga, Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, and Laos: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 [Date consulted: February 
2nd 2011].  
237 UNCAC, art.38. 
238 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 736. 
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criminalization and law enforcement despite the fact that it can also be qualified as 
a preventive provision239. 
 
Parties to the Convention must take measures in order to strengthen cooperation 
between public or government officials and prosecuting authorities, in accordance 
with State Parties’ domestic laws240. Such measures include but are not limited to 
providing enforcement authorities with requested information and to inform them 
when they have reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been 
committed241. The same types of measures are called for between national 
authorities and the private sector, with particular emphasis on financial 
institutions242. These provisions encourage the transmission of relevant 
information in regard to the commission of offences under the Convention. 
 
iii. Consequences of Corruption and Private Rights of Action 
 
The UNCAC's measures on civil liability and damages are far reaching and will 
undoubtedly enhance deterrence by creating additional weapons243: civil and 
administrative sanctions. A possible outcome of the implementation of these 
provisions is a gradual privatization of law enforcement: "[t]hese two articles thus 
signal a resolve on the part of negotiators of the UN Convention to unleash the 
                                                 
239 UNCAC, art.36. 
240 Ibid., art.38. 
241 Ibid., art.38. 
242 Ibid., art.39. 
243 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 15. 
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power of private civil litigation and collateral legal and administrative sanctions on 
persons that commit corrupt practices244". Moreover, recalling the difficulties 
associated with the investigation and prosecution of offences, the evidence 
obtained from civil trials could be used in ongoing investigations or in future 
criminal trials245. 
 
Article 35 explicitly establishes a private right of action, using discretionary terms: 
 
“Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that 
entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an act of 
corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those 
responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.246” 
The language used in the provision seems to give considerable latitude to countries 
in determining the parameters of a private right of action. 
 
The Convention also contains a separate provision allowing States to “consider 
corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to annul or rescind a contract, 
withdraw a concession or other similar instrument [...]247”. Discretionary in nature, 
Article 34 allows States to take measures allowing them to address the 
consequences of corruption. The following excerpt illustrates a few possible 
outcomes in relation to these provisions: 
 
“La convention permet aussi l'annulation d'un contrat ou le retrait 
d'une concession ou de tout autre acte juridique analogue qui 
pourrait se trouver infecté par une pratique de corruption. Elle 
                                                 
244 Ibid. at 17. 
245 Ibid.. 
246 UNCAC, art.35. Emphasis added. 
247 Ibid., art.34. 
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édicte, de plus, le droit d'engager une action en justice pour les 
entités ou personnes qui ont subi un préjudice du fait d'un acte de 
corruption248” 
 Though discretionary, Article 34 is significant since this type of provision was not 
previously part of anti-corruption treaties249. Furthermore, the provision is not 
limited to convicted offenders under the Convention, which allows it to apply to a 
wider array of situations. Close attention should therefore be paid as to how 
Member States will implement this measure: "[c]ompanies that do business abroad 
or at home through government contracts, concessions, licenses and permits 
should be aware that this provision may prompt more widespread revocation of 
rights than has historically been the case250".  
 
 
Chapter III - International Cooperation 
 
Having analyzed the Convention's preventive measures as well as its main 
offences one can begin to sense a pattern as to its lack of enforceability. 
Continuing the overview of the UNCAC's provisions and before moving to an 
analysis of its main challenges, measures relating to cooperation between Member 
States must be considered for they will affect the prosecution of alleged offenders.  
 
Due to the transnational nature of corruption it is often very difficult to prosecute, 
                                                 
248 Jean-Paul Laborde, “Un pas de plus dans la lutte contre la corruption: la Convention des Nations 
Unies contre la corruption”, (2004) 75 Revue internationale de droit penal, 837 at 849 [Laborde]. 
249 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 15. 
250 Ibid. at 16. 
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making trans-border cooperation crucial251. Within international conventions, it is 
often contended that the provisions relating to international cooperation are the 
most valuable in ensuring that both the convention’s as well as the domestic 
criminal justice system’s goals are attained252: 
 
“The effectiveness of the fight against transnational crime is in part 
dependant upon the effectiveness of international co-operation in 
criminal matters. In this sense the attainment of the goals of a 
domestic criminal justice system is often contingent upon 
international co-operation.”253  
 
The goal of international cooperation in the field of corruption is the same as in the 
domestic arena: gathering evidence in order to immobilize the suspects. With the 
prevalence of money laundering and transnational organized crime, another 
objective comes into play: the confiscation of the proceeds of crime254. The critical 
need for trans-border cooperation is a direct result of State sovereignty255: the 
principle of the sovereign equality of States (codified in the Charter of the United 
Nations256) limits the investigatory and enforcement powers locally, to a States' 
own territory257. This is in part why specific agreements need to be concluded to 
ensure effective cooperation.  
 
                                                 
251 Stessens, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, supra note 105 at 928. 
252 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 19. 
253 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 252 [Stessens, Money Laundering].  
254 Ibid. at 251. 
255 There are of course other considerations that challenge international cooperation, such as the 
lack of financial resources and available expertise. 
256 Art.2 (1), United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 
XVI, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html [Date consulted: February 
16th 2011]. 
257 Stessens, Money Laundering, supra note 253 at 251.  
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However daunting the task of facilitating the exchange of information and 
enforcement actions between nations, one must not forget the overall collective 
goal: the fundamental interests of the international community warrants that 
bilateral or multilateral action should at times be prioritized over unilateral 
decision-making258. In this spirit, the international cooperation chapter of the 
Convention contains a multitude of provisions detailing confiscation cooperation, 
extradition, and mutual legal assistance259. These provisions, lengthy and detailed, 
create a broad framework for cooperation. They are meant to operate 
independently from Member States’ national systems when domestic laws permit 
such an outcome and to supplement other existing cooperation treaties260.  
 
The obligation to cooperate applies regardless of whether the underlying offence is 
phrased in mandatory or discretionary terms, as long as it has been implemented at 
the national level261. However, the condition of dual criminality is applied, a 
notion which commands that the underlying conduct must be criminalized under 
the laws of both State Parties262. The following passage clearly explains the 
concept:  
“Under the dual criminality - or double criminality as it is often 
called – the act for which a prisoner was convicted and sentenced in 
a foreign country must also be a crime in the prisoner’s home 
country. If the home country does not recognize the act as a crime, 
the prisoner is not eligible for transfer under the terms of a penal 
transfer treaty.263” 
                                                 
258 Arbour & Parent,  supra note 130 at 259. 
259 UNCAC, Chapter IV, arts.43 to 49. 
260 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 18. 
261 Ibid. 
262 UNCAC, art.43(2); Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 346. 
263 William V. Dunlap, “Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties”, (1988-1989) 29 Virginia 
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In this respect, the UNCAC deems that the condition of dual criminality is fulfilled 
in the following cases:  
 
“[W]henever dual criminality is considered a requirement, it shall 
be deemed fully irrespective of whether the laws of the requested 
State Party place the offence within the same category of offence or 
denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting 
State Party, if the conduct underlying the offence for which 
assistance is sought is a criminal offence under laws of both States 
Parties.264” 
 
The nature or extent of the cooperation obligations between States will therefore 
depend on whether dual criminality is present on a case-by-case basis265. Simply 
put, if dual criminality is not present, the requirements for cooperation will not be 
mandatory, whereas if present, the same requirements become binding. Applied to 
extradition, the Convention stipulates that:  
 
“[T]his article shall apply to the offences established in accordance 
with this Convention where the person who is the subject of the 
request for extradition is present in the territory of the requested 
State Party, provided that the offence for which extradition is sought 
is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting State 
Party and the requested State Party.266” 
 
The terms of extradition under the UNCAC are similar to other international 
instruments in that the goal is to create a ‘treaty within a treaty267’, without having 
to fall back on other treaties or domestic laws. The extradition provision details 
                                                                                                                                      
Journal of International Law, 813 at 815 [Dunlap]. 
264 UNCAC, art.43(2). Emphasis added. 
265 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 18. 
266 UNCAC, art.44(1). Emphasis added. It should be noted that the provision on extradition is 
lengthy and complex, as is its applicable law. It is not our goal to fully analyze the provision here. 
267 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 346. See also Low, “The 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 18. 
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complex situations that could arise in the domestic implementation process and 
seeks to resolve them, such as preventive custody requirements pending 
extradition268, evidentiary requirements269 and prosecution where only one offence 
among many is extraditable270. The provisions practically illustrate actions that can 
be taken by Member States in different situations: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition 
treaties, the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the 
circumstances so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the 
requesting State Party, take a person whose extradition is sought 
and who is present in its territory into custody or take other 
appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at extradition 
proceedings.271” 
 
A wide measure of mutual legal assistance is provided for in Article 46. Among 
key features is the establishment of a central authority to ensure the rapid 
execution of mutual legal assistance requests272 and the requirement that mutual 
legal assistance requests not be refused on the grounds of bank secrecy273 or on 
fiscal grounds274. Such requests may pertain to evidence or statements, executing 
seizures, searches or freezing of assets, examining sites, providing expert 
evaluations, tracing the proceeds of crime, etc275. Other forms of cooperation are 
also detailed to “enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat 
                                                 
268 UNCAC, art.44(10). 
269 Ibid., para. (9). 
270 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 740. 
271 UNCAC, art.44(10). 
272 Ibid., art.46(13). 
273 Ibid., para. (8). 
274 Ibid., para. (22). 
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the offences covered by this Convention276”, for example, mechanisms to 
exchange information between State Parties’ competent authorities. It can be 
argued that the UNCAC has the most detailed provisions on mutual legal 
assistance among similar international anti-corruption tools277. 
 
 
Chapter IV - Asset Recovery 
 
The UNCAC is seen as revolutionizing the realm of asset recovery in the field of 
international law:  
 
“La Convention de l’ONU contre la corruption dans le domaine de 
ces infractions à caractère économique est, donc, venue apporter 
une mini révolution en instituant le principe de : celui qui saisit 
restitue. C’est là que réside, le revirement de tendance que nous 
nous plaisons à nommer d’avancée normative significative ou mini 
révolution conceptuelle.278”  
 
The importance of the Convention’s provisions pertaining to asset recovery can 
only be properly understood when considered against past international initiatives 
aimed at curtailing corruption and the looting of funds. The International Monetary 
Fund estimates that the equivalent of approximately two percent of the world’s 
gross domestic product (up to US $1.8 trillion) is laundered on a yearly basis and 
                                                 
276 UNCAC, art.48(1) paras. a), b), d), and f). 
277 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 346. Similar anti-corruption 
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278 Saliou Bah, “La restitution des avoirs issus de la corruption dans les conventions anti-corruption 
internationales: une avancée conceptuelle et normative à la portée pratique limitée”, (2010) 1 Revue 
de droit des affaires internationales, 15 at 16 [Bah]. 
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that a “significant portion of that activity involves funds derived from 
corruption279”.  
 
An interesting example of the severity of the problem is the case of Nigeria, which 
has been flagged for its high profile corruption cases280. Of the estimated $400 
billion that has been looted from the African continent, about a quarter is said to 
originate from Nigeria, a country in which an important majority of the population 
lives on less than a dollar a day. Another example is that of Indonesia, where 
Mohamed Suharto (President for almost thirty years and recently deceased) 
allegedly stole up to $35 billion from his own people281.  
 
Considering the staggering amount of funds lost, it is surprising that it is only 
recently that clauses on the recovery of stolen assets have been included in a 
                                                 
279 IMF, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering—Background Paper, 
February 2001, at 10, available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.htm [Date 
consulted: February 13th 2011], cited in: Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin, 
Especially Funds Derived From Acts of Corruption, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, 4th Session, Agenda item 3, UN Doc. A/AC 261/12 (2002) at 3. 
See also Bah, ibid. at 16-17 for other staggering amounts. 
280 Guest, supra note 1 at 121. See also Guillermo Jorge, “Notes on Asset Recovery in the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption”, (2003) available at: www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/ 
programs/Annual0316.03-16.06.pdf at 2 [Jorge] [Date consulted: June 15th 2010]; Ige Bola, 
“Abacha et le banquiers: la lumière sur la conspiration”, (2002) 2 Forum sur le crime et la société, 
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International in 2004 and is estimated to have stolen up to $5 billion (see Introduction to Political 
Corruption, TI, 2004 available at: 
www.transparency.org/content/download/4459/26786/file/Introduction_to_political_corruption. 
pdf, at 13 [Date consulted: July 28th 2010]. Records have shown that he and his associates stole 
over $1 million for each day he was in office. Such cases reveal the disparities between different 
countries’ legal systems for dealing with asset recovery. To mention but a few, such disparities 
include the legal value of the evidence obtained abroad, privileges and immunities applicable to 
public officials, and measures for the immobilization of assets. 
281 Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin, Especially Funds Derived From Acts of 
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multilateral treaty dealing with corruption. Indeed, while previously adopted 
regional and multilateral anti-corruption tools provide for the seizing and freezing 
of assets, they do not extensively cover the issue of asset recovery282. The UNCAC 
therefore enters new territory in this respect, being the first anti-corruption treaty 
to tackle the issue283. Veering away from a penalty approach to criminal law, the 
Convention targets a more profit-oriented perspective in its attempt to create 
mechanisms to recover stolen assets284. 
 
The draft resolution for the negotiation of the Convention originally proposed that 
a separate instrument be negotiated on the subject of the repatriation of stolen 
funds. However, as a result of negotiations, it was decided that both draft 
resolutions would be combined into one, placing asset recovery at the very center 
of the Convention285. During the first negotiation session, representatives from the 
Group of 77286, the European Union and other Latin American and African States 
insisted that the Convention should address the issue of asset recovery. They 
stressed the need to develop measures and mechanisms for the recovery of stolen 
funds and property. Furthermore, many representatives insisted on the highly 
complex nature of these issues, referring to the tracing of funds and the 
                                                 
282 Carr, supra note 61 at 29, referring to the AU and OAS conventions on corruption. 
283 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 19. 
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identification of their rightful owners287.  
 
To that effect, an informative seminar on the return of illicit funds was proposed 
by Peru and supported by Spain to cover practical and legal issues surrounding the 
implications of cases involving stolen funds and their return288. At the second 
negotiation session held in Vienna in June of 2002, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for the negotiation of the Convention stated the following: “the 
question of asset recovery is one of the fundamental aspects of the convention and 
would also serve as an indicator of the political will to join forces in order to 
protect the common good289”. It was the general opinion that these matters would 
be quite difficult to negotiate, given the complexities involved in investigating and 
recovering stolen assets, as well as problems related to the gathering of evidence, 
international cooperation, issues of cost, and jurisdiction290.  
 
The asset recovery chapter received important support from both developing and 
developed countries: 
 
“This is a particularly important issue for many developing 
countries where high-level corruption has plundered the national 
                                                 
287 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption on its 
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wealth, and where resources are badly needed for reconstruction 
and the rehabilitation of societies under new governments. Reaching 
agreement on this chapter has involved intensive negotiations, as 
the needs of countries seeking the illicit assets had to be reconciled 
with the legal and procedural safeguards of the countries whose 
assistance is sought.291”  
 
Many countries submitted proposals with specific sections addressing the proceeds 
of corruption. The United States found the subject so pressing that one of its draft 
proposals concerned only the redrafting of the asset recovery provisions292, 
whereas Austria and the Netherlands submitted revised texts on virtually every 
provision of the Convention293. Canada however qualified the discussion on asset 
recovery as unsatisfactory, considering that the concept itself was too broad and its 
consequences far-reaching, and that it covered a multitude of legal situations, 
some more complex than others294. Indeed, recovering stolen assets in an 
international setting can be a highly complex task, necessitating the availability of 
funds, technical cooperation and experts from many countries (to name a few, 
experts in accounting, criminal law, civil law and money laundering): 
 
“Le démêlage de ces affaires de corruption à cheval entre deux ou 
plusieurs pays, nécessite un concours de rationalités des plus 
qualifiés possibles. Pour sortir des dédales d’une grande corruption 
avec enjeux de restitution d’avoirs depuis l’étranger, une batterie 
d’experts en comptabilité, en blanchiment d’argent, en droit civil et 
pénal de plusieurs pays est nécessaire. A minima, une connaissance 
                                                 
291 UNODC, Consensus Reached on UN Convention Against Corruption, UN Information Service, 
(October 2003) available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/press-
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pointue en droit comparé et de ses méthodologies est requise295”. 
 
Although developed and developing countries had diverging opinions as to the 
content and scope of the asset recovery provisions, the need for some type of 
measure to be included was not a matter of debate. Although solidarity can 
sometimes give way to differing interests296, the contrary is also true: when a 
problem or issue affects many, efforts tend to coalesce.  
 
In its final version, not only is asset recovery explicitly stated as a “fundamental 
principle” of the Convention, State Parties are required to “afford one another the 
widest measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard297”. A whole chapter is 
dedicated to the recovery of stolen assets and other measures dealing with money 
laundering and prevention are also included298. As set out in the Convention and in 
order to be effective, the recovery of assets must be preceded by three stages: 
investigation, prevention, and confiscation299. The prevention provisions are said 
to be unique to the UNCAC and are written using mainly mandatory language300. 
Prevention refers to the freezing and seizing of assets in order to prevent their 
transfer into unlawful hands301. For instance, Article 52, focusing primarily on the 
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prevention and detection of the transfer of proceeds of crime, requires Member 
States to take measures to ensure that financial institutions verify their customers’ 
identity and maintain client records in a multitude of situations. The provision’s 
overall goal is to detect suspicious transactions and address large-scale corruption 
carried out by high-ranking officials302. Furthermore, disclosure systems for public 
officials, although discretionary in nature, are provided for in order to enable 
information sharing between States during investigations303.  
 
As for the specific issue concerning the recovery of assets, the Convention covers 
direct and indirect recovery304. The direct recovery provision requires that States 
take measures to afford Member States a civil right of action to “establish title or 
ownership of property305” acquired through corrupt behavior and subsequently 
recovered, in accordance with their domestic law. This not only helps harmonize 
civil and criminal proceedings, it also offers plaintiffs an important advantage: that 
of a lower burden of proof (preponderance of probability as opposed to beyond all 
reasonable doubt)306. Indirect measures include the recognition of confiscation 
orders prepared by other States307 and measures allowing for the freezing and 
seizure of property pending investigation308. Articles 55 through 57 pertain to 
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confiscation through international cooperation, seizure and the return and disposal 
of assets. While these provisions can be considered as an expansion of previous 
international anti-corruption tools article 57 merits special attention309. The 
disposal of corruptly obtained proceeds was largely discussed, mainly regarding 
whether it should be the requesting State or the confiscating State that should be 
lawfully compensated, either based on a surviving property right or on the basis of 
compensation for malfeasance310. The provision provides an answer to this 
dilemma by setting out:  
 
“[A] series of provisions governing return of confiscated proceeds 
and other property which generally prefers return to the requesting 
State Party, but sets stronger rules in cases where the property 
interest of that State Party is the strongest.311”  
Article 31 of the Convention, which is included in the “Criminalization and Law 
Enforcement” chapter, also deals with the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, as 
well as their freezing and seizure.  
 
While these provisions were always necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
Convention, their inclusion and acceptance by Member States represent a 
significant breakthrough and was never a foregone conclusion. Because of the 
Convention’s universal quality, it may prove to have an important advantage over 
regional anti-corruption tools in respect to asset recovery, especially when 
considering that States are not necessarily members of the same regional 
                                                 
309 Previous international and multilateral anticorruption tools, such as the IACAC, the AU 
Corruption Convention and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, did not contain such detailed 
provisions pertaining to the recovery of assets. 
310 Anti-corruption Toolkit, supra note 6 at 582. 
311 Ibid. 
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initiatives312.  
 
Although previous regional agreements, such as the AU Corruption Convention, 
the IACAC and the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
do address the question of asset recovery, neither offers the legal framework 
contained in the UNCAC: 
 
“Avec une intensité et une profondeur, certes moindres, les 
Conventions de l’Organisation de États américains et de l’Union 
africaine ont également traité de ce sujet. Celle de l’Organisation 
pour coopération et le développement économique et du Conseil de 
l’Europe n’en parle que de manière sous entendue. La réalité 
demeure qu’aucune des conventions régionales anti-corruption 
n’offre un mécanisme juridique autonome, toute une conception, 
une architecture juridique dédiée au seul recouvrement des avoirs 
issus de la corruption pouvant être valablement comparé à l’arsenal 
élaboré par le texte universel des Nations-Unies313”. 
 
As a result of this brief analysis, one may observe the different levels of norms 
contained in the UNCAC. This mixture of strict and discretionary language is not 
unusual within international agreements314 and is not a weakness per se. The 
following chapter will attempt to assess what issues may affect the Convention's 
effectiveness from a legal standpoint. In the last chapter we will offer an overview 
of the existing multilateral anti-corruption framework in order to assess the need 
for further anti-corruption legislation, and therefore the Convention's relevancy. 
 
 
                                                 
312 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 742. 
313 Bah, supra note 278 at 24. 
314 Shelton, supra note 179 at 70. 
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Part II – Barriers to the Effectiveness and 
Relevancy of the Convention 
 
The title of this chapter refers to effectiveness and relevancy. It is our opinion that 
effectiveness is measured by results, both on the long and short terms. A high level 
of compliance will yield positive results, and to ensure compliance, a legal tool 
must be enforceable: “an agreement is likely to be more effective the greater the 
degree to which its parties comply with its obligations315”. 
 
Compliance may be defined as: “the degree to which a State behaves in a manner 
that conforms to its legal obligations316”. Compliance, even where strict 
enforcement exists, is however never perfect. Taken on a smaller scale, there are in 
each society individuals who break the law. There are other factors which will 
influence compliance, such as a government’s monetary and human resource 
capacity, the law’s content and language, cooperation between institutions, and so 
on. However, effectiveness cannot simply be measured by assessing the goals 
achieved. The bigger picture must also be taken into consideration; simply put, is 
the overall situation better than it would have been without the Treaty317? 
Moreover, one cannot expect a legal tool to completely eradicate corruption. 
                                                 
315 Brett Frischmann, “A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law”, (2003) 51 Buffalo 
Law Review, 679 at 693 [Frischmann]. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Shirley V. Scott, “Political Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties: Reconciling Text With 
Political Reality”, (2007) 5 New Zealand Journal of Political International Law, 103 at 107 [Scott]. 
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Realistically, the desired result should be a change in the behavior of States318. The 
following passage illustrates this more realistic understanding of effectiveness:  
 
“Implementation is the process of putting international commitments 
into practice, including the promulgation of new regulations and 
legislation by the national governments. It is one of the most 
important factors that affect the degree of effectiveness of an 
international treaty. On the other hand, effectiveness is a different 
concept that entails a favorable change in behavior in a State Party. 
[…] effectiveness […] is measured by the extent it leads to change in 
behavior that furthers its goal. Effectiveness is not the ability […] to 
solve the problem of corruption. Thus the [agreement] will be 
effective even if it does not eliminate actual corruption, but causes 
desired behavioral change.319” 
 
 
Chapter I – Barrier to the Convention’s Effectiveness: 
Compliance Challenges 
“Agreements have value only if the promises exchanged serve to bind the parties. Agreements are, 
therefore, more valuable if they can bind the parties more effectively.320” 
 
Enforcement is a major hurdle in international law. It is generally very difficult to 
convince a group of Nations to agree to have their territorial rights diminished, 
even if the long-term outcome would be beneficial to all parties. Multilateral 
treaties have always been faced with this difficulty, as they are a product of their 
negotiators’ will. Once countries do decide to take part in such a process, not even 
the largest or most influential States manage to have all of their demands met. The 
                                                 
318 Giorleny D. Altamirano, “The Impact of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption”, 
(2006-2007) 38 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 487 at 508 [Altamirano]. 
319 Ibid. at 509. 
320 Andrew T. Guzman, “The Design of International Agreements”, (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law, 579 at 580 [Guzman, “The Design of International Agreements”]. 
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process is one of compromise and that is precisely what enables treaties to 
accommodate diverging interests321. Enforcement problems are often the result of 
this accommodation of broad scopes of interests during the negotiations since they 
often create obligations that are less strict and more loosely defined322.  
 
Many factors and causes of State disobedience have been identified by 
academics323. Although closely linked, each study offers a particular insight and a 
different approach.  In order to better understand the challenges to compliance, 
three theories will be summarily described in the following paragraphs.  
 
The first theory, illustrated by Haas, endeavors to predict the probability of 
compliance with international legal tools. Among the developed factors are State 
capacity (political and technical), national concern, institutional constraints on a 
domestic level, and the availability of monitoring mechanisms324. No mention is 
made of the treaty’s language or of issues relating to jurisdiction. In fact, apart 
from monitoring mechanisms, the variables are not particularly dependent on a 
treaty’s content and are rather focused on extraneous circumstances, such as the 
State Parties' economic, political, and social situation.  
                                                 
321 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 7. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch, The Impact of International Law on International 
Cooperation – Theoretical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004 
[Benvenisti & Hirsch]. See also Shelton, supra note 179 at 72. 
324 Peter M. Haas, “Choosing to comply: theorizing from international relations and comparative 
politics” in Dinah Shelton, ed., Commitment and Compliance, Compliance – The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 45 at 72 
[Haas]. 
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Two other authors, Chayes and Chayes, identify three variables that can explain 
why treaty obligations are violated: ambiguities in the language of the treaty, 
limitations of the Member State’s capacity, and the “temporal dimension” of the 
social and political changes contemplated by international conventions. This last 
variable refers to the lapse in time many agreements face from the moment they 
are adopted to their implementation. These elements may be considered causes but 
are sometimes used as justifications for infringements325. Thus, this theory gives 
significant weight to variables flowing from the treaty itself and unlike the first 
theory, lists treaty language as a cause for non-compliance. However, these factors 
also consider external elements to the convention. Interestingly, they do not 
consider the absence of a monitoring mechanism to be a threat to compliance.  
 
Lastly, Benvenisti’s study, in our view, is the most detailed and relevant theory to 
the UNCAC. Eleven factors affecting compliance are enumerated, some of which 
are of particular interest326. For instance, the number of parties to an agreement: 
the higher the number, the more difficult the monitoring. This is clearly a problem 
within the UNCAC: due to the high number of Parties, a monitoring mechanism 
was negotiated much later in November of 2009327. Another element is the 
participation of a higher number of countries in the agreement: the rationale is that 
                                                 
325 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 10. 
326 Benvenisti & Hirsch, supra note 323 at 141. Not all factors are discussed here. 
327 This factor is number 1 of the 11 factors (See ibid.). The UNCAC’s Members met in November 
of 2009 in Doha, Qatar, to negotiate a review mechanism, during the Conference of the States 
Parties’ Third Session, infra note 396. 
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the more actors participate, the more others will feel compelled to join328. There is 
however a downside: the more members there are to an agreement, the more 
difficult it is to monitor and to find common ground. The Member States’ behavior 
prior to engaging in negotiations is also a factor329. On this point, it is our view 
that if a State willingly takes part in an international agreement, modifications in 
behavior, however small they might turn out to be, are not only reasonable, but 
should be expected. Capacity is another element of importance and is also a 
variable figuring in Benvenisti’s list330. This refers to a government's financial 
capacity and its human resources, which vary from country to country. 
Furthermore, it is essential that leading countries take part in the negotiation of a 
convention, as they tend to exert greater influence upon others331. These factors 
relate to the treaty’s membership, and not necessarily to the treaty itself. 
Benvenisti does however include criteria relating to an agreement’s monitoring 
mechanism, stating that “international secretariats to the agreements play 
important roles in promoting compliance332”. 
 
These theories seem to share the opinion that a treaty’s content does not, in itself, 
heighten compliance levels among State Parties: the social and political 
circumstances of the Parties involved also play an important part333. With respect 
                                                 
328 Benvenisti & Hirsch, supra note 323 at 143 (number 8 of 11). 
329 Ibid., (number 2 out of 11). 
330 Ibid., (number 3 out of 11). 
331 Ibid. at 144 (numbers 10 and 11). 
332 Ibid. at 143 (number 9 of out of 11). 
333 For instance, Guzman suggests that given certain conditions, a State might choose to violate its 
obligations, and gives the example of a nation under conditions of “great national crisis” (See 
 
 
 
71
for this opinion, important treaty or content-related elements do have a 
considerable role in ensuring compliance. These elements include, but are not 
limited to the treaty’s language, its monitoring mechanism, as well as its sanctions. 
These criteria are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Section I - Direct Compliance Challenges 
 
The Convention’s language is important in determining its enforceability. Its 
monitoring mechanism and sanctions (or lack thereof) are also pivotal in this 
respect. We refer to these factors as “direct compliance challenges”, as these 
challenges are internal to the Convention: they exist as direct consequences of the 
treaty’s wording. 
 
i. The Treaty’s Language 
 
Compliance can be defined as “an actor’s behavior that conforms to a treaty’s 
explicit rules334”. It assesses whether the participants’ actions conform to the 
treaty. Some experts argue that with regard to most international agreements, 
governments negotiate and ratify treaties that they are certain they can comply 
                                                                                                                                      
Andrew T. Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”, (2002) 90 California 
Law Review, 1823 at 1862 [Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”]). 
Furthermore, a State’s technical and financial capacity must be taken into consideration (See 
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 at 
184 [Aust]). 
334 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 508. 
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with without having to alter their current legislation: “[a] situation of high 
compliance that lacks implementing efforts occurs when the [treaty] merely 
codifies the current behavior of a State Party. In such a case, compliance can be 
automatic335”. This passage clearly illustrates that the utility of the treaty may be 
lost. A contrario, the impact of a treaty is palpable when it breaks new ground by 
codifying controversial obligations. There is no question that the UNCAC covers a 
wide array of requirements that are sure to necessitate active implementation on 
the part of many signatories. However, problems may arise in regards to its quality 
as an enforceable treaty, as well as the preciseness of the language used in order to 
promote effective implementation. These potential obstacles will be assessed in 
the present section. 
 
The consensus of the negotiators on the content of the treaty is reflected in its text, 
which “constitutes the authentic written expression of their wills336”. The 
following passage demonstrates the inevitable confrontation between international 
treaties and interpretation: 
 
“For multilateral treaties, the greater the number of negotiating 
states, the greater is the need for imaginative and subtle drafting to 
satisfy competing interests. The process inevitably produces much 
wording which is unclear or ambiguous. Despite the care lavished on 
drafting, and accumulated experience, there is no treaty which cannot 
raise some question of interpretation.337” 
This is clearly the case of the UNCAC as it encompasses a large and diverse 
                                                 
335 Ibid. 
336 Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, supra note 80 at 37. 
337 Aust, supra note 333 at 184. 
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number of States whose interests are divergent. Certainly, when attempting to 
resolve ambiguities flowing from the text of the UNCAC, the actual words 
themselves, the context, purpose and goal of the Convention must all be 
considered338. Indeed, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
states that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. If the application of this provision leaves the 
meaning unclear, Article 32 can be applied, giving additional means of 
interpretation, namely reference to preparatory works of the treaty and the 
circumstances surrounding its conclusion339. 
 
The effectiveness of the UNCAC may face challenges partly because it attempts to 
prevent and punish corrupt behavior. Interpretation difficulties tend to arise in 
obligations meant to alter and prevent criminal behavior and most obligations 
within treaties are meant to affect behavior in some form340. 
 
The concept of corruption creates enforcement difficulties due to the lack of 
consensus as to its legal definition341. Indeed, experts qualify the concept as an 
                                                 
338 Ibid. at 187. 
339 It should be noted that these general rules of interpretation apply only in cases of interpretative 
dispute, and where a third party intervenes (see Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, supra note 
80 at 45). Furthermore, Article 33 provides for the situation whereby the meaning of a treaty differs 
in different languages. If the use of articles 31 and 32 do not solve the issue, the parties should 
apply the “meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty”. 
340 Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, ibid. note 80 at 41, n. 15. The author gives civil liability 
requirements as an example. 
341 Ibid. at 81. 
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“expanding and malleable concept342”, varying over time and societies343. Because 
of this, the UNCAC’s negotiators agreed that the Convention should not explicitly 
define corruption, but rather identify the specific conducts classified as criminal 
misconduct344. When reading the Convention’s Preamble, one may conclude that 
the Convention's reach is meant to be vast345.  
 
However, ambiguity tends to produce grey zones within which it becomes difficult 
to assess what behavior is allowed or prohibited346. This is for example the case of 
facilitation payments under the UNCAC347: it is unclear whether such transactions 
are prohibited or not348. Considered “bribery loopholes349”, Argandona defines 
facilitation payments as follows: “[u]nlike the worst forms of corruption, 
facilitating payments do not usually involve an outright injustice on the part of the 
payer, as she is entitled to what she requests, but they may lead to a certain moral 
callousness350”. Such payments are therefore acceptable, in theory, for tasks that 
would be accomplished with or without the payment351.  
 
                                                 
342 Henning, supra note 97 at 805. 
343 Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, supra note 80 at 70. 
344 Ibid. 
345 A treaty’s Preamble may be used as an interpretation tool in order to assess its objectives: “the 
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise the whole treaty text, 
including its preamble and annexes” (Scott, supra note 317 at 109-110). 
346 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 10. 
347 These are a form of petty corruption. For a comprehensive overview of facilitation payments, 
see Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 146. 
348 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 228. 
349 Ethics Resource Center, Facilitation Payments: Whether Considered Custom or Bribery, They 
Put Companies in a Precarious Position, (April 2003) Volume 8, Issue 1, Ethics Today Online, 
available at: http:/resources/article_detail.cfm?ID=807 [Date consulted: July 12th 2010]. 
350 Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 146 at 1. 
351 The difference lies in the expediency of the task. They are also known as grease payments.  
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There are however drawbacks to allowing facilitating payments. For instance, they 
create a competitive advantage: those not financially able to offer such payments 
are unfairly penalized. Furthermore, they distort local bureaucracies, confuse 
government employees as to what behavior is permitted, and create accounting 
difficulties352. In the end, “facilitation payments do not achieve their goals. Instead 
they increase delays, and become costs and risks in themselves353”. One may infer 
that because the UNCAC includes concerns for good governance, facilitation 
payments should be considered as “undue advantages”354.  
 
The United States however has taken a different stance, interpreting the 
Convention’s language as allowing facilitation payments, whereas the United 
Kingdom’s legislation states that such payments constitute an offence under the 
Anti-Terrorism Act355. The position of the United States is understandable in light 
of the fact that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act356 allows exceptions for such 
payments: 
 
“There is an exception to the anti-bribery prohibition for payments 
                                                 
352 Toby Webb, “Strategy and Management: Facilitation Payments – Stop Paying and they Stop 
Asking”, (2006), Ethical Corporation, available at: 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=4471 [Toby Webb] [Date consulted: June 29th 
2010]. 
353 Ibid. (quoting Alexandra Wrage, President of TRACE). 
354 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 229. 
355 Anti-Terrorism Act, Crime and Security Act, UK, 2001. The Parties position may eventually 
have significant influence over the treaty’s interpretation. Indeed, art. 31(3) b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “there shall be taken into account, together with the 
context [...] any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty [...]”. In other words, whether or 
not the US decides to continue to allow facilitation payments in the future might impact Member 
States’ behavior. See Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 230; Scott, 
supra note 317 at 109). See also Gerald McGinley, “Practice as a Guide to Treaty Interpretation”, 
(1985) 9 The Fletcher Forum, 211-230 [McGinley], for an in depth analysis of this provision. 
356 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1997) [FCPA]. 
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to facilitate or expedite performance of a "routine governmental 
action." The statute lists the following examples: obtaining permits, 
licenses, or other official documents; processing governmental 
papers, such as visas and work orders; providing police protection, 
mail pick-up and delivery; providing phone service, power and 
water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable 
products; and scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or transit of goods across country.357” 
 
The unequal treatment of such transactions between Member States will 
undoubtedly create unequal standards towards companies conducting business 
abroad358.  
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, although not defending such behavior, 
explains that these types of payments should be dealt with nationally, because they 
are “minor domestic offences and not ones of an international nature that, like the 
larger scale bribing of foreign officials, will distort international trade359”. This 
area is still being debated, and the merits of either allowing facilitation payments 
versus prohibiting them are still unclear.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that by refusing to acknowledge their 
legality, the UNCAC was inherently meant to leave a measure of discretion to the 
Member States. The second is that there was no consensus on the matter during 
                                                 
357 United States Department of Justice, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions” 
(June 2001), available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf 
[Date consulted: February 14th 2011]. 
358 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra 95 at 230. 
359 Martjin Wilder and Michael Ahrens, “Australia’s Implementation of the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions”, (2001) 2 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 568 at 582 [Wilder & Ahrens]. 
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negotiations and a broad definition of corruption was necessary in order to ensure 
that as many States as possible would adhere to the Convention360. It is our view 
that both factors played a part in the Convention's lack of a specific provision 
criminalizing facilitation payments. 
 
Another example of ambiguity concerns the concept of undue advantage. Because 
it is not specified within the UNCAC, the notion must be defined locally. This 
omission is most probably due to the reluctance of the negotiating States to see 
their sovereignty infringed upon by a requirement which might be contrary to local 
practices. In other words, States feared “extraterritorial browbeating361” and the 
infringement of their sovereignty. The following passage illustrates these 
concerns:  
 
“[O]ccasionally, it is necessary to have recourse to vague terms or 
terms that leave the parties a wide margin for discretion when 
drafting the text of the norm. This is the tribute paid by the parties in 
order to achieve a norm which is an instrument for formalising 
cooperation. This is a consequence of the sovereignty of the state and 
the principle of the autonomy of the will of the parties which 
becomes manifest during the process for drafting the norms362”.  
 
Critics against harmonizing the notion of “undue advantage” have also argued that 
bribery remains a domestic concern and the responsibility of the victimized 
State363. However, this varying individual and national treatment of bribery is far 
                                                 
360 Snider & Kidane, supra note 62 at 731. The Convention by neither expressly allowing them nor 
prohibiting them refuses to take a stance, highlighting the existing controversy. 
361 Kim & Kim, supra note 13 at 558. 
362 Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, supra note 80 at 40. 
363 Kim & Kim, supra note 13 at 558; Delaney, supra note 18 at 10. 
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from being an optimal situation, for extradition and international cooperation are 
subject to the dual criminality principle under the Convention (this is also the case 
with other international and regional anti-corruption initiatives). As such, if an 
offence is not criminalized by both the requesting and requested States, the 
extradition and cooperation provisions cannot be enforced. 
 
Although ambiguity invites interpretation and leads to enforcement difficulties, 
detail and precision have their own drawbacks. For instance, precision does not 
always allow for evolution or changes in society. It may also create narrow 
requirements, omitting unforeseeable elements at the time of the treaty’s drafting, 
and thus restricting its scope364. This in turn may create eventual loopholes. 
Furthermore, the length of the Convention has been criticized: “on peut d’ailleurs 
se poser la question si les auteurs du traité, en voulant couvrir un si grand nombre 
de matières, n’ont pas déforcé l’efficacité de son dispositif.365”  
 
Stating that “far from creating a set of fixed and immutable rights and duties, 
treaties may over the course of time mutate with surprising and perhaps 
unwelcome results366”, Professor Merills exposes situations depicting the 
                                                 
364 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 11. A treaty doted of general language can be just as 
effective as a more precisely drafted instrument. Although citing an example of an international 
organization’s constitutive treaty, the Chayes’ work gives the example of the North Atlantic Treaty 
that contains very general terminology, but has shown remarkable sustainability.  
365 Vincke, supra note 42 at 364. 
366 John Merills, “The Mutability of Treaty Obligations”, in Matthew C. R. Craven and M. 
Fitzmaurice, Interrogating the Treaty – Essays in the Contemporary Law of Treaties, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 2005 at 101 [Merills]. 
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mutability of treaty obligations. One of them concerns developments in 
international law that are external to the international instrument367. He gives as an 
example the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body decision in the 
Shrimp/Turtle368 case of 1998 in which it was decided that current international 
concerns must be taken into account when interpreting treaty obligations, as well 
as taking into consideration objectives stated in the preamble369.  
 
In our opinion, the use of broader terms and the absence of specificity within the 
UNCAC are justified; these characteristics will allow room to consider external 
factors, such as future legal and political developments that might affect the 
interpretation of obligations. In the event that such developments should arise, a 
broader terminology will ensure that the requirements under the treaty can adapt 
over a long period of time and not become obsolete. Furthermore, disputes 
between Member States can also be avoided as they are granted larger latitude to 
comply with the treaty’s requirements370. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius summarizes these arguments and may be translated as “to express one 
thing is to exclude the other371”.  
 
Aside from precision, the compulsory nature of the language used is determinant 
                                                 
367 Ibid. at 93. 
368 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body 
Report, NT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998 (in ibid. at 95). 
369 Merills, supra note 366 at 95. 
370 Dispute settlement is provided for by Article 66 of the UNCAC. 
371 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 10. 
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in instigating State compliance. In other words, both the vagueness of the 
terminology and the absence of specific indications as to how obligations should 
be enforced are decisive372. In the following passage, it is argued that although a 
treaty is legally binding, its value can be diminished if lacking specific indications 
as to how the Parties’ obligations are to be carried out:  
 
“The analysis of state practice reveals that, on many occasions, 
international treaties have no more value than simple 
recommendations, due to the way in which their obligations have 
been drafted. In such cases, the treaty is binding as a norm from the 
formal point of view, but its content must be limited to simple 
guidelines unless the Parties have laid down precise and detailed 
rules which involve specific attitudes.373” 
 
There are however drawbacks to including precise and mandatory language in a 
treaty: it can create legal complexities making implementation more costly and 
strenuous. For instance, some argue that the obligations derived from the 
UNCAC’s asset recovery chapter are heavy, creating “a further layer of 
bureaucracy374” and might end up having the opposite effect, especially in many 
developing countries where banks are already overloaded with administrative 
burdens375. It is likely that many developing countries will lack the capacity to 
fully implement such demands. There will therefore have to be a certain level of 
flexibility in regard to the application of these types of obligations. Adaptability to 
social, economic, and political changes is necessary376. If one is to follow this 
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opinion, it can be argued that including detailed and precise enforcement 
provisions may not be the best solution, as they may not be able to adapt to the 
changing and evolving needs of anti-corruption legislation and leave little room 
for unilateral interpretation. 
 
The absence of definitions and the resulting ambiguity in the text allow for a 
broader interpretation of the Convention. The manner in which a State will 
interpret a given obligation is closely if not inextricably linked to its cultural 
practices and domestic legal system, which determines how it will implement the 
treaty. Monitoring mechanisms may therefore be necessary in order to ensure 
compliance, whether through recommendations, oversight commissions, and 
sanctions. These review challenges are examined in the following sections. 
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism and Implementation 
 
In order to ensure a country's commitment to the UNCAC, a review mechanism is 
essential for monitoring implementation: “[a]nything less would undermine the 
credibility of UNCAC […]”377. The goal of monitoring provisions is to encourage 
countries to ratify conventions and to put them into practice378. Most of the 
UNCAC’s provisions are not self-executing and therefore require national 
                                                 
377 TI, Effectively Monitoring the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Policy Position 
Paper No 1/2008, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/policy_positions/ti_pp_01_08_uncac at 2 
[Date consulted: June 12th 2010]. 
378 Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 146 at 10. 
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implementation on the part of its Member States379. The mechanisms created to 
ensure proper domestic implementation are of critical importance in light of the 
large and diverse array of participating States. This diversity in the Convention's 
membership also makes it more difficult for Member States to reach a consensus 
on a monitoring mechanism380.  
 
The presence of one disobedient State is enough to create an incentive for other 
members to disobey the rules. This argument is based on the assumption that 
compliance is in part a result of the expectation that all States will comply381. 
Proper implementation is said to take into account the existing social, cultural, and 
economic ‘incentive systems’: 
 
“Reform works when it gets the incentives right, that is, when its 
design and implementation take into account existing social, 
economic, and cultural incentive systems; and works with them 
adaptively.[...] Reformers must also take into account the 
incentives of natural resisters – those who profit from things as they 
are – who are likely to oppose, resist, or manipulate reforms and 
who somehow often co-opt or neutralise these parties.382” 
 
The concept of “natural resisters” is quite pertinent in the case of legal anti-
corruption measures in that many individuals already profit from the way things 
currently stand. The incentive to allow the status quo to continue and to refrain 
                                                 
379 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 4. 
380 Fritz Heimann, “Follow-up Monitoring Needed for the UN Convention against Corruption”, 
(2005) Compact Quarterly, available at: 
http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article000350362.cfm?x=b11,0,w [Heimann] [Date 
consulted: July 13th 2010]. 
381 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 142. 
382 Tim Lindsey, Law Reform in Developing and Transitional States, Routledge, London and New 
York, 2007 at 107 [Lindsey]. 
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from implementing international anti-corruption laws will therefore probably 
prove to be a significant problem in many countries. Without a proper monitoring 
mechanism, States may decide not to properly implement certain obligations under 
the Convention.   
 
In addition to the problem that "natural resisters" present for compliance, the 
"temporal dimension383" identified by Chayes’ theory as a factor of non-
compliance should also be underlined. This temporal problem arises more 
specifically in regard to instruments dealing with major international problems and 
necessitating a considerable timeframe for implementation. Such treaties 
invariably require a transitional period between their adoption and their 
implementation. The UNCAC without a doubt falls into this category of treaty, as 
corruption is a major global problem to be remedied.  
 
In its final version, Chapter VII of the Convention consists of two provisions 
covering mechanisms for implementation384. Article 63 establishes a Conference 
of the States Parties to the Convention (hereafter “COSP” or “Conference”) to 
“improve the capacity of and cooperation between States Parties to achieve the 
objectives set forth in this Convention and to promote and review its 
implementation385”. The Convention also states that the COSP will periodically 
                                                 
383 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at .9.  
384 UNCAC, arts.63-64. Article 63 establishes the Conference of the States Parties to the 
Convention, and Article 64 establishes the Secretariat. 
385 Ibid., art.63. 
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review Member States’ implementation386 and make necessary recommendations 
for improvement387. The Conference can decide to establish a mechanism or body 
in order to aid in the effective implementation, “if it deems it necessary”388.  
 
The vague terminology used unfortunately recalls the expression lex simulata, 
which refers to “a vehicle for sustaining or reinforcing basic civic tenets, but not 
for influencing pertinent behavior389”. Defining the notion of lex simulata and 
applying it to the field of international law, Reisman states that: 
 
“Formal lawmaking bodies sometimes (and, some, often) emit 
communications that have the form of law but that close observers 
know are not law. A patent contradiction which makes the 
purported law unenforceable, the absence of necessary 
implementing legislation, insufficient enforcement machinery, an 
inadequate budget if a budget at all, or the delegation of 
implementation to create not law but what I have called elsewhere 
lex simulata or lex imperfecta. […] Thurman Arnold thought the 
creation of intentionally unenforceable law was an efficient and 
economic way of mediating between distinct classes and groups 
which had irreconcilably incompatible demands.390” 
 Applied to the UNCAC, this passage sustains the view that although certain 
means for enforcing the Convention were provided for in its implementation 
provisions, they were perhaps not meant to foster immediate action among States. 
 
During the negotiations, many countries held the position that a monitoring system 
                                                 
386 Ibid., art.63(4)e). 
387 Ibid., para.f). 
388 Ibid., art.63(7). 
389 W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades and Reforms (Free Press, New York 
1979) at 32 [Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades and Reforms]; Philippa Webb, supra note 46 
at 221. See also Babu, supra note 26 at 27. 
390 W. Michael Reisman, “International Law-making: A Process of Communication”, (1981) 75 
American Society of International Law Procedure, 101 at 102 [Reisman, “International Law-
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should be established. However, the only proposal retained was that of Austria and 
the Netherlands suggesting the adoption of a Conference of States Parties (Article 
63 of the Convention). States opposing a more stringent monitoring system feared 
it would violate their sovereignty391. Other proposals suggesting a subsidiary 
monitoring body, a regional evaluation process, and a peer review system 
including sanctions for non-compliance were all rejected due to that same fear392. 
Because of the lack of consensus, the issue was deferred to the COSP to be held 
one year after the Convention’s entry into force393. The COSP’s first session took 
place in December 2006 at which time it deferred any decision as to an 
implementation review mechanism394. A second Conference took place in late 
January and early February of 2008395, which again deferred the matter to its third 
session, held in Doha in November 2009396. The first two sessions, although not 
bringing about any firm decisions on the review process, still covered many issues 
relating to technical assistance, asset recovery mechanisms, and certain guidelines 
or principles to be followed in deciding on a future implementation review 
                                                 
391 Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 146 at 10. 
392 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 221; Babu, supra note 26 at 25. 
393 Heimann, supra note 380. Article 63 (2) of the UNCAC foresees this delay. 
394 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption on its first session, First Session, CAC/COSP/2006/12, Amman, 10 to 14 December 
2006. The following passage gives reasons for deferring these negotiations to a conference of 
parties: “on the one hand the negotiators might not be able to agree on the text of a particular 
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given through “enabling clauses”, such as article 63 of the UNCAC. 
395 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption on its second session, Second Session, CAC/COSP/2008/15, Nusa Dua, Indonesia, 
from 28 January to 1 February 2008. 
396 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against 
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mechanism397. The third session finally brought about a much awaited review 
mechanism. This review mechanism will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
The UNCAC’s review mechanism is based on an intergovernmental process and is 
best described as a “peer review mechanism”398. Although the term has not been 
officially defined, it has, throughout the years, been given a specific meaning:  
 
“Peer review can be described as the systematic examination and 
assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the 
ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its policy 
making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards 
and principles. The examination is conducted on a non-adversarial 
basis, and it relies heavily on mutual trust among the states 
involved in the review, as well as their shared confidence in the 
process399” 
 
Other types of review mechanisms include self-evaluation and expert reviews. 
Self-evaluation occurs when a government is asked to review itself. It often 
requires that Member States answer a questionnaire, assessing their own 
performance. This method is, in our view, the most lenient of review mechanisms, 
as it is not independent or impartial. Expert reviews, on the other hand, are a more 
adversarial method, whereby government performance is assessed by a panel of 
independent experts who are generally well versed in the reviewed State’s national 
law as well as on the applicable agreement. This process ensures a higher level of 
                                                 
397Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption on its first session, supra note 394; Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption on its second session, supra note 395. 
398 Fabricio Pagani, “Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change”, (2002) 11 African 
Security Review, 15-24 at 15 [Pagani]. 
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independence and expertise than both the self-evaluation and mutual evaluation 
processes400.  
 
Some of the main objectives of the mechanism under the UNCAC are 
transparency, impartiality, the absence of ranking among States and the sharing of 
good practices401. More specifically, its characteristics include a self-assessment 
checklist, a desk review and dialogue between the reviewer and reviewed State. 
The country review is carried out by two other Member States, one of which must 
be from the same geographical region as the State under review. The reviewers, 
made up of government experts, are chosen on a random basis by the drawing of 
lots. However, the reviewed State may request that different reviewers be drawn 
and this privilege can be exercised up to two times within the same review period; 
exceptionally, this process can be repeated more than twice402. Within the peer 
review process, country reviews are deemed as one of the most crucial elements 
and are said to be part of a process which is formal, systematic and representative 
of the entire membership of the agreement403. 
 
                                                 
400 See the following website: 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/advocacy/monitoring/mon
itoring_mechanisms [Date consulted: February 21st 2011]. 
401 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption on its Third Session, supra note 396 at 6, para.3. 
402 Ibid. at 8, para.18. The mechanism states that: “the State party under review may request, a 
maximum of two times, that the drawing of lots be repeated. In exceptional circumstances, the 
drawing of lots may be repeated more than twice”. These ‘exceptional circumstances’ are not 
defined, but a definition might come to light in the future, following practical applications of the 
rule.  
403 Cyrille Fijnaut and Leo Huberts, Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002, at 353 [Fijnaut & Huberts]. 
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The self-assessment checklist consists mainly of a questionnaire that must be filled 
out by the reviewed State404. Each reviewing State appoints experts for the purpose 
of the review process405. A desk review is then conducted, which consists of an 
analysis of the responses given by the reviewed State in the self-assessment 
checklist406, as well as pertinent information produced by similar mechanisms 
under other agreements covering anti-corruption measures407. An on-site visit can 
follow but only if the reviewed State agrees to it408.  
 
An important aspect of any review process is its follow up procedure. Within the 
UNCAC, follow up occurs during the review phase and consists of an analysis of 
the progress made in regard to the observations received by the reviewed State409.  
 
Finally, a country review report is then created by the reviewing States and is 
based on all of the information gathered. It identifies the country’s challenges, 
successes, and good practices and contains “observations” for future 
implementation410. These reports are never published and remain confidential411.  
 
The peer review mechanism is said to be an "instrument for formalizing 
                                                 
404 Ibid. at 8, para.15. 
405 Ibid., para.21. 
406 Ibid. at 9, para.23. 
407 Ibid., para.27. 
408 Ibid., para.29. 
409 Ibid. at 10, para.40. 
410 Ibid., para.33. 
411 Ibid., para.37. 
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cooperation412", in that it is not considered a strict monitoring mechanism but 
rather a cooperative one. Its effectiveness is said to depend on four factors: value 
sharing, commitment, mutual trust, and credibility413. Value sharing implies that 
the participating countries share similar standards upon which to evaluate their 
respective performance. Commitment, on the other hand, refers to the use of an 
adequate level of financial and human resources by Member States in the 
fulfillment of their obligations. While the mutual trust requirement might seem self 
explanatory, it includes transparency and openness in the sharing of information 
and data. Finally, credibility implies complete independence on the part of the 
evaluators.414  
 
There is an added element that is considered as pivotal in the proper functioning of 
the peer review process, that of the participation of civil society, which adds public 
pressure to the existing peer pressure415. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
serves as a good example of the possible benefits of civil society participation, as 
its monitoring mechanism is qualified as elaborate: reports and recommendations 
are made public and private sector and civil society play an active role throughout 
each review phase of the convention's monitoring mechanism416. 
                                                 
412 Fernandez de Casadevante y Romani, supra note 80 at 40. 
413 Pagani, supra note 398 at 21. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Transparency International’s website: 
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itoring_mechanisms [Date consulted: July 14th 2010]. 
416 Marie Chêne and Gillian Dell, “U4 Expert Answer: Comparative Assessment of Anti-
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In our view, the confidentiality of the country reports goes against the UNCAC’s 
guiding principles of transparency and impartiality, as well as its own article 13 
which states that each member should take measures to promote the participation 
of civil society and non-governmental organizations by allowing the public to 
contribute to the decision-making process and by ensuring the public’s access to 
information417. Indeed, before the UNCAC’s mechanism was adopted, 
Transparency International suggested that its monitoring mechanism be as 
transparent as possible, by implementing a mechanism that includes the 
participation of civil society and the private sector418. In this respect, it stated that: 
 
“A process limited to governments reviewing governments behind 
closed doors will have far less public credibility than a more broad-
based process and will be less effective in achieving UNCAC’s 
basic objective of overcoming corruption.419” 
 
It could however be argued that confidentiality is necessary in order to ensure the 
active participation of Member States. However, secrecy is said to have resulted in 
diminished compliance in other regimes, by highlighting difficulties in the 
disclosure of information throughout the evaluation process420: “ [a]ccess to data is 
                                                 
417 UNCAC., art.13. 
418 Fritz Heimann and Gillian Dell, “Recommendations for Review Mechanism for UN Convention 
Against Corruption”, (2007) Transparency International, available 
at:http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/uncac_review_ti_recommen
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419 Ibid. 
420 It is said that secrecy in the International Atomic Energy Agency and human rights regimes has 
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compliance (Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, “Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under 
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essential if […] representatives are to evaluate meaningfully the compliance of 
parties421”.  
 
Although transparency is listed as one of the main objectives of the UNCAC’s 
mechanism, negotiations unfortunately did not give rise to the participation of civil 
society or the private sector in the review process422. Reviewed States must 
however consult impartial parties in order to answer the self-assessment checklist: 
 
“The State party under review shall endeavour to prepare its 
responses to the comprehensive self-assessment checklist through 
broad consultations at the national level with all relevant 
stakeholders, including the private sector, individuals and groups 
outside the public sector.423” 
 
Another guiding principle within the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism is 
impartiality424. In this respect, Transparency International recommends that longer 
term funding come from the regular United Nations budget, as opposed to 
voluntary contributions, as such contributions might affect State impartiality. 
Indeed, they allow the donating governments to exert a measure of control over the 
disbursement of funds425. Furthermore, voluntary contributions are not always 
                                                 
421 Barratt-Brown, ibid. 
422 Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
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consistent and may differ from year to year. The Conference of the States Parties 
decided to follow this recommendation in part only: 
 
“The requirements of the Mechanism and its secretariat shall be 
funded from the regular budget of the United Nations. […] The 
requirements […] relating […] to the requested country visits, the 
joint meetings at the United Nations Office at Vienna and the 
training of experts, shall be funded through voluntary contributions 
[…].426” 
 
It seems that two fundamental principles of the Convention, transparency and 
impartiality, were watered down during the negotiations of the monitoring 
mechanism in order to please the largest number of Member States.  
 
Other obstacles need to be overcome in order for the mechanism to be at its most 
effective. Firstly, many developing countries are worried that close monitoring 
will expose deficiencies which their governments will be unable to adequately 
remedy. This is where the convention’s technical assistance provisions become 
essential. Article 60 of the UNCAC states that: 
 
“States Parties shall, according to their capacity, consider affording 
one another the widest measure of technical assistance, especially 
for the benefit of developing countries, […], which will 
facilitate international cooperation between States Parties in the 
areas of extradition and mutual legal assistance.427” 
                                                                                                                                      
contributions (Ruben Mendez, “Financing the United Nations and the International Public Sector: 
Problems and Reform”, (1997) 3 Global Governance, 283, at 284-288 [Mendez]). For example, 
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Secondly, some industrialized members are concerned that the UNCAC’s 
monitoring process will duplicate efforts under other regional anti-corruption 
conventions428. In order to avoid this, proper coordination among the different 
agreements is necessary and is provided for in the desk review: the reviewed 
participant must expose its efforts based on other anti-corruption initiatives429. As 
the implementation of the UNCAC goes forward, any overlap with other anti-
corruption initiatives can be avoided430. 
 
It is still widely debated whether it is more advantageous to have less strict 
obligations with wider compliance or strict obligations with lower compliance431. 
Only once the review process has been given some time to progress will the 
UNCAC's long term benefits and flaws become visible.  
 
iii. Sanctions Towards Member States 
 
The UNCAC is devoid of sanctions (military or monetary) and does not penalize 
its Member States for non-compliance. There is however considerable debate as to 
the necessity and benefits of sanctions in fostering compliance with international 
                                                 
428 Heineman & Heimann, supra note 60 at 81. 
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treaties432. In fact, it is argued that emphasis should be placed on cooperative 
instead of punitive tactics. The following passage explains this position: 
 
“[A]n emphasis on compliance may point towards a backwards-
looking and essentially legalistic approach focusing on state 
‘misbehaviour’, rather than towards a productive enquiry into 
devising and deploying better normative techniques and 
arrangements that facilitate more effective international dealings and 
cooperation433”.  
 
If one were to compare national enforcement systems with that at the international 
level, the latter might disappoint the unsuspecting eye. A closer look however 
reveals that the two mechanisms do not affect the same players: the reign of 
sovereignty among countries inevitably means that international rules are almost 
always created through a consensual rather than adversarial process. According to 
one author, this fact creates a perpetual conundrum, for the State negotiates 
between its desire to assure itself enough latitude for its own compliance and its 
desire for predictability in other States’ behavior434. This reality can perhaps serve 
to explain in part why the UNCAC does not include sanctions.  
 
There are further arguments positing that sanctions (in either an economic435 or 
military form) are not necessarily beneficial to a treaty’s implementation or 
sustained enforcement. This is in part due to financial constraints: repeated 
sanctions may be costly over time and diminish legitimacy436. The following 
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passage illustrates this reality: 
 
“The costs of economic sanctions are also high, not only for the state 
against which they are directed, where sanctions fall mainly on the 
weakest and most vulnerable, but also for the sanctioning states. 
When economic sanctions are used, they tend to be leaky. Results are 
slow and not particularly conducive to changing behaviour. The most 
important cost, however, is less obvious. It is the serious political 
investment required to mobilize and maintain a concerted military or 
economic effort over time in a system without any recognized or 
acknowledged hierarchically superior authority437”. 
 
Another opinion suggests that cooperative enforcement models do not exclude the 
application of sanctions, but that they may in fact complement one another438. The 
success of the cooperation-based model would be enhanced by the mere fear or 
threat of sanctions439. It is also argued that military and economic sanctions or 
fines are rarely invoked due to the high risk of failure: the “membership 
dilemma440” posits that the failure to impose sanctions on the non-abiding member 
is a sign of acceptance of the prohibited behavior. Expulsion on the other hand 
cuts off cooperation completely, allowing the member to act freely441. These 
possibilities however represent extreme measures, whereas monetary sanctions can 
be considered as an intermediary solution. The downside with such a measure is 
that poorer States might not be able to pay the sanction, whereas richer States 
might not be deterred. It can therefore be argued that monetary sanctions and 
member expulsion are not beneficial in fostering State compliance and negatively 
                                                                                                                                      
Journal, 2599 at 2636 [Koh]. 
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impact the more vulnerable States. 
 
Another argument downplaying the importance of economic or military sanctions 
is related to the concern a State has over its reputation. The following author 
believes that a country’s reputation within a treaty regime affects its behavior:  
 
“Even in situations with considerable incentives to defect and 
unavailable reciprocal and institutional sanctions, the prospect of 
exclusion from future agreements and/or having participation in 
current agreements discounted suffices to ensure compliance442”. 
Thus, States guilty of non-compliance can face the prospect of a reputation-
oriented sanction: 
 
“The parties to an agreement know that reservations, exceptions, 
escape clauses, and so on capture only some of the possible future 
situations. They recognize that there is a risk that they will violate a 
commitment, and that this may generate a loss of reputation.443”  
 
One of the benefits of this type of sanction is that it affects States more 
democratically or equally. Wealthier States are normally more able to answer to 
economic or military sanctions, whereas no State is sheltered when it comes to its 
reputation444. However, the reputation of poorer Member States might suffer due 
to their lower compliance rate as a result of their developing economies445.  
 
There are different theories concerning a State's reputation. A more traditional 
theory suggests that a State has a single reputation, making less financially stable 
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States more vulnerable to being typecast as non-cooperative. However, another 
theory posits that any given State has a different reputation for each of its different 
regimes446. This multiple reputation-based theory is less penalizing, as it allows 
weaker developing States to be perceived as non-compliant in one regime, and 
compliant in another. Guzman’s theory regarding reputation-oriented sanctions 
suggests that the impact that a violation might have on a State’s reputation must be 
contextualized on a case-by-case basis: 
 
“It seems clear that the reputational impact of a violation of 
international law varies depending on the nature of the violation. 
For example, a failure to comply with a minor international 
obligation that is a result of oversight or human error and that is 
promptly corrected without damage to other states is unlikely to 
have a major reputational impact. In contrast, an egregious and 
intentional violation, such as support of terrorist activities against 
another state, is likely to have a profound impact on a nation’s 
reputation. […] A list of factors that influence the reputational 
impact of a violation, therefore, should include (1) the severity of 
the violation, (2) the reasons for the violation, (3) the extent to 
which other states know of the violation, and (4) the clarity of the 
commitment and the violation.447” 
 
It can be argued that one of the main goals of law is to affect behavior, whether in 
individuals or international actors448. This behavioral change is also considered 
essential in creating effective conventions449. Although the UNCAC does not 
provide for economic or military sanctions, Member States cannot escape their 
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448 Ibid. at 51. See also Haas, supra note 324 at 67. 
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members whose behavior is consequential must be part of the agreement, and finally, they must 
feel obligated to modify their behavior. These three conditions are considered key elements to a 
different kind of level of compliance: cooperation. 
 
 
 
98
reputation. Therefore there is in fact an important incentive for them to comply 
with their obligations: the perception of society and their peers. 
 
Section II - Indirect Compliance Challenges 
 
By “indirect compliance challenges”, we refer to external factors to the UNCAC, 
meaning difficulties which arise not from the Convention’s wording or content, 
but by elements that exist independently and that cannot easily if at all be 
modified, such as the absence of good governance in some countries and the 
inherent nature of the offences covered by the Convention. 
 
i. Good Governance 
 
The greatest challenges in combating corruption are mostly related to good 
governance450. Good governance is a broad notion that has many meanings, one of 
which defines it as the “proper functioning of governmental machinery451”. 
Another specifies that it can be measured using three main criteria: the nature of a 
State’s political regime, the process by which economic and social resources are 
managed, and the ability of the State to prepare and apply economic policy452. A 
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more normative description illustrates governance as “the conscious management 
of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public 
realm453”.  
 
Strong existing domestic institutions are considered an obvious requirement of 
good governance454. Their importance in fostering compliance is apparent when 
considering the work of Hathaway:  
 
“[…] strong domestic institutions are essential not only to domestic 
rule of law, but also to international rule of law. Where 
international bodies are less active in enforcement of treaty 
commitments […] it falls to domestic institutions to fill the gap. In 
some states, this reliance on domestic institutions is effective. In 
others it is less so. In democratic nations, where domestic rule of 
law and hence enforcement tend to be relatively strong (because the 
judiciary, media, and political parties are free to operate 
independent of the executive), states are more likely to abide by 
international law whether it is externally enforced or not. In less 
democratic nations, where domestic enforcement can be less 
effective, states are less likely to abide by international law that is 
not enforced by transnational bodies.455” 
 
According to the World Bank, transparency is a core component of good 
governance456 and includes many facets, such as the “public disclosure of assets 
and incomes of candidates running for public office (…), public disclosure of 
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political campaign contributions457”, “campaign expenditures458” and “public 
disclosure of all parliamentary votes, draft legislation and parliamentary 
debates459”. The following paragraphs attempt to assess this specific aspect of 
transparency that we consider particularly relevant to the persisting lacuna in 
multilateral anti-corruption agreements: that of political party financing460.  
 
Political parties should arise independently from the State as an answer to the will 
of societies461. It is therefore imperative that they remain free of government 
influence as the voice of the people. The rationale for limiting political party 
financing is supported by the opinion that “transparency has a curative effect on 
the process of raising money, and contribution limits diminish the possibility of 
corruption462”. Other justifications include the fast growth of competition derived 
from campaign financing463, and the frequent instances of diversion of funds for 
personal use, favoritism, and vote purchasing464.  
 
During the UNCAC’s negotiations, political corruption, or more specifically the 
                                                 
457 Daniel Kaufmann, “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption”, in Global 
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call on States to “incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties” (Article 
10). 
461 Antonio Argandona, “Political Party Funding and Business Corruption”, Chair of Economics 
and Ethics, Research Paper No 458, January 2002 at 4 [Argandona, “Political Party Funding and 
Business Corruption”]. 
462 Henning, supra note 97 at 843. 
463 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 215. 
464 Babu, supra note 26 at 15. 
 
 
 
101
use of illegally obtained funds to finance political parties caused intense debate. 
The views of the delegations diverged considerably regarding the inclusion of a 
provision incorporated in the Draft Convention465 entitled “Funding of Political 
Parties”, which tentatively read as follows: 
 
“1. Each State Party shall adopt, maintain and strengthen measures 
and regulations concerning the funding of political parties. Such 
measures and regulations shall serve: 
(a) To prevent conflicts of interest; 
(b) To preserve the integrity of democratic political structures and 
processes; 
(c) To proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and 
corrupt practices to finance political parties; and 
(d) To incorporate the concept of transparency into funding of 
political parties by requiring declaration of donations exceeding a 
specified limit. 
2. Each State Party shall take measures to avoid as far as possible 
conflicts of interest owing to simultaneous holding of elective office 
and responsibilities in the private sector.466” 
A number of delegations however suggested that the provision be deleted because 
of the important differences in the Parties' legal systems467 and the provision was 
eventually removed during the sixth session of the Ad Hoc Committee468. There 
                                                 
465 Proposed by Austria, the Netherlands, and France in Proposals and Contributions Received 
from Governments: Austria, France and The Netherlands, U.N.Doc. A/AC.261/L.21. 
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did however remain a shadow of the deleted offence included in article 7 of the 
Convention which stipulates that: 
 
“Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative 
and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this 
Convention and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, to enhance transparency in the funding of 
candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the 
funding of political parties.469” 
The final non-mandatory language has been labeled a disappointment and 
criticized as “toothless”470. Indeed, the revised provision is stripped of its content, 
scope, and enforceability. The removal of the more detailed and stringent 
provision was however deemed necessary to accommodate the concerns of a 
substantial number of delegations and to ensure the completion of the Draft 
Convention before the fast-approaching deadline471. It should be noted that no 
existing multilateral instrument contains detailed provisions on the funding of 
political parties and that perhaps attempting to arrive at a global consensus on this 
sensitive issue was an unrealistic goal472.  
 
ii. The Prosecution of Bribery and Bribery Related Offences 
 
Unlike other crimes, “crimes of corruption are carried out in secret473”. As bribery 
                                                                                                                                      
2003). 
469 UNCAC, art.7(3). Emphasis added. 
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is a consensual act, there is no apparent or direct victim. Indirect victims are 
usually not aware that a specific transaction has occurred474. Only incomplete 
transactions are likely to be reported, unless there is third party knowledge of the 
corrupt transaction. Logically, if the transaction is completed, then both parties to 
it are guilty of a crime, and neither of them will denounce the act or want to come 
forward as a witness. This makes detection of the crime and its enforcement quite 
problematic. Furthermore, the low reporting rate of such crimes may be explained 
by the fact that complaints are made only when bribery deals fail to come to 
fruition475. The following passage clearly demonstrates the difficulties in 
prosecuting such offences: 
 
“Bribery takes place in the shadows. It may never be visible to 
anyone but the immediate actors. Where there are hints of bribery, 
investigations backed with some form of compulsory process may 
be necessary to establish the case that a signatory is obliged to take 
action. Finally, even if there is information available about a 
specific, possibly illicit payment, a prosecutor may have good 
reasons for declining to prosecute the case: insufficient evidence to 
meet a criminal conviction standard of proof, potential cost of the 
prosecution relative to other enforcement priorities, etc.476” 
 
Another aspect making prosecuting corruption offences difficult lies in the 
inadequacy of procedural and evidentiary laws in many countries. For instance, 
many money laundering offences or financial offences are carried out with the use 
of computers and advanced software. Developing countries do not always have the 
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necessary legislation in place in order to manage the admissibility of such 
evidence before national courts477. This is still the case in Nigeria. Even dating 
back to 1976, the Nigerian Supreme Court rendered a decision stating that new 
means of reproducing bank account information needed to be considered, referring 
to computer generated bank statements: 
 
“The law cannot be and is not ignorant of modern business methods 
and must not shut its eyes to the mysteries of computer. In modern 
times reproductions or inscriptions or ledgers or other documents 
by mechanical process are common place and S.37 cannot, 
therefore, only apply to books of account so bound and the pages 
not easily replaced.478” 
 
A further drawback concerns the availability of testimonial evidence. When 
witnesses live abroad, obtaining statements or ensuring witness cooperation is 
more difficult. This is not a rare occurrence in money laundering or bribery cases 
and without key witnesses the possibility of losing the case at trial can be high479. 
Even with the arrival of the UNCAC, this scenario is probable when taking a 
closer look at its extradition requirements. Article 44 of the Convention creates 
loopholes by subjecting extradition to Member States domestic laws480. Moreover, 
in cases where extradition is refused, it is said that local trials rarely produce any 
outcome as a result of the inaccessibility of evidence, such as witnesses located 
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overseas481.  
 
Furthermore, the investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes can become 
expensive and time-consuming as they may require specialized forensics in certain 
areas such as accounting and money laundering. For these types of offences, local 
forensic offices are necessary. If countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan and the 
United Kingdom are not equipped with proper forensic offices, the chances that 
developing countries might possess the necessary means are quite slim482. 
 
The prosecution of transnational crimes is wholly dependant upon national 
prosecution. Even with a comprehensive international treaty, it is up to each 
Member State to either prosecute locally or to cooperate with its counterparts. The 
following passage illustrates the difficulty in effectively prosecuting transnational 
organized crime: 
 
“But it is this reliance on national action that creates the greatest 
obstacle against effective action against transnational organized 
crime, and which has created so many safe havens for drug 
traffickers, migrant smugglers, money launderers and other 
suspects. […] The opportunities offered by globalization have 
enabled sophisticated criminal organizations to take advantage of 
the discrepancies in different legal systems and the non-cooperative 
attitude of many nations.483” 
 
These are critical arguments justifying the need for the centralized prosecution of 
bribery and bribery-related crimes through the International Criminal Court 
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(hereafter “ICC”). It is argued that such a step would make international law 
enforcement more efficient by providing a further layer or forum in addition to 
prosecutions at the national level484.  
 
Although some might assume that the ICC’s jurisdiction is universal, it is in fact 
subsidiary and complementary to national tribunals485. Furthermore, it is limited 
by other factors: 
 
“Il y a plusieurs restrictions qui ont été posées à la compétence de 
la C.P.I. et l’on doit malheureusement constater que cette 
compétence n’est pas aussi universelle qu’on pourrait le croire. En 
effet, la compétence de la Cour n’est pas seulement 
complémentaire ou subsidiaire mais elle est aussi limitée quant aux 
infractions qu’elle peut juger, quant à l’époque où ces infractions 
ont été commises, quant au lieu où elles se sont produites et quant 
aux personnes qui peuvent comparaître devant elle.486” 
The ICC has jurisdiction over a limited number of offences, namely genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression487. Although the 
ICC’s jurisdiction initially extended itself to other offences such as drug 
trafficking, opposition to including them grew due to several considerations488. 
Among these was the fear that such an inclusion might substantially burden the 
court’s resources and that “sovereignty issues of some nations might bar 
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prosecution of such offences by an international authority489”. The following 
passage illustrates this resistance among certain States to the creation of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions: 
 
“Historically, efforts to create treaty provisions for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction met significant resistance. During negotiations of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the treaty that 
established the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United 
States (who ultimately did not ratify the treaty) resisted efforts by 
some nations to add a provision permitting universal jurisdiction, 
and as a result of this resistance, no such provision was added. […] 
[T]he United States now generally refuses to consent to any treaty 
that provides the International Court of Justice with jurisdiction 
over disputes without having the option to waive such a provision. 
Other states, including Australia and the United Kingdom, consent 
to ICJ treaties only under the reservation that certain disputes be 
excluded from the ICJ’s jurisdiction.490” 
 
The ICC’s statute would have to be amended in order for it to have jurisdiction 
over the offences included in the UNCAC. The following passage illustrates the 
difficult task of amending the ICC’s statute to include other offences: “A review 
and inclusion is not going to happen soon, and the mere fact that the ICC’s statute 
will have to be amended to include such offences will be a formidable barrier to 
the ICC ever taking responsibility for them491”.  
 
In order to conclude this chapter, the following paragraphs consider the work of 
Gerald E. Caiden that advances common flaws that have been observed in most 
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anti-corruption tools492. These flaws, when studied against the UNCAC, may serve 
as a basis for reviewing the Convention’s effectiveness493. 
 
The first flaw relates to the definition of corruption. Too often corruption is 
defined using specific and narrow terms, disregarding the fact that in reality it 
encompasses a very wide spectrum of misconduct494. The second flaw, similar to 
the first, addresses the scope of the treaties; it criticizes the absence of offences 
relating to private sector corruption, stating that “[c]orruption in the private sector 
infiltrates the public sector and vice versa, just as the corruption in international 
business has been assimilated with governments495”. This applies to most anti-
corruption agreements that criminalize only certain types of bribery496. However, 
the negotiators of the UNCAC clearly took this aspect into consideration by 
purposely omitting to include a definition of corruption, instead focusing on 
criminalizing a wide range of public and private bribery offences. 
 
The third flaw concerns the lack of a distinction between political and 
administrative corruption within many anti-corruption tools. According to Caiden, 
administrative corruption does not necessarily imply political corruption: one level 
of administration can participate in corrupt activities leaving other levels unaware 
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of any wrongdoing. Adversely, political corruption can rarely function without the 
participation of the administration497. Although the UNCAC differentiates between 
these two types of corruption in its provision against political party funding, it 
does not go any further with this distinction498. Instead, the UNCAC clearly 
defines what acts must constitute criminal offences under the Convention, without 
categorizing the offence as either political or administrative. In our view, this 
categorization is not necessary for ensuring the proper application of anti-
corruption provisions in an international treaty, since the details of implementation 
are left to the Member States. As long as the act itself is prohibited, its 
categorization, in our view, is not crucial to the agreement’s capacity to eradicate 
and prevent the unwanted behavior.  
 
Another flaw criticizes the mistake many anti-corruption tools make by failing to 
differentiate between large and small-scale corruption, implying that both may be 
tackled together499. In our opinion, a distinction must be made between 
institutionalized corruption and occasional or intermittent acts of corruption. 
Simply punishing an individual act of corruption does not in itself result in the 
prevention of future corrupt behavior, particularly in instances where corruption is 
institutionalized:  
 
“Regrettably, in systemic corruption, the mere elimination of 
individual wrongdoers will not stem institutionalized corruption 
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since there are always other individuals that can replace the 
wrongdoers, and the cycle of corruption continues virtually without 
interruption500”. 
 
In this respect, the UNCAC’s preventive measures seem to have captured this 
fundamental attribute of corruption by tackling corruption at its root instead of 
simply attempting to punish the corrupt individuals. 
 
The fifth flaw stresses the importance of setting realistic goals. Corruption will 
never be fully eradicated. The attempt to eradicate it is therefore inevitably futile. 
It has taken successful States many generations to restrain corruption501. The 
UNCAC does not attempt to eliminate corruption in its entirety, but rather intends 
to strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption, to promote international 
cooperation and integrity502.  
 
The next two flaws relate to the lack of political will among States and 
'sabotage'503. Although the lack of political will is passive and results in inaction, 
sabotage necessitates deliberate action504. Describing the act of sabotage, Caiden 
gives the example of a political leader who promises to end corruption in order to 
attract supporters, only to later adopt the same behavior as his predecessors, thus 
continuing the cycle of corruption505.  
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With the adoption of the UNCAC, the political will for an anti-corruption 
convention was strongly felt. However, the use of discretionary language is 
prevalent throughout the Convention. It is a reflection of how much Member 
States were willing to sacrifice in the fight against corruption. The discretionary 
quality of the language used within the UNCAC is, in our view, one of the 
Convention's greatest flaws and may prove to diminish its effectiveness by its 
inability to sustain compliance. Another major flaw is the Convention’s 
monitoring mechanism, which fails to go further than previous anti-corruption 
agreements by omitting to include civil society in the mutual evaluation process.  
 
Although the Convention does not define its obligations as precisely as hoped, it 
does put a vast framework into place, thus allowing an important number of 
Member States to cooperate with each other. Its broad terminology also reflects 
the need for flexibility and adaptability, as corruption is an evolving 
phenomenon506.  
 
Furthermore, the UNCAC’s provisions on asset recovery, technical assistance, 
cooperation, and the private sector are an important development in the field of 
anti-corruption as these areas were scarcely prioritized in previous multilateral 
anti-corruption treaties. Moreover, these provisions play a major role in addressing 
large-scale corruption and in bringing the fight against corruption to new 
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territories. 
 
Given the previous analysis, it is clear that the UNCAC’s effectiveness is 
threatened by its direct and indirect compliance challenges. The next chapter will 
attempt to determine the UNCAC’s relevancy by studying competing multilateral 
anti-corruption agreements.  
 
 
Chapter II – Barriers to the Convention’s Relevancy: 
Existing Anti-Corruption Initiatives  
 
Relevancy addresses the urgency of the problem tackled by the Convention. It can 
be assessed in part by studying other similar instruments and laws already in place, 
as these, we argue, are in competition with one another: “il convient sans doute de 
tenir compte, dans l’analyse de l’internationalisation des pratiques de corruption 
internationale, de la concurrence normative […]507”. If the UNCAC is able to 
tackle more diverse corruption offences and to incorporate a higher number of 
players than its counterparts, it can in our view be qualified as relevant regardless 
of the already existing anti-corruption instruments.  
 
The UNCAC is not the first international instrument to tackle corruption. It is 
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however argued that it is the most comprehensive anti-corruption tool508. The 
following sections will briefly consider previous anti-corruption related 
international and regional agreements by starting with an overview of the 
agreement, followed by a brief summary of its monitoring mechanism. 
 
Section I - The OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials  
 
i. Overview of the Instrument 
 
The OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials entered into 
force in 1999, after two years of negotiations509. The Convention “marked the 
beginning of an international movement based on the premise that we all have a 
stake in the integrity of the global marketplace that deserves the protection of 
law510”. The United States exerted considerable pressure on its fellow OECD 
Member States to bring about their participation in the Convention. The United 
States, up to that period, was the only country to have made the act of bribing a 
foreign public official illegal with the adoption of its Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act511 in 1977. In fact, the FCPA was used as a model for the OECD Anti-Bribery 
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Convention512. All thirty-four members of the OECD are party to the 1999 
Convention513, and as of December 1999, eighteen members had also enacted their 
own national anti-bribery laws514. 
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s main requirement is that each Member 
State adopt national legislation against the bribery of foreign government officials 
in international business transactions515: it therefore deals strictly with 
transnational bribery, making it its main punishable offence. The OECD 
Convention is a clear example of an agreement dealing with the supply-side of 
bribery only: 
 
“The Convention, which deals only with transnational bribery, is 
the exemplary case of an arrangement addressing the “supply-side” 
of bribery. It obliges signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign 
officials but does not address the “taking” of bribes by their own 
officials. Thus, it covers only the impact of bribery by one 
country’s residents (including corporations) upon the government 
of another country.516” 
Its application is therefore limited when considering that the UNCAC covers both 
the supply and demand sides of bribery. The following passage demonstrates that 
the main goal of the agreement was to hinder active bribery as opposed to passive 
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bribery: “The OECD initiative against bribery in international business 
transactions developed out of the pledge by industrialized nations […] to combat 
the supply side of bribery. The approach is aimed at reducing the influx of corrupt 
payments […]517”. 
 
Although it is still unclear whether the UNCAC’s provisions apply to facilitation 
payments in practice, it is quite clear that the OECD Convention creates an 
exception allowing such payments when made to lower level public officials: 
“[s]mall “facilitation” payments do not constitute payments made “to obtain or 
retain business or other improper advantage” […] and, accordingly, are also not an 
offence”518. 
 
Similarly to the UNCAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention does not provide for 
any sanctions against offenders, nor does it provide sanctions against Member 
States for non-compliance. It leaves the use of sanctions towards legal persons to 
the discretion of the Parties, stating that among the sanctions used there should be 
effective and dissuasive criminal penalties, including the “deprivation of liberty 
sufficient to enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradition519”. 
Moreover, the OECD Convention contains two provisions that attempt to hinder 
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Member States from trying to circumvent the goal of the agreement. Firstly, a 
State must not be influenced by the potential effect its decisions might have on 
relations with another member, nor should it be influenced by national economic 
interests: 
 
“Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public 
official shall be subject to the applicable rules and principles of 
each Party. They shall not be influenced by considerations of 
national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with 
another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons 
involved. 520”  
Secondly, regarding the issue of a statute of limitations, the Convention states that 
every Member State's national legislation must “allow an adequate period of time 
for the investigation and prosecution521” of all offences522. 
 
When comparing the OECD Convention to the UNCAC, a few elements stand out. 
First is the length of the agreements. The OECD Convention has a mere seventeen 
articles, whereas the UNCAC has over seventy. Second is the number of Parties: 
the UNCAC has over a hundred parties, whereas the OECD Convention has 
roughly thirty-five523. Although this is in part due to the regional quality of the 
latter agreement, it still merits consideration when assessing the universal 
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characteristic of the conventions. Third, the OECD Convention does not address 
asset recovery, a key issue provided for in length by the UNCAC. However, the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s monitoring mechanism is said to be its 
distinguishing characteristic524. 
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s monitoring mechanism was the first 
mechanism to be adopted in the field of anti-corruption and is considered one of 
the most vigorous among its counterparts525. The OECD has conducted over 150 
investigations from which approximately sixty individuals and companies have 
been sanctioned526. It contains a questionnaire prepared by the reviewing States, a 
mandatory on site visit and a public country review report. Furthermore, civil 
society and the private sector play an active part in all phases of the process527. 
 
The review process consists of two phases. The first phase focuses on whether the 
enacted national legislation is consistent with the anti-bribery convention’s 
requirements. The second phase focuses on enforcement and the Member State’s 
capacity to prevent, deter and sanction transnational bribery528. In order to create 
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incentives to cooperate with the reviewing countries and to properly implement the 
convention requirements, the review reports include specific recommendations as 
well as a follow-up mechanism. The review process is set up so as to allow 
participants enough time to start implementing changes in their national regime 
according to the recommendations they receive in each phase529. By rendering the 
results of the review process public, significant pressure is brought to bear on 
members to improve their implementation of the Convention's obligations.  
 
In practice, the country evaluations are carried out by experts from two countries 
who in the first phase will use questionnaires answered by the reviewed State as 
well as submitted legal materials. In this phase, the standard of implementation is 
evaluated and a report is published on the Internet. In the second phase, the 
examined State’s deployed resources and structures are considered by using once 
again questionnaires followed by on-site visits530. 
 
It is safe to conclude that the UNCAC represents a significant step forward in 
many respects, for instance by the number of its Member States, its geographical 
pull, the wide array of offences it includes (such as the bribery of a domestic 
official and bribery in the private sector), its detailed provisions and the inclusion 
of detailed asset recovery provisions. However, when comparing both agreements’ 
monitoring mechanisms, one must conclude that the OECD Anti-Bribery 
                                                 
529 Chêne & Dell, supra note 416 at 2. 
530 Fijnaut & Huberts, supra note 403 at 354. 
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Convention’s enforcement mechanism is more effective: contrary to the UNCAC’s 
monitoring process, the results of the country reviews are rendered public, a 
quality that in our view, enhances the process’ transparency as well as any effect 
public dishonor might have on the reviewed State’s behavior.  
 
Section II - The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
 
i. Overview of the Instrument 
 
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted by the Organization 
of American States531 in March of 1996, was the first regional agreement to 
impose anti-corruption obligations532. It became effective almost exactly a year 
later and consists of 28 articles with 33 Parties to date533. Its approach is qualified 
as hemispheric due to the region it covers534 and it is considered “a compromise 
between Latin-American interests in mutual legal assistance and extradition and 
the North-American agenda in criminalizing active transnational commercial 
                                                 
531 Hereafter “OAS”. Members of the OAS are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.  
532 Nancy Boswell, “International Law Standards for Domestic Governance”, (2003) 97 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings, 133 at 134 [Boswell]. 
533 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 499. Parties to the IACAC are: Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
534 Henning, supra note 97 at 807. 
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bribery535”. 
 
The IACAC’s scope is wider than that of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, also 
criminalizing transnational bribery in the public and private sector but including 
both the supply and demand sides of bribery, as well as provisions criminalizing 
illicit enrichment. Furthermore, the IACAC does not contain any exceptions 
allowing facilitation payments, but rather criminalizes “any article of monetary 
value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage536”. It also 
reverses the burden of proof pertaining to cases where there exists a sudden 
increase in an official’s assets537. In these respects, it rivals the UNCAC: it does 
not create any prima facie exception for facilitation payments and contains 
provisions that lighten the burden for the prosecution in certain circumstances538. It 
leaves the criminalization of other corruption related offences to the discretion of 
its members by encouraging them to consider establishing additional offences539. 
Once adopted, these additional offences become acts of corruption under the 
IACAC triggering requirements concerning cooperation with States that have not 
necessarily criminalized the same offences540. The OAS Convention has other 
noteworthy provisions relating to extradition and cooperation:  
 
“[T]he convention constitutes the most important inter-American 
                                                 
535 Mark Pieth, “The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime”, (1999) 1 European Journal 
of Law Reform, 527 at 538 [Pieth]. 
536 IACAC, art.6 (1) a). 
537 Ibid. 
538 For example, Article 20 of the UNCAC shifts the burden of proof to the defendant where he or 
she is accused of illicit enrichment.  
539 IACAC, art.V, para.4. 
540 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 194. 
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legal instrument for extraditing those who commit crimes of 
corruption [and] in co-operation and assistance among the states in 
obtaining evidence and facilitating necessary procedural acts 
regarding the investigation or trials of corruption […]541”. 
 
Similarly to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UNCAC, the IACAC is 
devoid of any penalties542, and is therefore criticized as being weak543. While the 
compulsory quality of the language varies within the IACAC, its key provision on 
acts of corruption is however drafted in mandatory terms:  
 
“Article VI specifies all acts of corruption that fall within the 
IACAC’s scope. While Article VI does not provide a specific 
definition of corruption, it does list a number of ‘acts of corruption’ 
that must be criminalized. Article VI condemns both active and 
passive bribery, but limits its reach to corrupt practices by public 
officials within the State Party’s territorial boundary544”. 
 
One of its shortcomings is its limited geographical scope, centered on the western 
hemisphere. Although this is explained by the fact that the IACAC remains a 
regional initiative, accession is open to any other State, not only to members of the 
OAS545. European Union countries and other important non-western nations have 
therefore no incentive to adhere to the OAS scheme546. Furthermore, contrary to 
the UNCAC, the IACAC does not contain any actual asset recovery provisions: 
 
“La Convention de l’Organisation des États américains apparait, 
donc, plus intéressée par la punition des contrevenants à ses 
prescriptions et au remboursement des frais d’investigation et 
d’enquêtes que par la restitution proprement dite des avoirs issus de 
                                                 
541 Fijnaut & Huberts, supra note 403 at 393. 
542 IACAC, art.V, para.4 
543 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 214. 
544 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 501. 
545 IACAC, art.XXIII. 
546 Gantz, supra note 128 at 482. 
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la corruption.547” 
 
Finally, no compliance mechanism was initially set up in the Convention548. Such 
a mechanism was only subsequently adopted in June of 2001 during the OAS’ 
thirty-first General Assembly after participants to the agreement realized that the 
agreement had a limited chance of success unless a monitoring process was put 
into place549. The State Parties used the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as a 
model and adopted a similar procedure based on peer review550.  
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The Convention’s monitoring mechanism is composed of two bodies: the 
Conference of the States Parties to the IACAC and the Committee of Experts. The 
latter is responsible for the analysis of the implementation of the Convention 
among its members, whereas the COSP reviews the performance of the 
Committee551. Contrary to the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism, the State under 
review can decide to change, and appoint, experts to the Committee552. The 
Committee of Experts reviews the State Party’s performance in multiple rounds, 
                                                 
547 Bah, supra note 278 at 24. 
548 Gantz, supra note 128 at 480. 
549Roberto De Michele, “The Follow-Up Mechanism of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption: A Preliminary Assessment”, (2003-2004) 10 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade 
in the Americas, 295 at 297 [De Michele]. 
550 Ibid. at 300. 
551 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 506. 
552 Rules of procedure and Other Provisions of the Committee of Experts of the Mechanism for 
Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 
SG/MESICIC/doc.9/04 rev.3 (Dec. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic_rules.pdf. 
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each round pertaining to an individual provision of the IACAC553. 
 
An important aspect of the IACAC’s review process is that it is subject to the 
public’s scrutiny: country reports are made public at the end of the review process 
and civil society can take part in the self-assessment phase554. Furthermore, civil 
society organizations may submit documents to the experts carrying out the review 
in order to ensure that the information available to them is not biased or purely 
one-sided555. They may also make presentations in Committee meetings, whether 
formal or informal556. Experts can also decide to search or to receive any 
information pertinent to the review process557. The importance of experts using 
information submitted by third parties is illustrated in the following passage: 
 
“These are some of the reasons why civil society organizations 
should keep an appropriate distance from the responsibilities of 
their own governments in responding to the questionnaire. Failing 
to do so can affect the independence of judgment expected from 
non-governmental organizations. In fact, one of the debates within 
the Conference of the State Parties focused on how to avoid 
governments providing unreliable information on the 
implementation of the Convention. Logically, a third party – civil 
society – could play a role in providing alternative opinions that 
could help balance the information and avoid governments acting 
softly on each other558”. 
 
On a more practical front, there have been problems with the timeliness of the 
review process. The following passage dating back to 2003 criticized the first 
                                                 
553 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 506. 
554 De Michele, supra note 549 at 308. 
555 Ibid. at 311. 
556 Altamirano, supra note 318 at 506. 
557 De Michele, supra note 549 at 312. 
558 Ibid. at 317. 
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stage of the review process and demonstrates a clear lagging in the mechanism: 
 
“This initial phase has demonstrated the need for resources to do a 
thorough review of all the parties within a reasonable time. The 
original timetable has already slipped (…). Some countries will not 
be reviewed until eight years after the Convention entered into 
force. Moreover, this stage of review only examines certain 
Convention provisions. As the program is currently organized, 
others will not be addressed until 2005. It is urgent that the process 
be accelerated if the Convention is to have an impact on 
governance in the hemisphere559”.  
 
While the IACAC criminalizes more offences than the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, its scope and wider applicability do not compare to that of the 
UNCAC. When comparing review mechanisms, one can observe that the OECD 
and the IACAC’s mechanisms have an important aspect in common: they are more 
transparent than the UNCAC’s review process in that they allow the participation 
of the private sector and of non-governmental organizations, a crucial facet of 
transparency. Furthermore, the IACAC’s monitoring mechanism comprises of a 
COSP and a Committee of Experts. It seems that the IACAC’s Committee of 
Experts has quasi-investigatory powers that enable it to conduct inquiries. Such 
powers were not provided for in the negotiation of the UNCAC’s monitoring 
mechanism. Creating such a committee within the UNCAC’s review process 
would not only, in our opinion, afford the mechanism greater independence, but 
would bring it closer to the expert review process (as opposed to the peer review 
mechanism), rendering the evaluation process more adversarial and effective. 
 
                                                 
559 Boswell, supra note 532 at 135. 
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Section III - The United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime  
 
i. Overview of the Instrument 
 
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was the 
United Nations’ first attempt to create a binding international agreement in the 
fight against corruption. It was drafted by a committee composed of a 127 States 
and was adopted in November of 2000 and has 159 Parties560. It entered into force 
three years later with the submission of the fortieth instrument of ratification, and 
contains little over twenty articles561.  
 
Focusing mainly on organized crime, it also recognizes that corruption can be a 
result of organized criminal activity. It therefore also addresses other various 
transnational criminal offences, such as money laundering, corruption, and 
obstruction of justice562. The Convention does not address the issue of corruption 
in the private sector. Regarding bribery related offences, both the supply and 
demand sides are criminalized563, and the criminalization of other forms of 
                                                 
560 For a full list of the Parties to the UNCATOC, see the following website: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&lang=en [Date consulted: February 15th 2011]. 
561 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 203. 
562 Gerhard Kemp, “The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: A 
Milestone in International Criminal Law”, (2001) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 152 at 
152 [Kemp]. 
563 UNCTOC, art.8. 
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corruption is left to the discretion of the Member States564. Because of the 
Convention’s main concern with organized crime, its cooperation provisions can 
only apply to corruption cases if they contain a transnational component or if they 
involve an organized criminal group565. Unfortunately, the UNCTOC does not 
provide for any penalties or sanctions. However, it does call on Member States to 
adopt measures enabling the confiscation of proceeds of crime, as well as their 
identification, tracing, freezing and seizure566. 
 
It is our opinion that any rivalry between the UNCTOC and the UNCAC is trivial, 
because the UNCTOC was not meant to vastly cover corruption. In fact, during the 
negotiations for the UNCTOC, it was understood that the problem of corruption 
was so important that a separate agreement should be negotiated in order for it to 
be properly addressed567. However, because the UNCTOC’s monitoring 
mechanism has been widely criticized, its overview against that of the UNCAC’s 
is far from trivial.  
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The UNCTOC’s monitoring mechanism has been deemed too weak in order to be 
considered a “fully fledged review mechanism568”. It is carried out by the 
                                                 
564 Ibid. 
565 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 204. 
566 UNCTOC, art.12. 
567 Vlassis, supra note 17 at 127. 
568 Chêne & Dell, supra note 416 at 6. 
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Conference of States Parties to the Convention and consists mostly of 
questionnaires. While the COSP has the ability to recommend improvements to the 
reviewed State, there is however no process allowing for the verification or 
publicity of country reports. Furthermore, the mechanism does not provide for any 
on-site visits.  
 
The UNCTOC’s mechanism suffers from some of the same lacunas as the 
UNCAC’s: civil society is not involved and the evaluations are based on similar 
questionnaires or checklists569. This is quite interesting as there had been high 
hopes that the UNCAC would rectify many of the UNCTOC’s gaps. The will of 
the States to either carry out their reviews zealously or to abstain in doing so will 
be decisive in the new convention’s success. Indeed, part of the problem with the 
UNCTOC’s review process was the lack of participation by its members: the 
questionnaires based on self-assessments received a very low response rate570. 
 
When considering the UNCTOC, it is safe to conclude that the UNCAC is not at 
risk of becoming obsolete or without purpose. It was after all understood at the 
time of the adoption of the UNCTOC that a separate and more complete anti-
corruption agreement needed to be negotiated in order to remedy the legislative 
gaps relating to corruption, and in this respect, the UNCAC does not disappoint. 
Counting over seventy articles, it contains detailed provisions on private sector 
                                                 
569 Ibid. 
570 Ibid. 
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corruption, detailed asset recovery measures and also covers many other bribery 
related offences, such as trading in influence, embezzlement, and obstruction of 
justice571. What is disappointing is that the UNCAC, having adopted a similar 
review mechanism, doesn’t seem to have surpassed the UNCTOC in this respect. 
 
Section IV - The African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption 
 
i. Overview of the Instrument 
 
The Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted by the 
African Union in July of 2003 after five years of negotiations572. Its main goals are 
to "promote and develop mechanisms of prevention, to detect, to punish and to 
eradicate corruption both in the public as well as the private sector573". It therefore 
criminalizes both public and private sector corruption, the supply and demand 
sides of corruption, money laundering, concealment, as well as illicit 
                                                 
571 Vincke, supra note 42 at 364. 
572 Kolawole Olaniyan, “The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: 
A Critical Appraisal”, (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal, 74 at 78 [Olaniyan]. The 
African Union was established in 2000 in replacement of the Organization of African Unity 
(Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 202). Members of the African Union are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Democratic, Sao Tome and Principe, Senega, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
573 Mpazi Sinjela, “The African Union Takes a Legal Stand On Corruption”, (2003) 11 African 
Yearbook of International Law, 143-159 at 150 [Sinjela]. 
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enrichment574. Similarly to the UNCAC and the IACAC, the CPCC criminalizes 
the solicitation or acceptance of “any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, 
such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage575”, and does not create any exception 
allowing facilitation payments.  It contains a total of 28 articles and one of its main 
long-term objectives is to strengthen the political and economic development of 
the African continent576. The Convention counts 44 States signatories and 31 
Parties to date577.  
  
The AU Corruption Convention does not address corruption offences implicating 
foreign public officials or officials of international organizations. Nevertheless, it 
does concern public officials or "any other person" as stated in the provision on the 
Convention's scope of application578. According to some experts, the meaning of 
“any other person” is “exceedingly wide-ranging” and creates confusion: if the 
drafters intended to extend corruption offences to the private sector, this inclusion 
was unnecessary because Article 11 of the Convention requires that Member 
States criminalize similar conduct in the private sector579. It is therefore our 
opinion that the term was most likely meant to encompass any person carrying out 
a public official’s tasks, in order to ensure the provision’s equal application to 
                                                 
574 AU Corruption Convention, art. 4. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid., art.2, para.1. 
577 Parties to the Convention are: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
578 AU Corruption Convention, art.4. 
579 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 354. 
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temporary employees.  
 
Similarly to the previously studied anti-corruption agreements, the CPCC does not 
include any sanctions or penalties580. However, all of its substantive provisions are 
drafted in mandatory terms581. Indeed, Member States must “undertake to” adopt 
legislation in order to establish the Convention’s offences nationally. In this 
respect, “[t]he African Convention is comprehensive on paper and is largely 
phrased in mandatory terms. However, some argue that its expansiveness may 
actually deter countries from ratifying it582”.  
 
An important measure in regard to transparency was considered during the 
Convention's drafting: that of political party funding. Although it was a 
contentious issue, it was finally inserted and calls on Member States to adopt local 
measures prohibiting the use of funds acquired illegally or in a corrupt manner and 
used to finance political parties583. Moreover, States are required to establish an 
independent authority or agency in order to combat corruption and to carry out 
cooperation among nations when necessary584. A similar provision was initially 
included in the UNCAC, but was ultimately removed during negotiations585. The 
importance of such measures in diminishing corruption cannot be stressed enough: 
                                                 
580 Kofele-Kale, “The Right to a Corruption-Free Society”, supra note 37 at 719. 
581 Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 352. 
582 AU Corruption Convention, art.5 (See Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 203). 
583 Ibid., art.10; Sinjela, supra note 573 at 153. 
584 Ibid., art.20. 
585 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, 
Seventh session, supra note 468 at 10. 
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limiting contributions to political parties lessens the possibilities for corruption, as 
does transparency in political financing586. 
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The Convention establishes a monitoring mechanism, also based on a peer review 
process, by creating an advisory board consisting of eleven experts elected by 
Member States for a period of two years587. These experts are chosen from a list of 
people who are deemed as having the highest measure of integrity, impartiality, 
and recognized competence in matters relating to the Convention588. As part of its 
tasks it must “submit a report to the Executive Council on a regular basis on the 
progress made by each State Party in complying with the provisions of this 
Convention589”. Member States must report to the Board on their progress and 
they must also provide for the participation of civil society during the monitoring 
process. The Board possesses purely advisory powers, meaning it is devoid of any 
investigatory authority590. 
 
The AU Corruption Convention’s success is deemed quite low due to the 
reluctance of many African governments to criticize each other. The mechanism 
                                                 
586 Henning, supra note 97 at 843. 
587 AU Corruption Convention, art.22. 
588 Sinjela, supra note 573 at 157. 
589 AU Corruption Convention, art.22, para.(5)h). 
590 Sinjela, supra note 573 at 157. 
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has also faced important financial and technical challenges591. Furthermore, the 
short mandate of the board of experts is criticized: “[i]ts limited mandate means 
that there is little chance for the Advisory Board to translate the norms of the 
Convention into reality or provide important clarifications of the obligations 
imposed by the Convention592”. It is also argued that for the Convention to have 
any positive results, the public needs to be more involved in the monitoring 
mechanism: "civil society and other pressure groups will have to claim possession 
of the monitoring process. By joining forces as coalitions, they can help ensure its 
[Parties] successfully implement this new treaty593". 
 
Another main problem concerns the Convention’s regional limitations. As is the 
case with many regional anti-corruption initiatives, neighboring countries are 
made to evaluate each other within the review process, which in this case creates a 
reluctance to participate. The CPCC is however one of the few multilateral 
agreements to contain asset recovery measures: within the African continent, the 
scale of illicitly obtained public assets is immense. In the worst cases, the amounts 
held in individual foreign accounts amount to billions of dollars594. Unfortunately, 
these measures under the CPCC address the confiscation of looted funds only, 
                                                 
591 Chêne & Dell, supra note 416 at 6. 
592 Olaniyan, supra note 572 at 86. The members of the Advisory Board are elected for a period of 
two years, renewable once. 
593 Akere Muna, "The African Convention Against Corruption", in Global, Regional and Country 
Reports, (2004), Transparency International, 116-121 at 117 [Muna]. 
594 Commission for Africa, “Report of the Commission for Africa”, (2005) 3 International Journal 
Civil Society Law, 20 at 38. 
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without providing for specific seizing and freezing measures595. 
 
One of the UNCAC’s advantages over the CPCC is that it allows for a much larger 
number and wider diversity of reviewing States. Furthermore, it provides for 
detailed cooperation and technical assistance among Member States, detailed asset 
recovery measures, and it contains provisions criminalizing a larger number of 
offences, such as concealment, trading in influence, embezzlement, abuse of 
functions and obstruction of justice. Interestingly, it seems that while the UNCAC 
and the CPCC share similar qualities (they both deal with bribery in the public and 
private sectors, supply and demand-side bribery, contain bribery related offences, 
preventive provisions, etc.) they also share a similar difficulty: the lack of political 
will in creating an enforceable implementation system. A first step to remedying 
this is to prioritize the participation of civil society organizations in their 
monitoring process596. 
 
Section V - The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption  
 
i. Overview of the Instrument 
 
The Council of Europe, consisting today of 47 nations, adopted the Criminal Law 
                                                 
595 Bah, supra note 278 at 25. 
596 Sinjela, supra note 573 at 158. 
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Convention on Corruption in 1999597. Originally, the Council of Europe had 
planned on drafting a framework convention containing more general 
requirements pertaining to corruption. After realizing that the incorporated 
principles were drafted using such vague terminology that it would be practically 
impossible to implement them in a formal treaty, they became the Twenty Guiding 
Principles for the Fight Against Corruption598. These principles enabled the 
Council of Europe to start working on a corruption convention and are the 
foundation of the CLCC599. At the time of the Convention's adoption in 1999, it 
was considered the broadest among regional efforts to combat corruption600. 
Cooperation was made easier among its members due to the tradition or history of 
cooperation as well as the smaller number of participating nations601. 
 
The CLCC prohibits both the supply and demand sides of bribery as well as 
bribery in both the public and private sectors602. It also applies to foreign and 
international public servants, members of legislatures and judges, as well as 
domestic public officials and members of international organizations603. When the 
                                                 
597 The members are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom. 
598 Resolution (97) 24 adopted by the Committee of Ministers, 6 November 1997. Hereafter 
“Guiding Principles”. 
599 Shihata, supra note 515 at 240. 
600 Pieth, supra note 535 at 537. 
601 The Council of Europe was implemented in 1949, counting 10 signatories: 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=datesCles&l=fr [Date consulted: July 21st 2010]. 
602 Henning, supra note 97 at 822. 
603 CLCC, arts. 2, 3 and 9; Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, supra note 2 at 360. 
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Convention was adopted, it was the first international agreement to deal with 
private sector corruption604. Other than bribery, the Convention incorporates 
provisions on trading in influence, money laundering and account offences605: it is 
compared to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in that it treads “a very thin line 
between corruption and acceptable interaction in public administration606”. 
Although its scope is considered broad, the range of conduct that Member States 
are required to criminalize is quite narrow, as most offences are limited to active 
and passive bribery607. The agreement does not contain any specific measures 
pertaining to facilitation payments. However, similarly to the UNCAC, one may 
infer that such payments are included in the following conduct: “[…] the 
promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or indirectly, of any undue 
advantage […]608”.  
 
The CLCC contains provisions ensuring that Member States provide sanctions that 
include the deprivation of liberty and monetary sanctions to offending 
individuals609. There are however no sanctions or penalties provided for against 
Parties to the Convention for non-compliance. Furthermore, contrary to the 
UNCAC, the Convention’s asset recovery measures are succinct and limited in 
scope. Indeed, the provisions simply call on Parties to adopt legislation in order to 
                                                 
604 Shihata, supra note 515 at 247. 
605 CLCC, art.14. Account offences pertain to the use of false accounting documents and omitting 
to hold payment records.   
606 Henning, supra note 97 at 824. 
607 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 199. 
608 CLCC, art.2. 
609 Ibid., art.19. 
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“trace, freeze, and seize instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption610”, without 
anticipating any specific measures. 
 
ii. Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The monitoring process is implemented by the Group of States Against 
Corruption611 (known as GRECO), which uses a peer pressure model combined 
with mutual evaluation measures. GRECO was established in order to improve its 
members’ capacity to fight corruption and compliance with corruption related 
undertakings612. It monitors compliance with the CLCC and with the Guiding 
Principles. The Group has 47 Member States, including the United States: 
membership is open to all members of the Council of Europe and to non-member 
States as well.  
 
Ad hoc expert teams are created to evaluate each country with the use of 
questionnaires, country visits, evaluation reports and plenary sessions. The process 
is made public by publishing the country reports on the Internet. These reports 
contain measures that need to be taken by the evaluated Member State in order to 
ensure future compliance. In the subsequent evaluation round, a follow-up 
procedure assesses whether the measures have been implemented613. In less than 
                                                 
610 Ibid., art.23. 
611 Hereafter “GRECO” or “Group”. 
612 Shihata, supra note 515 at 260. 
613 Nichols, supra note 2 at 367. 
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five years, GRECO managed to issue 42 country reports614.  
 
Although mutual legal assistance treaties already exist within the region, the 
CLCC also provides for international cooperation measures because its ratification 
is open to States outside of the Council of Europe615. The mandatory quality of 
language used in the corruption convention, coupled with the existing ties among 
its members, makes this regional agreement attractive. The UNCAC however still 
benefits from a much higher number of Member States, criminalizes a higher 
number of offences, and contains much more detailed provisions on the recovery 
of stolen assets616. However, once again, the UNCAC is faced with a multilateral 
anti-corruption agreement that chose to arm itself with a public review mechanism. 
 
Having given an overview of existing anti-corruption agreements, the UNCAC’s 
relevancy is quite clear in our view: it criminalizes a much more important number 
of offences and applies to a much higher number of States than any other 
multilateral anti-corruption treaty. It also creates a ‘normative mechanism’ for the 
recovery of assets, whereas other anti-corruption agreements barely broach the 
subject617. Furthermore, unlike other agreements, the UNCAC contains a chapter 
devoted entirely to technical assistance and information exchange618. Our main 
                                                 
614 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 200. 
615 Shihata, supra note 515 at 257. 
616 As previously discussed in Part I, Chapter IV, the UNCAC dedicates a whole chapter to Asset 
recovery. 
617 Bah, supra note 278 at 25. 
618 UNCAC, Chapter VI; Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 220. 
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criticism is directed towards the UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism: it seems to fall 
short compared to multilateral agreements such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the IACAC and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention. 
Indeed, the public aspect of the UNCAC’s review process is lacking. By making 
the country reports available to civil society scrutiny, and by giving the COSP the 
authority to verify reported information, it is our opinion that the monitoring 
mechanism would gain significant value.  
 
Furthermore, the issue of political party funding is also lacking in the 
criminalization chapter of the Convention and is an important aspect of anti-
corruption measures. For instance, the AU Corruption Convention contains such a 
measure, by calling on Member States to adopt measures that “proscribe the use of 
funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties619” 
and that “incorporate the principle of transparency into the funding of political 
parties620”.  It is out opinion that by incorporating these small changes, the 
UNCAC might live to its high expectations. 
                                                 
619 CLCC, art.10. 
620 Ibid. 
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Conclusion  
 
The need for a global in-depth corruption convention is obvious when considering 
the devastating effects of corruption. To name a few, corruption diminishes 
development, increases social inequalities and poverty, and discredits the rule of 
law621. It also channels criminal activity, such as terrorism, organized crime, drug 
and human trafficking, and deters foreign direct investment by acting as an 
additional expense or tax for investors. Finally, it diverts government funds away 
from essential sectors, such as health and education sectors622, and enhances the 
public's distrust towards political and government authorities623.  
 
The UNCAC attempts to create a universal framework against corruption and is 
the first of its kind. It is described as the most detailed, complex and broadest 
international anti-corruption agreement to date624: 
 
“The UNCAC has a broader mandate than any previous anti-
corruption initiative. Unlike any of its predecessors, the 
Convention has the potential to create and disseminate a truly 
global anti-corruption movement that will affect governments and 
businesses in both developing and industrialized countries. 
Although it remains to be seen how successful the implementation 
of the Convention will be, the passage itself is significant because 
it illustrates the fact that the anti-corruption movement is now 
worldwide, cross- jurisdictional and here to stay.625” 
 
                                                 
621 Delaney, supra note 18 at 9. 
622 Ibid., at 10. 
623 Ibid., at 11. 
624 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 3. 
625 Babu, supra note 26 at 32. 
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Its main purposes are to promote and strengthen preventive anti-corruption 
measures, to facilitate international cooperation, and to promote accountability and 
integrity in the management of public affairs626. In doing so the Convention 
focuses on four main issues, each of which makes up a separate chapter: 
preventive measures, criminalization, international cooperation, and asset 
recovery. 
 
Preventive measures are necessary in order to ensure sustainability. The UNCAC's 
preventive measures cover both the public and private sectors, innovating in this 
respect: previous agreements, such as the IACAC and the AU Corruption 
Convention do not contain such provisions. Among the public sector requirements 
are provisions concerning the requirement that Parties ensure the existence of 
independent anti-corruption bodies627, the oversight of campaign finance, the 
establishment of transparent public procurement systems628, and public financing 
accountability measures629.  On the other hand, preventive private sector measures 
include provisions pertaining to money laundering, accounting and auditing 
standards630. Unfortunately, the provision pertaining to campaign finance is 
phrased in discretionary terms. Although the inclusion of the offence was highly 
debated during the Convention's negotiation, its non-mandatory phrasing remains 
a disappointment, especially when considering that there is only one other 
                                                 
626 UNCAC, art.1. 
627 Ibid., art.6. 
628 Ibid., art.9. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid., arts.12 and 14. 
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multilateral anti-corruption agreement dealing with the issue (the AU Corruption 
Convention)631. The UNCAC had a chance to phrase the offence in binding terms, 
but due to the negotiating States' objections, fell short in doing so. 
 
The UNCAC's criminalization chapter is extensive, and provides for bribery and 
bribery related offences. Bribery is considered as the most identifiable form of 
public corruption, and past multilateral agreements have relied on bribery as the 
main infraction of corruption632. Within the Convention, the bribery of national 
and foreign public officials is criminalized using mandatory terms, and applies to 
all government branches633. Although both the supply and demand sides of bribery 
are criminalized, they are not treated equally. Indeed, the offence of soliciting or 
accepting bribes is drafted using discretionary terms, whereas the offering of 
bribes is phrased using mandatory terms634. This may be due to a lack of will in 
criminalizing behavior committed by another State's public official. However, in 
our view, both conducts are equally damaging: public officials hold a position of 
power, a power that they can use in order to influence the actions of others.  
 
The importance of private sector measures becomes apparent with outsourcing and 
privatization635. The UNCAC's private sector measures include both the supply 
                                                 
631 Low, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption”, supra note 52 at 5. 
632 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 225. 
633 UNCAC, art.15. 
634 Ibid., art.21. 
635 This is the case for example in China, see the Asian Development Bank’s Annual Report from 
2006: www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Annual_Report/2006/ADB-AR2006-East-Asia.PDF [Date 
consulted: March 23rd 2009].  
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and demand sides of bribery, but both offences are drafted using non-mandatory 
terms636. It is our view that bribery in the private sector should be criminalized on 
a similar level as public sector bribery: because both sectors are becoming more 
and more intertwined, tolerating private sector bribery makes the prevention of 
public corruption more difficult, and allows it to seep into the public sector637. 
Other bribery related offences are criminalized within the UNCAC, and include 
trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, embezzlement, money 
laundering, and obstruction of justice.  
 
The UNCAC revolutionizes asset recovery in the field of international law, 
dedicating a whole chapter to provisions that create mechanisms to recover stolen 
funds638. In order to be successful, such provisions must be accompanied by 
investigatory provisions, preventive recovery provisions such as the freezing and 
seizing of funds, and provisions allowing the confiscation of assets639. In addition 
to considering these aspects, the UNCAC also calls on Member States to 
incorporate measures in order to detect criminal activity and to afford each other 
the needed cooperation and assistance in investigations640. 
 
The breadth of the UNCAC is unparalleled, due to the global quality of the 
Convention and the many offences it covers. The goal of this study was to assess 
                                                 
636 UNCAC, art.21. 
637 Argandona, “The United Nations Convention Against”, supra note 146 at 9. 
638 UNCAC, Chapter V. 
639 Bah, supra note 278 at 27. 
640 UNCAC, art.51. 
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whether the UNCAC is relevant and effective. In order to assess the Convention's 
relevancy, similar anti-corruption agreements were considered. Effectiveness, on 
the other hand, was measured by studying its enforceability. 
 
The UNCAC's enforceability was assessed through its direct and indirect 
compliance challenges. We considered the treaty's language, its monitoring 
mechanism, and the absence of sanctions as falling under direct compliance 
challenges. Prosecution difficulties and the absence of good governance, on the 
other hand, were considered as indirect challenges. 
 
Although the use of precise language is an important component of effective 
implementation, strict or narrow definitions are not always beneficial, as they may 
not be adaptable to political and social change641. The Convention, purposely 
omitting to include a precise definition of corruption, ensures itself a wider and 
longer applicability.  One of the drawbacks to choosing vague terminology is the 
uncertainty of its applicability to certain behavior642. This is the case of facilitation 
or grease payments. For instance, the United States and the United Kingdom have 
taken different positions due to the absence of a clear indication as to whether the 
Convention either allows or prescribes such payments643. Furthermore, by giving 
an overview of the UNCAC's criminalization chapter, we assessed that the 
provisions are mostly phrased using discretionary terms and lack the use of 
                                                 
641 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 11.  
642 Ibid., at 10. 
643 Nicholls, “Corruption in the South Pacific”, supra note 95 at 230; Scott, supra note 317 at 109. 
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mandatory language. This outcome is unfortunate as it renders the Convention 
'toothless'. Aside from re-drafting the provisions, we believe that a more 
adversarial monitoring mechanism would be sufficient to solve or compensate this 
issue. 
 
The UNCAC’s monitoring mechanism, based on a mutual evaluation or peer 
review process, is considered more rigorous than the self evaluation method, but 
more lenient than the expert review process644. All in all, peer review can be quite 
effective, especially when it contains an element of public pressure. This aspect, 
although lacking within the UNCAC, can be remedied in the future by namely 
making country reports available to the public, and by including civil society 
organizations in the review process. Furthermore, by giving the UNCAC’s COSP 
investigatory powers similar to the IACAC’s Committee of Experts, the review 
process would acquire a more adversarial quality. 
 
Although the UNCAC does not provide for any sanctions, whether economic or 
military, against Member States for non-compliance, there are arguments which 
downplay the importance of such sanctions within international agreements. For 
instance, monetary sanctions against richer States might not be sufficient in order 
to create significant deterrence, whereas poorer States might not be able to cover 
such costs. Furthermore, expulsion tends to cut off cooperation completely, thus 
                                                 
644 See the following website: 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/international_conventions/advocacy/monitoring/mon
itoring_mechanisms [Date consulted: February 21st 2011].  
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allowing the State to act freely645. The main argument demonstrating how the 
UNCAC can foster compliance without strict sanctions is the inherent concern a 
State has over its own reputation646.  Such reputation-oriented sanctions exist but 
are stronger when the violation is egregious, as opposed to smaller violations 
incurred due to inadvertencies647. It is our view that strict sanctions are not 
necessary if the public is made aware of the Member States actions, as this could 
trigger the reputation-oriented sanction, depending on the importance of the 
violation. The public aspect of the review mechanism is therefore even more 
important when considering the absence of traditional sanctions due to State non-
compliance. 
 
The UNCAC faces prosecution difficulties that go beyond the control or will of 
the Member States and are due to the type of offences criminalized by the 
Convention. The commission of a crime such as bribery necessitates two parties, 
both of which can be held criminally responsible, and neither of which may want 
to come forward to the authorities. Detection and enforcement are therefore 
difficult and often require third party knowledge of the infraction648. Another 
aspect making prosecuting corruption offences difficult has to do with the 
availability of testimonial evidence. For instance, because witnesses might live 
abroad, receiving statements or ensuring their presence in court is much more 
                                                 
645 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 59 at 74. 
646 Guzman, “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”, supra note 443 at 1856. 
647 Ibid., at 1861.  
648 Okogbule, supra note 475 at 51. 
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difficult649. 
 
The specific aspect of good governance that we deemed most relevant to this study 
was that of political party financing. Provisions limiting political financing and 
ensuring financing transparency are necessary when one considers the fast growth 
of competition derived from political party financing, the diversion of funds for 
personal use, and vote purchasing650. An earlier draft of the UNCAC contained a 
provision on the funding of political parties. It was however deleted during the 
Convention’s negotiation because of important differences in the legal systems of 
Member States651. This outcome is disappointing, particularly in light of the AU 
Corruption Convention’s political party funding provision652. Although the 
offence is not criminalized in other major anti-corruption agreements, the UNCAC 
had the possibility to do so, and chose not to. Member States could, in the future, 
chose to include such a provision by adding precision to the UNCAC’s public 
sector measures. 
 
The Convention's relevancy was measured against existing regional and 
multilateral anti-corruption initiatives, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the IACAC, the UNCTOC, the AU Corruption Convention, and the 
Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Following the 
                                                 
649 Schloenhardt, supra note 479 at 95. 
650 Philippa Webb, supra note 46 at 215. 
651 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption on its 
Sixth Session, supra note 468 at 10.  
652 CLCC, art.10. 
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overview of these competing agreements, one may conclude that the UNCAC is 
relevant in today’s international legal forum and has many qualities, such as 
criminalizing a large number of bribery and bribery related offences both in the 
public and private sectors, extensively covering asset recovery and technical 
assistance measures, not to mention its number of Parties. However, the UNCAC 
seems to have failed to fulfill expectations in regards to its monitoring mechanism. 
Although having adopted a peer review monitoring mechanism (which is not the 
least adversarial form of review method per se), the UNCAC failed to include 
three key features which would have given it a more independent and transparent 
quality, namely, the participation of civil society, ensuring that country review 
results are made available to the public, and affording the COSP with (even 
limited) investigatory powers. These three characteristics are all the more crucial 
when one considers that an important number of provisions are phrased in non-
mandatory terms and that the Convention is devoid of economic or military 
sanctions. Without these changes, we fear that the UNCAC may not foster 
compliance in any meaningful way. 
 
Nevertheless, the UNCAC is in our opinion a step forward in the fight against 
corruption, as it creates a forum allowing continuing discussions between many 
countries around the world. Due to the Convention's recent entry into force, only 
time will tell whether it can sustain compliance. There is still a chance for political 
and business leaders to act upon their rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
148 
Bibliography 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, CONVENTIONS, 
DECLARATIONS AND PREPARATORY DOCUMENTS 
 
African Union, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, 11 July 2003 
 
Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 27 January 1999 
 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution (97)24 on the Twenty 
Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption, 101st Session (1997) 
 
European Union Joint Action on Corruption in the Private Sector, Joint Action 
98/742/JHA of 22 (1995) 
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (1997) 
 
Global Study on the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin, Especially Funds Derived 
From Acts of Corruption, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention 
Against Corruption, 4th Session, UN Doc. A/AC 261/12 (2002) 
 
Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, A/AC.261/IPM/4, Buenos Aires (2001) 
 
Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, A/AC.261/IPM/19, Buenos Aires (2001) 
 
Organization of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 1 July 2000 
 
Organization of American States, Charter of the Organisation of American States, 
30 April 1948 
 
 
 
 
 
149
Organization of American States, OAS Rules of Procedure and Other Provisions 
of the Committee of Experts of the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the 
Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 
SG/MESICIC/doc.9/04 rev.3 (2006) 
 
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 
March 29th 1996 
 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, December 17th 1997 
 
Paper Submitted by Spain Concerning the Seminar on Return of Illicit Funds as 
Proposed by Peru, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention 
Against Corruption, First Session, A/AC.261/CRP1 (2002) 
 
Proposals and Contributions Received from Governments: Austria, France and 
The Netherlands, U.N.Doc. A/AC.261/L.21 (2002) 
 
Proposals Received From Governments, Canada: Non-Paper, A/AC.261/IPM/27 
(2001) 
 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on its First Session, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, Second Session, A/AC.261/4 (2002) 
 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on its First Session, held in Vienna from 17 to 28 June 2002, Ad Hoc 
Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, Second 
Session, A/AC.261/7 (2002) 
 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on the Work of its First to Seventh Sessions, Ad Hoc Committee for 
the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, A/58/422/Add.1 (2003) 
 
 
 
 
150 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on its Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, Third session, A/AC.261/7 (2002) 
 
Report From the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption Fourth Session Vienna, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, A/AC.261/9 (2003) 
 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against 
Corruption on its Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention Against Corruption, Seventh Session, Vienna, A/AC.261/22 (2003) 
 
Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption on its First Session, First Session, CAC/COSP/2006/12, 
Amman (2006) 
 
Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption on its Second Session, Second Session, CAC/COSP/2008/15, 
Nusa Dua, Indonesia (2008) 
 
Report of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption on its Third Session, CAC/COSP/2009/15, Doha (2009) 
 
Revised Draft United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Ad Hoc Committee 
for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, 18 U.N.Doc. 
A/AC.261/3/Rev. 2 (2002) 
 
Revised Draft United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Ad Hoc Committee 
for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, Fifth Session, Vienna, 
A/AC.261/3/Rev.3 (2003) 
 
Revised Draft United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Ad Hoc Committee 
for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption, Sixth Session, Vienna, 
A/AC.261/3/Rev.4 (2003) 
 
 
 
 
151
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, December 19th 1988 
 
UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended January 2002), A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) 
 
UN General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, G.A. Res. 
55/25, 55th Session (2000) 
 
UN General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, G.A. Res. 
55/61, U.N. GAOR, 55th Session (2001) 
 
UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, A/58/422 
(2003) 
 
UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, A/RES/55/25 (2001) 
 
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (1945) 
 
 
CASE LAW 
 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
NT/DS58/AB/R, World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report (1998) 
 
Festus Yesufu v. African Continental Bank Ltd, 4 SC 1: ALL N.L.R., 264 (1976) 
 
United Bank for Africa Plc. C. Sani Abacha Foundation for Peace and Unity & 5 
Others, 3 NWLR, 541-542 (2004) 
 
 
MONOGRAPHS AND COLLECTIONS 
 
ARBOUR, Jean-Maurice and Geneviève PARENT, Droit International Public, 
 
 
 
152 
Éditions Yvon Blais, Montréal, 2006 
 
AUST, Anthony, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000 
 
BEARE, Margaret, Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, 
Money Laundering, and Corruption, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
Buffalo and London, 2003 
 
BENVENISTI, Eyal and Moshe HIRSCH, The Impact of International Law on 
International Cooperation – Theoretical Perspectives, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004 
 
CHAYES Abram, and Antonia Handler CHAYES, The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, London, 1995 
 
CRAVEN Matthew C. R., and M. FITZMAURICE, Interrogating the Treaty – 
Essays in the Contemporary Law of Treaties, Wolf Legal Publishers, The 
Netherlands, 2005 
 
DAHOU, Karim, “La bonne gouvernance selon la Banque mondiale: au-delà de 
l’habillage juridique”, in Marc Totté et. al. eds.,  La décentralisation en Afrique de 
l’ouest, Karthala Editions, Paris, 2003 
 
FERNANDEZ DE CASADEVANTE Y ROMANI Carlos, Sovereignty and 
Interpretation of International Norms, Springer, Madrid, 2007 
 
GUEST, Robert, The Shackled Continent, Pan Books, Basingstoke and Oxford, 
2005 
 
FIJNAUT Cyrille and Leo HUBERTS, Corruption, Integrity and Law 
Enforcement, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002 
 
HUQUE Ahmed Shafiqul and Habib ZAFARULLAH, International Development 
 
 
 
153
Governance, Taylor and Francis, New York, 2006  
 
LINDSEY, Tim, Law Reform in Developing and Transitional States, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2007 
 
NICHOLLS, Colin, et al., Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 2006 
 
REISMAN, W. Michael, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades and Reforms, Free Press, 
New York, 1979 
 
SHELTON, Dinah, Commitment and Compliance – The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000 
 
SHIHATA, Ibrahim, International Finance and Development Law, Kluwer Law 
International, Boston, 2001 
 
STESSENS, Guy, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement 
Model, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 
 
STUART, Don, Canadian Criminal Law, 4th Edition, Carswell, Toronto, 2001 
  
 
ARTICLES 
 
ALTAMIRANO, Giorleny D.,  “The Impact of the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption”, (2006-2007) 38 University of Miami Inter-American Law 
Review, 487 
 
ARGANDONA, Antonio, “Political Party Funding and Business Corruption”, 
Chair of Economics and Ethics, Research Paper No 458, January 2002 
 
ARGANDONA, Antonio, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
and its Impact on International Companies”, Chair of Economics and Ethics, 
Research Paper No 656, October 2006 
 
 
 
154 
 
BABU, R. Rajesh, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A 
Critical Overview”, (2006) Asian African Legal Consultative Organization, New 
Delhi, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=891898 
 
BAH, Saliou, “La restitution des avoirs issus de la corruption dans les conventions 
anti-corruption internationales: une avancée conceptuelle et normative à la portée 
pratique limitée”, (2010) 1 Revue de droit des affaires internationales, 15  
 
BARRATT-BROWN, Elizabeth P., “Building a Monitoring and Compliance 
Regime Under the Montreal Protocol”, (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International 
Law, 519  
 
BOLA, Ige, “Abacha et le banquiers: la lumière sur la conspiration”, (2002) 2 
Forum sur le crime et la société, 123 
 
BONTRAGER UNZICKER, Andrea D., “From Corruption to Cooperation: 
Globalization Brings a Multilateral Agreement Against Foreign Bribery”, (1999-
2000) 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 655  
 
BOSWELL, Nancy, “International Law Standards for Domestic Governance”, 
(2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 133 
 
BOTCHWAY, Francis N., “Good Governance: The Old, The New, The Principle, 
and The Elements”, (2000-2001) 13 Florida Journal of International Law, 159 
 
BRESSON, Jean-Cartier, “La Banque mondiale, la corruption et la gouvernance”, 
(2000) 41 Tiers monde, 165  
 
CAIDEN, Gerald E., "A Cautionary Tale: Ten Major Flaws in Combating 
Corruption", (2003-2004) 10 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade & Trade in 
the Americas, 269 
 
CARR, Indira, “The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a Real 
Difference to the Quality of Life of Millions?”, (2006) 3 Manchester Journal of 
 
 
 
155
International Economic Law, 3 
 
CARRINGTON, Paul D., “Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law”, (2010) 
32 Michigan Journal of International Law, 129  
 
CHÊNE, Marie and Gillian DELL, “U4 Expert Answer: Comparative Assessment 
of Anti-Corruption Conventions’ Review Mechanisms”, (U4 Issue 2008) 
Transparency International, available at: 
http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=163 
 
CORR, Christopher F.  and Judd LAWLER, “Damned If You Do, Damned If You 
Don’t? The OECD Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures”, 
(1999) 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1249 
 
DELANEY, Patrick X., “Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders”, 
(2007), 47 Virginia Journal of International Law, 413 
 
DE MICHELE, Roberto, “The Follow-Up Mechanism of the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption: A Preliminary Assessment”, (2003-2004) 10 
Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 295 
 
D’HOLLANDER, Juliette, “Ethics in Business: The New OECD Convention on 
Bribery”, (1999) 33 Revue Juridique Thémis, 147 
 
DUNLAP, William V., “Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties”, (1988-
1989) 29 Virginia Journal of International Law, 813 
 
FRISCHMANN, Brett, “A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law”, 
(2003) 51 Buffalo Law Review, 679  
 
GANTZ, David A., “Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery”, (1997-
1998) 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 457 
 
GEORGE, Barbara Crutchfield and Kathleen A. LACEY, “A Coalition of 
Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks and 
 
 
 
156 
NGOs: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives”, (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal, 547 
 
GOODLING, Nicholas A., "Nigeria's Crisis of Corruption: Can the UN Global 
Programme Hope to Resolve this Dilemma?", (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 997  
 
GUZMAN, Andrew T., “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law”, 
(2002) 90 California Law Review, 1823  
 
GUZMAN, Andrew T., “The Design of International Agreements”, (2005) 16 
European Journal of International Law, 579  
 
HÄGEL, Peter, “L’incertaine mondialisation du contrôle – La France et 
l’Allemagne dans la lutte contre la corruption et le blanchiment”, (2005) 29 
Déviance et Société,  243  
 
HAAS, Peter M., “Choosing to comply: theorizing from international relations and 
comparative politics” in Dinah Shelton, ed., Commitment and Compliance, 
Compliance – The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, 45 
 
HATHAWAY, Oona A., “Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of 
International Law”, (2005) 72 The University of Chicago Law Review, 469  
 
HEIMANN, Fritz, “Follow-up Monitoring Needed for the UN Convention against 
Corruption”, (2005) Compact Quarterly, available at: 
http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article000350362.cfm?x=b11,0,w 
 
HEIMANN, Fritz and Gillian DELL, “Recommendations for Review Mechanism 
for UN Convention Against Corruption”, (2007) Transparency International, 
available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/uncac_review_
ti_recommendations 
 
 
 
 
157
HEINEMAN, Ben W. and Fritz HEIMANN, “The Long War Against Corruption”, 
(2006), Volume 85, Issue 3 Foreign Affairs, 75  
 
HENNING, Peter J., “Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International 
Corruption Conventions and United States Law”, (2001) 18 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 793 
 
IGBINEDION, Simeon Aisabor, “A Critical Appraisal of the Mechanism for 
Prosecuting Grand Corruption Offenders Under the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption”, (2009) 6 Manchester Journal of International Economic 
Law, 56  
 
JORGE, Guillermo, “Notes on Asset Recovery in the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption”, (2003) available at: www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/ 
programs/Annual0316.03-16.06.pdf 
 
KAUFMANN Daniel, “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption”, in 
Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2005, 
81 
 
KEMP, Gerhard, “The United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime: A Milestone in International Criminal Law”, (2001) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice, 152 
 
KIM, Joongi and Jong Bum KIM, “Cultural Difference in the Crusade Against 
International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses In Korea and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, (1997) 6 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 549 
 
KOFELE-KALE, Ndiva, “The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual 
and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under 
International Law”, (2000) 34 The International Lawyer, 149 
 
KOFELE-KALE, Ndiva, “Change or the Illusion of Change: Against Official 
Corruption in Africa”, (2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review, 
697 
 
 
 
158 
 
KOFELE-KALE, Ndiva, “Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and 
Interests in Combating Economic Crimes”, (2006) 40 The International Lawyer, 
909 
 
KOH, Harold Hongju, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law”, (1996-1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal, 2599 
 
LABORDE, Jean-Paul, “Un pas de plus dans la lutte contre la corruption: la 
Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption”, (2004) 75 Revue 
internationale de droit pénal, 837  
 
LANDMEIER, Lisa et al., “Anti-Corruption International Legal Developments”, 
(2002) 36 The International Lawyer, 589 
 
LESTELLE, Evan P., “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of 
Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction”, (2008-2009) 83 Tulane 
Law Review, 527  
 
LOW, Lucinda A.  et al., “Milestones in Mutual Evaluation: The Phase 2 Review 
of the United States Under the OECD Antibribery Convention”, (2003) 5 
International Law FORUM du Droit International, 106 
 
LOW, Lucinda A., “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: The 
Globalization of Anticorruption Standards”, Conference of the International Bar 
Association, International Chamber of Commerce, and OECD, “The Awakening 
Giant of AC Enforcement” London, England 4-5 May 2006 
 
MANIRAKIZA, Pacifique, “L’Afrique et le système de justice pénale 
internationale”, (2009) 3 African Journal of Legal Studies, 21  
 
MCGINLEY, Gerald, “Practice as a guide to Treaty Interpretation”, (1985) 9 The 
Fletcher Forum, 211 
 
MENDEZ, Ruben, “Financing the United Nations and the International Public 
 
 
 
159
Sector: Problems and Reform”, (1997) 3 Global Governance, 283  
 
MUNA, Akere, "The African Convention Against Corruption", (2004) Global, 
Regional and Country Reports, Transparency International, 116 
 
NICHOLS, Philip M., “The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational 
Intrusion”, (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal, 627 
 
NICHOLLS, Ruth, “Corruption in the South Pacific: The Potential Impact of the 
UN Convention Against Corruption on Pacific Island States”, (2005) 2 New 
Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 207 
 
NOLAN, Justine, “The United Nations’ Compact With Business”, (2005) 24 
University of Queensland Law Journal, 445 
 
OKOGBULE, Nlerum S., “Official Corruption and the Dynamics of Money 
Laundering in Nigeria”, (2007) 14 Journal of Financial Crime, 49 
 
OLANIYAN, Kolawole, “The African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption: A Critical Appraisal”, (2004) 4 African Human Rights 
Law Journal, 74 
 
PAGANI, Fabricio, “Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change”, (2002) 
11 African Security Review, 15 
 
PIETH, Mark, “The Harmonization of Law Against Economic Crime”, (1999) 1 
European Journal of Law Reform, 527 
 
POLAINE, Martin, “Criminalizing the Bribery of National and Foreign Public 
Officials”, (2005) Background Paper, ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for 
Asia and the Pacific, 3rd Master Training Seminar, Pakistan, 14-17 February 2005 
 
POPE, Jeremy and Frank VOGL, “Making Anticorruption Agencies More 
Effective”, (2000) 37 Finance and Development, 6 
 
 
 
 
160 
QUINONES, Enery, “L’évolution du droit international en matière de corruption: 
La Convention de l’OCDE”, (2003) 49 Annuaire français de droit international, 
563  
 
REISMAN, W. Michael, “International Law-making: A Process of 
Communication”, (1981) 75 American Society of International Law Procedure, 
101  
 
RIDER, Barry A. K., “Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption”, (2007) 10 Journal 
of Money Laundering Control, 5 
 
RIFFAULT-SILK, Jacqueline, “La lutte contre la corruption nationale et 
internationale par les moyens du droit pénal”, (2002) 54 Revue internationale de 
droit comparé, 639  
 
SALBU, Stephen R., “A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change and 
Transnational Bribery”, (2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal, 657 
 
SALBU, Steven R., “Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature 
Evocation of the Normative Global Village”, (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law, 233  
 
SALBU, Stephen R., “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global 
Harmony”, (1998-1999) 20 Michigan Journal of International Law, 423 
 
SANDGREN, Claes, “Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law”, 
(2005) 39 The International lawyer, 717 
 
SCOTT, Shirley V., “Political Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties: Reconciling 
Text With Political Reality”, (2007) 5 New Zealand Journal of Political 
International Law, 103 
 
SCHLOENHARDT, Andreas, “Transnational Organized Crime and the 
International Criminal Court Developments and Debates”, (2005) 24 University of 
Queensland Law Journal, 93 
 
 
 
161
 
SHAMS, Heba, “The Fight Against Extraterritorial Corruption and the Use of 
Money Laundering Control”, (2001) 7 Law and Business Review of the Americas, 
85 
 
SHEHU, Abdullahi Y., “Combating Corruption in Nigeria: Bliss or Bluster?”, 
(2005) 12 Journal of Financial Crime, 69 
 
SINJELA, Mpazi, “The African Union Takes a Legal Stand On Corruption”, 
(2003) 11 African Yearbook of International Law, 143 
 
SNIDER, Thomas R. and Won KIDANE, “Combating corruption through 
international law in Africa: A comparative analysis”, (2007) 40 Cornell 
International Law Journal, 691 
 
STESSENS, Guy, “The International Fight Against Corruption”, (2001) 72 
International Review of Penal Law, 892 
 
STOKER Gerry, “Cinq propositions pour une théorie de la gouvernance”, (1998) 
155 Revue internationale de sciences sociales, 19 
 
TARULLO, Daniel K., “The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention”, (2003-2004) 44 Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 665 
 
TRICOT, Juliette, “Les figures de l’internationalisation en droit penal des affaires: 
La corruption internationale”, (2005) 4 Revue de science criminelle et de droit 
pénal comparé, 753  
 
VINCKE, François, “L’Anti-Corruption Après la Convention de Mérida”, (2005) 
85 Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 351 
 
VLASIC, Mark V. and Jenae N. NOELL, “Fighting Corruption to Improve Global 
Security: An Analysis of International Asset Recovery Systems”, (2010) 5 Yale 
Journal of International Affairs, 106  
 
 
 
 
162 
VLASSIS, Dimitri, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption Origins 
and Negotiation Process”, (2002) UNAFEI, 66 Resource Material Series, 126 
 
VON ROSENVINGE, Alison, “Global Anti-Corruption Regimes: Why Law 
Schools May Want to Take a Multi-jurisdictional Approach”, (2009) 10 German 
Law Journal, 785  
 
WAGNER, Benjamin B. and Leslie G. JACOBS, “Retooling Law Enforcement to 
Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure 
Reforms for Indonesia and Other Nations”, (2008-2009) 30 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 183  
 
WEBB, Philippa, “The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global 
Achievement or Missed Opportunity?”, (2005) 8 Journal of International 
Economic Law, 191 
 
WEBB, Toby, “Strategy and Management: Facilitation Payments – Stop Paying 
and they Stop Asking”, (2006), Ethical Corporation, available at: 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=4471 
 
WILDER, Martjin and Michael AHRENS, “Australia’s Implementation of the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions”, (2001) 2 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law, 568 
 
ZAGARIS, Bruce, “Trends in International Money Laundering From a US 
Perspective”, (2001) 35 The International Lawyer, 839 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS, GOVERNEMENT 
DOCUMENTS, POSITION PAPERS, PRESS RELEASES AND NEWS 
BULLETINS 
 
ARIEFF, Irwin, UN Anti-Corruption Pact Raises Last-Minute Alarms, Reuters, 
June 29th 2003 
 
 
 
163
 
Ethics Resource Center, Facilitation Payments: Whether Considered Custom or 
Bribery, They Put Companies in a Precarious Position, Volume 8, Issue 1, April 
2003, Ethics Today Online, available at: /resources/article_detail.cfm?ID=807 
 
Commission for Africa, “Report of the Commission for Africa”, (2005) 3 
International Journal Civil Society Law, 20 
 
IMF, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering—
Background Paper, February 2001, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.htm 
 
TI, Effectively Monitoring the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
Policy Position Paper No 1/2008, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/policy_positions/ti_pp_01_
08_uncac 
 
TI, US Weakens UN Convention by Blocking Measures Tackling Political 
Corruption, Press Release, (August 2003) available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2003/2003_0
8_11_us_blocking_measures 
 
TI, Corruption Perception Index Report, Transparency International Secretariat, 
Berlin, 2007  
 
UN News Service, General Assembly Approves International Treaty Against 
Corruption, (October 2003) 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Antibribery Provisions” (June 2001), available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf 
 
UNODC, UNODC Update, (December 2003) V.03-89343, available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/newsletter_2003-12-01_1.pdf 
 
UNODC, Anti-corruption toolkit, 3rd Edition, Vienna, 2004 
 
 
 
164 
 
UNODC, Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption, Second 
edition, New York, 2005 
 
UNODC, Consensus Reached on UN Convention Against Corruption, UN 
Information Service, (October 2003) available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/background/press-release-
consensus.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165
Annex I 
 
Full text of the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption653 
 
                                                 
653 The text of the UNCAC was taken from the following website: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html [Date consulted: February 12th 2011]. 
1General Assembly resolution 58/4
of 31 October 2003
United Nations Convention
against Corruption
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 55/61 of 4 December 2000, in which it established
an ad hoc committee for the negotiation of an effective international legal in-
strument against corruption and requested the Secretary-General to convene an
intergovernmental open-ended expert group to examine and prepare draft terms
of reference for the negotiation of such an instrument, and its resolution 55/188
of 20 December 2000, in which it invited the intergovernmental open-ended
expert group to be convened pursuant to resolution 55/61 to examine the
question of illegally transferred funds and the return of such funds to the
countries of origin,
Recalling also its resolutions 56/186 of 21 December 2001 and 57/244 of
20 December 2002 on preventing and combating corrupt practices and transfer
of funds of illicit origin and returning such funds to the countries of origin,
Recalling further its resolution 56/260 of 31 January 2002, in which it
requested the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against
Corruption to complete its work by the end of 2003,
Recalling its resolution 57/169 of 18 December 2002, in which it accepted
with appreciation the offer made by the Government of Mexico to host a high-
level political conference for the purpose of signing the convention and re-
quested the Secretary-General to schedule the conference for a period of three
days before the end of 2003,
Recalling also Economic and Social Council resolution 2001/13 of 24 July
2001, entitled “Strengthening international cooperation in preventing and com-
bating the transfer of funds of illicit origin, derived from acts of corruption,
including the laundering of funds, and in returning such funds”,
Expressing its appreciation to the Government of Argentina for hosting the
informal preparatory meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of
a Convention against Corruption in Buenos Aires from 4 to 7 December 2001,
2Recalling the Monterrey Consensus, adopted by the International Con-
ference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, from 18 to
22 March 2002,1 in which it was underlined that fighting corruption at all
levels was a priority,
Recalling also the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development,
adopted by the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in
Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002,2 in parti-
cular paragraph 19 thereof, in which corruption was declared a threat to the
sustainable development of people,
Concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corrup-
tion to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and
values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable
development and the rule of law,
1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation
of a Convention against Corruption,3 which carried out its work at the head-
quarters of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, in which
the Ad Hoc Committee submitted the final text of the draft United Nations
Convention against Corruption to the General Assembly for its consideration
and action, and commends the Ad Hoc Committee for its work;
2. Adopts the United Nations Convention against Corruption annexed
to the present resolution, and opens it for signature at the High-level Political
Signing Conference to be held in Merida, Mexico, from 9 to 11 December
2003, in accordance with resolution 57/169;
3. Urges all States and competent regional economic integration organi-
zations to sign and ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption
as soon as possible in order to ensure its rapid entry into force;
4. Decides that, until the Conference of the States Parties to the Conven-
tion established pursuant to the United Nations Convention against Corruption
decides otherwise, the account referred to in article 62 of the Convention will
be operated within the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Fund, and encourages Member States to begin making adequate voluntary
contributions to the above-mentioned account for the provision to developing
1Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March
2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.A.7), chap. I, resolution 1, annex.
2Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa,
26 August-4 September 2002 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 and corrigendum), chap. I,
resolution 1, annex.
3A/58/422 and Add.1.
3countries and countries with economies in transition of the technical assistance
that they might require to prepare for ratification and implementation of the
Convention;
5. Also decides that the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a
Convention against Corruption will complete its tasks arising from the negotia-
tion of the United Nations Convention against Corruption by holding a meet-
ing well before the convening of the first session of the Conference of the States
Parties to the Convention in order to prepare the draft text of the rules of
procedure of the Conference of the States Parties and of other rules described
in article 63 of the Convention, which will be submitted to the Conference of
the States Parties at its first session for consideration;
6. Requests the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention to
address the criminalization of bribery of officials of public international organi-
zations, including the United Nations, and related issues, taking into account
questions of privileges and immunities, as well as of jurisdiction and the role of
international organizations, by, inter alia, making recommendations regarding
appropriate action in that regard;
7. Decides that, in order to raise awareness of corruption and of the role
of the Convention in combating and preventing it, 9 December should be
designated International Anti-Corruption Day;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to designate the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime to serve as the secretariat for and under the direction of
the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention;
9. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime with the resources necessary to enable it to promote
in an effective manner the rapid entry into force of the United Nations Con-
vention against Corruption and to discharge the functions of secretariat of the
Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, and to support the Ad Hoc
Committee in its work pursuant to paragraph 5 above;
10. Further requests the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive
report on the High-level Political Signing Conference to be held in Merida,
Mexico, in accordance with resolution 57/169, for submission to the General
Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

5Preamble
The States Parties to this Convention,
Concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corrup-
tion to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and
values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable
development and the rule of law,
Concerned also about the links between corruption and other forms of
crime, in particular organized crime and economic crime, including money-
laundering,
Concerned further about cases of corruption that involve vast quantities of
assets, which may constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of States,
and that threaten the political stability and sustainable development of those
States,
Convinced that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational
phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making international co-
operation to prevent and control it essential,
Convinced also that a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach is
required to prevent and combat corruption effectively,
Convinced further that the availability of technical assistance can play an
important role in enhancing the ability of States, including by strengthening
capacity and by institution-building, to prevent and combat corruption
effectively,
Convinced that the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly
damaging to democratic institutions, national economies and the rule of law,
Annex
United Nations Convention
against Corruption
6Determined to prevent, detect and deter in a more effective manner inter-
national transfers of illicitly acquired assets and to strengthen international co-
operation in asset recovery,
Acknowledging the fundamental principles of due process of law in criminal
proceedings and in civil or administrative proceedings to adjudicate property
rights,
Bearing in mind that the prevention and eradication of corruption is a
responsibility of all States and that they must cooperate with one another, with
the support and involvement of individuals and groups outside the public sec-
tor, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based
organizations, if their efforts in this area are to be effective,
Bearing also in mind the principles of proper management of public affairs
and public property, fairness, responsibility and equality before the law and the
need to safeguard integrity and to foster a culture of rejection of corruption,
Commending the work of the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in pre-
venting and combating corruption,
Recalling the work carried out by other international and regional organi-
zations in this field, including the activities of the African Union, the Council
of Europe, the Customs Cooperation Council (also known as the World Cus-
toms Organization), the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Organization
of American States,
Taking note with appreciation of multilateral instruments to prevent and
combat corruption, including, inter alia, the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption, adopted by the Organization of American States on
29 March 1996,1 the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the
European Union, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 26 May
1997,2 the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, adopted by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development on 21 November 1997,3 the Criminal Law
1See E/1996/99.
2Official Journal of the European Communities, C 195, 25 June 1997.
3See Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries (United Nations publi-
cation, Sales No. E.98.III.B.18).
7Convention on Corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on 27 January 1999,4 the Civil Law Convention on Corrup-
tion, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
4 November 1999,5 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption, adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the
African Union on 12 July 2003,
Welcoming the entry into force on 29 September 2003 of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,6
Have agreed as follows:
Chapter I
General provisions
Article 1. Statement of purpose
The purposes of this Convention are:
(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corrup-
tion more efficiently and effectively;
(b) To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and
technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including
in asset recovery;
(c) To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of pub-
lic affairs and public property.
Article 2. Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) “Public official” shall mean: (i) any person holding a legislative, execu-
tive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether appointed or
elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective
of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public function,
including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service,
as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent
area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a “public
4Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 173.
5Ibid., No. 174.
6General Assembly resolution 55/25, annex I.
8official” in the domestic law of a State Party. However, for the purpose of some
specific measures contained in chapter II of this Convention, “public official”
may mean any person who performs a public function or provides a public
service as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the
pertinent area of law of that State Party;
(b) “Foreign public official” shall mean any person holding a legislative,
executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether ap-
pointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function for a foreign
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise;
(c) “Official of a public international organization” shall mean an inter-
national civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an organization
to act on behalf of that organization;
(d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or in-
corporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents
or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets;
(e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or ob-
tained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence;
(f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the trans-
fer, conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming
custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or
other competent authority;
(g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean
the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent
authority;
(h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which pro-
ceeds have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined
in article 23 of this Convention;
(i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or
suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or
more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent
authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification
of persons involved in the commission of the offence.
Article 3. Scope of application
1. This Convention shall apply, in accordance with its terms, to the
prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption and to the freezing,
seizure, confiscation and return of the proceeds of offences established in
accordance with this Convention.
92. For the purposes of implementing this Convention, it shall not be
necessary, except as otherwise stated herein, for the offences set forth in it to
result in damage or harm to state property.
Article 4. Protection of sovereignty
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention
in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in
the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of
functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by
its domestic law.
Chapter II
Preventive measures
Article 5. Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated
anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the
principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public
property, integrity, transparency and accountability.
2. Each State Party shall endeavour to establish and promote effective
practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.
3. Each State Party shall endeavour to periodically evaluate relevant legal
instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their
adequacy to prevent and fight corruption.
4. States Parties shall, as appropriate and in accordance with the funda-
mental principles of their legal system, collaborate with each other and with
relevant international and regional organizations in promoting and developing
the measures referred to in this article. That collaboration may include partici-
pation in international programmes and projects aimed at the prevention of
corruption.
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Article 6. Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that
prevent corruption by such means as:
(a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention
and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of
those policies;
(b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of cor-
ruption.
2. Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in para-
graph 1 of this article the necessary independence, in accordance with the fun-
damental principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out
its or their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The nec-
essary material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that such
staff may require to carry out their functions, should be provided.
3. Each State Party shall inform the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the name and address of the authority or authorities that may assist
other States Parties in developing and implementing specific measures for the
prevention of corruption.
Article 7. Public sector
1. Each State Party shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the
fundamental principles of its legal system, endeavour to adopt, maintain and
strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retire-
ment of civil servants and, where appropriate, other non-elected public officials:
(a) That are based on principles of efficiency, transparency and objective
criteria such as merit, equity and aptitude;
(b) That include adequate procedures for the selection and training of
individuals for public positions considered especially vulnerable to corruption
and the rotation, where appropriate, of such individuals to other positions;
(c) That promote adequate remuneration and equitable pay scales, taking
into account the level of economic development of the State Party;
(d) That promote education and training programmes to enable them to
meet the requirements for the correct, honourable and proper performance of
public functions and that provide them with specialized and appropriate train-
ing to enhance their awareness of the risks of corruption inherent in the
11
performance of their functions. Such programmes may make reference to codes
or standards of conduct in applicable areas.
2. Each State Party shall also consider adopting appropriate legislative
and administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention
and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to
prescribe criteria concerning candidature for and election to public office.
3. Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and
administrative measures, consistent with the objectives of this Convention and
in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to enhance
transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where
applicable, the funding of political parties.
4. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its domestic law, endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems that
promote transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.
Article 8. Codes of conduct for public officials
1. In order to fight corruption, each State Party shall promote, inter alia,
integrity, honesty and responsibility among its public officials, in accordance
with the fundamental principles of its legal system.
2. In particular, each State Party shall endeavour to apply, within its own
institutional and legal systems, codes or standards of conduct for the correct,
honourable and proper performance of public functions.
3. For the purposes of implementing the provisions of this article, each
State Party shall, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental
principles of its legal system, take note of the relevant initiatives of regional,
interregional and multilateral organizations, such as the International Code of
Conduct for Public Officials contained in the annex to General Assembly reso-
lution 51/59 of 12 December 1996.
4. Each State Party shall also consider, in accordance with the funda-
mental principles of its domestic law, establishing measures and systems to
facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate
authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their
functions.
5. Each State Party shall endeavour, where appropriate and in accord-
ance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to establish measures
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and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate
authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, invest-
ments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest
may result with respect to their functions as public officials.
6. Each State Party shall consider taking, in accordance with the funda-
mental principles of its domestic law, disciplinary or other measures against
public officials who violate the codes or standards established in accordance
with this article.
Article 9. Public procurement and management
of public finances
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its legal system, take the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of
procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in
decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption. Such
systems, which may take into account appropriate threshold values in their
application, shall address, inter alia:
(a) The public distribution of information relating to procurement pro-
cedures and contracts, including information on invitations to tender and rel-
evant or pertinent information on the award of contracts, allowing potential
tenderers sufficient time to prepare and submit their tenders;
(b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions for participation, includ-
ing selection and award criteria and tendering rules, and their publication;
(c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procure-
ment decisions, in order to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct
application of the rules or procedures;
(d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system
of appeal, to ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or
procedures established pursuant to this paragraph are not followed;
(e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding personnel
responsible for procurement, such as declaration of interest in particular public
procurements, screening procedures and training requirements.
2. Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its legal system, take appropriate measures to promote transparency and
accountability in the management of public finances. Such measures shall
encompass, inter alia:
(a) Procedures for the adoption of the national budget;
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(b) Timely reporting on revenue and expenditure;
(c) A system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight;
(d) Effective and efficient systems of risk management and internal con-
trol; and
(e) Where appropriate, corrective action in the case of failure to comply
with the requirements established in this paragraph.
3. Each State Party shall take such civil and administrative measures as
may be necessary, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic
law, to preserve the integrity of accounting books, records, financial statements
or other documents related to public expenditure and revenue and to prevent
the falsification of such documents.
Article 10. Public reporting
Taking into account the need to combat corruption, each State Party shall,
in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, take such
measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public administra-
tion, including with regard to its organization, functioning and decision-
making processes, where appropriate. Such measures may include, inter alia:
(a) Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general
public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, function-
ing and decision-making processes of its public administration and, with due
regard for the protection of privacy and personal data, on decisions and legal
acts that concern members of the public;
(b) Simplifying administrative procedures, where appropriate, in order to
facilitate public access to the competent decision-making authorities; and
(c) Publishing information, which may include periodic reports on the
risks of corruption in its public administration.
Article 11. Measures relating to the judiciary
and prosecution services
1. Bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its crucial role
in combating corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the funda-
mental principles of its legal system and without prejudice to judicial independ-
ence, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for
corruption among members of the judiciary. Such measures may include rules
with respect to the conduct of members of the judiciary.
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2. Measures to the same effect as those taken pursuant to paragraph 1 of
this article may be introduced and applied within the prosecution service in
those States Parties where it does not form part of the judiciary but enjoys
independence similar to that of the judicial service.
Article 12. Private sector
1. Each State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the funda-
mental principles of its domestic law, to prevent corruption involving the
private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the private sector
and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil,
administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures.
2. Measures to achieve these ends may include, inter alia:
(a) Promoting cooperation between law enforcement agencies and
relevant private entities;
(b) Promoting the development of standards and procedures designed to
safeguard the integrity of relevant private entities, including codes of conduct
for the correct, honourable and proper performance of the activities of business
and all relevant professions and the prevention of conflicts of interest, and for
the promotion of the use of good commercial practices among businesses and
in the contractual relations of businesses with the State;
(c) Promoting transparency among private entities, including, where ap-
propriate, measures regarding the identity of legal and natural persons involved
in the establishment and management of corporate entities;
(d) Preventing the misuse of procedures regulating private entities, in-
cluding procedures regarding subsidies and licences granted by public authori-
ties for commercial activities;
(e) Preventing conflicts of interest by imposing restrictions, as appropri-
ate and for a reasonable period of time, on the professional activities of former
public officials or on the employment of public officials by the private sector
after their resignation or retirement, where such activities or employment relate
directly to the functions held or supervised by those public officials during their
tenure;
(f) Ensuring that private enterprises, taking into account their structure
and size, have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in preventing and
detecting acts of corruption and that the accounts and required financial state-
ments of such private enterprises are subject to appropriate auditing and certi-
fication procedures.
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3. In order to prevent corruption, each State Party shall take such meas-
ures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic laws and regulations
regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial statement disclosures
and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the following acts carried
out for the purpose of committing any of the offences established in accordance
with this Convention:
(a) The establishment of off-the-books accounts;
(b) The making of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions;
(c) The recording of non-existent expenditure;
(d) The entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their objects;
(e) The use of false documents; and
(f) The intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier than
foreseen by the law.
4. Each State Party shall disallow the tax deductibility of expenses that
constitute bribes, the latter being one of the constituent elements of the offences
established in accordance with articles 15 and 16 of this Convention and, where
appropriate, other expenses incurred in furtherance of corrupt conduct.
Article 13. Participation of society
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and
in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the
active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as
civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based organiza-
tions, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public
awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by
corruption. This participation should be strengthened by such measures as:
(a) Enhancing the transparency of and promoting the contribution of the
public to decision-making processes;
(b) Ensuring that the public has effective access to information;
(c) Undertaking public information activities that contribute to non-
tolerance of corruption, as well as public education programmes, including
school and university curricula;
(d) Respecting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive,
publish and disseminate information concerning corruption. That freedom may
be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided for
by law and are necessary:
(i) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
16
(ii) For the protection of national security or ordre public or of
public health or morals.
2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the
relevant anti-corruption bodies referred to in this Convention are known to the
public and shall provide access to such bodies, where appropriate, for the re-
porting, including anonymously, of any incidents that may be considered to
constitute an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 14. Measures to prevent money-laundering
1. Each State Party shall:
(a) Institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime
for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural or legal persons
that provide formal or informal services for the transmission of money or value
and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-
laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of
money-laundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer
and, where appropriate, beneficial owner identification, record-keeping and the
reporting of suspicious transactions;
(b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, ensure that ad-
ministrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities dedicated to
combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate under domestic
law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange information
at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its
domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial
intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and
dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.
2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect
and monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments
across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information
and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such
measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the
cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable
instruments.
3. States Parties shall consider implementing appropriate and feasible
measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters:
(a) To include on forms for the electronic transfer of funds and related
messages accurate and meaningful information on the originator;
17
(b) To maintain such information throughout the payment chain; and
(c) To apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do not contain
complete information on the originator.
4. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the
terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Conven-
tion, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of
regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering.
5. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional,
subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and
financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.
Chapter III
Criminalization and law enforcement
Article 15. Bribery of national public officials
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indi-
rectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the
exercise of his or her official duties;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indi-
rectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the
exercise of his or her official duties.
Article 16. Bribery of foreign public officials and officials
of public international organizations
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intention-
ally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of
a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advan-
tage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties,
in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the
conduct of international business.
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2. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an
official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity,
in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her
official duties.
Article 17. Embezzlement, misappropriation or
other diversion of property by a public official
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his
or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property,
public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the
public official by virtue of his or her position.
Article 18. Trading in influence
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other per-
son, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public
official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view
to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an
undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person,
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another
person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or
supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public
authority of the State Party an undue advantage.
Article 19. Abuse of functions
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or
failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the
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discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advan-
tage for himself or herself or for another person or entity.
Article 20. Illicit enrichment
Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal sys-
tem, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed inten-
tionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public
official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful
income.
Article 21. Bribery in the private sector
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities:
(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private
sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order
that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private
sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order
that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from acting.
Article 22. Embezzlement of property in the private sector
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other meas-
ures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally in the course of economic, financial or commercial activities,
embezzlement by a person who directs or works, in any capacity, in a private
sector entity of any property, private funds or securities or any other thing of
value entrusted to him or her by virtue of his or her position.
Article 23. Laundering of proceeds of crime
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental prin-
ciples of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
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(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such
property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing
or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any
person who is involved in the commission of the predicate
offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the
time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit,
attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and coun-
selling the commission of any of the offences established in
accordance with this article.
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:
(a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the
widest range of predicate offences;
(b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences at a minimum a
comprehensive range of criminal offences established in accordance with this
Convention;
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b) above, predicate offences shall
include offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State
Party in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a
State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is
a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed
and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party
implementing or applying this article had it been committed there;
(d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this
article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
(e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State
Party, it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article
do not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence.
Article 24. Concealment
Without prejudice to the provisions of article 23 of this Convention, each
State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may
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be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally
after the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with this
Convention without having participated in such offences, the concealment or
continued retention of property when the person involved knows that such
property is the result of any of the offences established in accordance with this
Convention.
Article 25. Obstruction of justice
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the promise,
offering or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to inter-
fere in the giving of testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding
in relation to the commission of offences established in accordance with this
Convention;
(b) The use of physical force, threats or intimidation to interfere with the
exercise of official duties by a justice or law enforcement official in relation to
the commission of offences established in accordance with this Convention.
Nothing in this subparagraph shall prejudice the right of States Parties to have
legislation that protects other categories of public official.
Article 26. Liability of legal persons
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary,
consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for
participation in the offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.
3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the
natural persons who have committed the offences.
4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons
held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate
and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary
sanctions.
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Article 27. Participation and attempt
1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its
domestic law, participation in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or
instigator in an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic
law, any attempt to commit an offence established in accordance with this
Convention.
3. Each State Party may adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, in accordance with its domestic
law, the preparation for an offence established in accordance with this
Convention.
Article 28. Knowledge, intent and purpose
as elements of an offence
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence estab-
lished in accordance with this Convention may be inferred from objective
factual circumstances.
Article 29. Statute of limitations
Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law
a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any
offence established in accordance with this Convention and establish a longer
statute of limitations period or provide for the suspension of the statute of
limitations where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice.
Article 30. Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions
1. Each State Party shall make the commission of an offence established
in accordance with this Convention liable to sanctions that take into account
the gravity of that offence.
2. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish or maintain, in accordance with its legal system and constitutional
principles, an appropriate balance between any immunities or jurisdictional
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privileges accorded to its public officials for the performance of their functions
and the possibility, when necessary, of effectively investigating, prosecuting and
adjudicating offences established in accordance with this Convention.
3. Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal
powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences
established in accordance with this Convention are exercised to maximize the
effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and with
due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences.
4. In the case of offences established in accordance with this Conven-
tion, each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its
domestic law and with due regard to the rights of the defence, to seek to ensure
that conditions imposed in connection with decisions on release pending trial
or appeal take into consideration the need to ensure the presence of the defend-
ant at subsequent criminal proceedings.
5. Each State Party shall take into account the gravity of the offences
concerned when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons
convicted of such offences.
6. Each State Party, to the extent consistent with the fundamental prin-
ciples of its legal system, shall consider establishing procedures through which
a public official accused of an offence established in accordance with this Con-
vention may, where appropriate, be removed, suspended or reassigned by the
appropriate authority, bearing in mind respect for the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence.
7. Where warranted by the gravity of the offence, each State Party, to the
extent consistent with the fundamental principles of its legal system, shall con-
sider establishing procedures for the disqualification, by court order or any
other appropriate means, for a period of time determined by its domestic law,
of persons convicted of offences established in accordance with this Convention
from:
(a) Holding public office; and
(b) Holding office in an enterprise owned in whole or in part by the
State.
8. Paragraph 1 of this article shall be without prejudice to the exercise of
disciplinary powers by the competent authorities against civil servants.
9. Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that
the description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention
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and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the
lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and that
such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that law.
10. States Parties shall endeavour to promote the reintegration into society
of persons convicted of offences established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 31. Freezing, seizure and confiscation
1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its
domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation
of:
(a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance
with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such
proceeds;
(b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for
use in offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
enable the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation.
3. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with its domestic law,
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to regulate the admin-
istration by the competent authorities of frozen, seized or confiscated property
covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
4. If such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part
or in full, into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures
referred to in this article instead of the proceeds.
5. If such proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property ac-
quired from legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any
powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed
value of the intermingled proceeds.
6. Income or other benefits derived from such proceeds of crime, from
property into which such proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted
or from property with which such proceeds of crime have been intermingled
shall also be liable to the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner
and to the same extent as proceeds of crime.
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7. For the purpose of this article and article 55 of this Convention, each
State Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that
bank, financial or commercial records be made available or seized. A State Party
shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the ground
of bank secrecy.
8. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an of-
fender demonstrate the lawful origin of such alleged proceeds of crime or other
property liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consist-
ent with the fundamental principles of their domestic law and with the nature
of judicial and other proceedings.
9. The provisions of this article shall not be so construed as to prejudice
the rights of bona fide third parties.
10. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the
measures to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance
with and subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party.
Article 32. Protection of witnesses, experts and victims
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with
its domestic legal system and within its means to provide effective protection
from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts who give
testimony concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention
and, as appropriate, for their relatives and other persons close to them.
2. The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this article may include,
inter alia, without prejudice to the rights of the defendant, including the right
to due process:
(a) Establishing procedures for the physical protection of such persons,
such as, to the extent necessary and feasible, relocating them and permitting,
where appropriate, non-disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of informa-
tion concerning the identity and whereabouts of such persons;
(b) Providing evidentiary rules to permit witnesses and experts to give
testimony in a manner that ensures the safety of such persons, such as permit-
ting testimony to be given through the use of communications technology such
as video or other adequate means.
3. States Parties shall consider entering into agreements or arrangements
with other States for the relocation of persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
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4. The provisions of this article shall also apply to victims insofar as they
are witnesses.
5. Each State Party shall, subject to its domestic law, enable the views
and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of
criminal proceedings against offenders in a manner not prejudicial to the rights
of the defence.
Article 33. Protection of reporting persons
Each State Party shall consider incorporating into its domestic legal system
appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for
any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the com-
petent authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with
this Convention.
Article 34. Consequences of acts of corruption
With due regard to the rights of third parties acquired in good faith, each
State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles
of its domestic law, to address consequences of corruption. In this context,
States Parties may consider corruption a relevant factor in legal proceedings to
annul or rescind a contract, withdraw a concession or other similar instrument
or take any other remedial action.
Article 35. Compensation for damage
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accord-
ance with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who
have suffered damage as a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate
legal proceedings against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain
compensation.
Article 36. Specialized authorities
Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its
legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in
combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or per-
sons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fun-
damental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out
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their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or
staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources
to carry out their tasks.
Article 37. Cooperation with law enforcement authorities
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons
who participate or who have participated in the commission of an offence
established in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to
competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide
factual, specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving
offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds.
2. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appro-
priate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides sub-
stantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established
in accordance with this Convention.
3. Each State Party shall consider providing for the possibility, in ac-
cordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity
from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the in-
vestigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this
Convention.
4. Protection of such persons shall be, mutatis mutandis, as provided for
in article 32 of this Convention.
5. Where a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this article located in one
State Party can provide substantial cooperation to the competent authorities of
another State Party, the States Parties concerned may consider entering into
agreements or arrangements, in accordance with their domestic law, concerning
the potential provision by the other State Party of the treatment set forth in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article.
Article 38. Cooperation between national authorities
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage,
in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between, on the one hand, its
public authorities, as well as its public officials, and, on the other hand, its
authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. Such
cooperation may include:
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(a) Informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there
are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the offences established in accord-
ance with articles 15, 21 and 23 of this Convention has been committed; or
(b) Providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary infor-
mation.
Article 39. Cooperation between national authorities
and the private sector
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation between national
investigating and prosecuting authorities and entities of the private sector, in
particular financial institutions, relating to matters involving the commission of
offences established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall consider encouraging its nationals and other
persons with a habitual residence in its territory to report to the national inves-
tigating and prosecuting authorities the commission of an offence established in
accordance with this Convention.
Article 40. Bank secrecy
Each State Party shall ensure that, in the case of domestic criminal inves-
tigations of offences established in accordance with this Convention, there are
appropriate mechanisms available within its domestic legal system to overcome
obstacles that may arise out of the application of bank secrecy laws.
Article 41. Criminal record
Each State Party may adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to take into consideration, under such terms as and for the purpose
that it deems appropriate, any previous conviction in another State of an alleged
offender for the purpose of using such information in criminal proceedings
relating to an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 42. Jurisdiction
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this
Convention when:
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(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of
that State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party
at the time that the offence is committed.
2. Subject to article 4 of this Convention, a State Party may also estab-
lish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
(a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party; or
(b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a state-
less person who has his or her habitual residence in its territory; or
(c) The offence is one of those established in accordance with article 23,
paragraph 1 (b) (ii), of this Convention and is committed outside its territory
with a view to the commission of an offence established in accordance with
article 23, paragraph 1 (a) (i) or (ii) or (b) (i), of this Convention within its
territory; or
(d) The offence is committed against the State Party.
3. For the purposes of article 44 of this Convention, each State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the
offences established in accordance with this Convention when the alleged
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely
on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.
4. Each State Party may also take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with this
Convention when the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not
extradite him or her.
5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of
this article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that any other States
Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in
respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those States Parties
shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their
actions.
6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this Con-
vention shall not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by
a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.
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Chapter IV
International cooperation
Article 43. International cooperation
1. States Parties shall cooperate in criminal matters in accordance with
articles 44 to 50 of this Convention. Where appropriate and consistent with
their domestic legal system, States Parties shall consider assisting each other in
investigations of and proceedings in civil and administrative matters relating to
corruption.
2. In matters of international cooperation, whenever dual criminality is
considered a requirement, it shall be deemed fulfilled irrespective of whether the
laws of the requested State Party place the offence within the same category of
offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting
State Party, if the conduct underlying the offence for which assistance is sought
is a criminal offence under the laws of both States Parties.
Article 44. Extradition
1. This article shall apply to the offences established in accordance with
this Convention where the person who is the subject of the request for extra-
dition is present in the territory of the requested State Party, provided that the
offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of
both the requesting State Party and the requested State Party.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, a State
Party whose law so permits may grant the extradition of a person for any of the
offences covered by this Convention that are not punishable under its own
domestic law.
3. If the request for extradition includes several separate offences, at least
one of which is extraditable under this article and some of which are not
extraditable by reason of their period of imprisonment but are related to of-
fences established in accordance with this Convention, the requested State Party
may apply this article also in respect of those offences.
4. Each of the offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to
be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between
States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. A State Party
whose law so permits, in case it uses this Convention as the basis for extradition,
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shall not consider any of the offences established in accordance with this Con-
vention to be a political offence.
5. If a State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which
it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention the legal basis for
extradition in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
6. A State Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty shall:
(a) At the time of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval of or accession to this Convention, inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations whether it will take this Convention as the legal basis for
cooperation on extradition with other States Parties to this Convention; and
(b) If it does not take this Convention as the legal basis for cooperation
on extradition, seek, where appropriate, to conclude treaties on extradition with
other States Parties to this Convention in order to implement this article.
7. States Parties that do not make extradition conditional on the exist-
ence of a treaty shall recognize offences to which this article applies as extradit-
able offences between themselves.
8. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the
domestic law of the requested State Party or by applicable extradition treaties,
including, inter alia, conditions in relation to the minimum penalty require-
ment for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may
refuse extradition.
9. States Parties shall, subject to their domestic law, endeavour to expe-
dite extradition procedures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating
thereto in respect of any offence to which this article applies.
10. Subject to the provisions of its domestic law and its extradition trea-
ties, the requested State Party may, upon being satisfied that the circumstances
so warrant and are urgent and at the request of the requesting State Party, take
a person whose extradition is sought and who is present in its territory into
custody or take other appropriate measures to ensure his or her presence at
extradition proceedings.
11. A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is found, if it does
not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this article applies
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solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request
of the State Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without
undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those
authorities shall take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same
manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the domestic
law of that State Party. The States Parties concerned shall cooperate with each
other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the
efficiency of such prosecution.
12. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extra-
dite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the
person will be returned to that State Party to serve the sentence imposed as a
result of the trial or proceedings for which the extradition or surrender of the
person was sought and that State Party and the State Party seeking the extra-
dition of the person agree with this option and other terms that they may deem
appropriate, such conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to
discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 11 of this article.
13. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence, is refused
because the person sought is a national of the requested State Party, the re-
quested State Party shall, if its domestic law so permits and in conformity with
the requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting State Party,
consider the enforcement of the sentence imposed under the domestic law of the
requesting State Party or the remainder thereof.
14. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in
connection with any of the offences to which this article applies shall be
guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment
of all the rights and guarantees provided by the domestic law of the State Party
in the territory of which that person is present.
15. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an ob-
ligation to extradite if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for
believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin or political opinions or that compliance with the request would
cause prejudice to that person’s position for any one of these reasons.
16. States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition on the sole
ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
17. Before refusing extradition, the requested State Party shall, where
appropriate, consult with the requesting State Party to provide it with ample
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opportunity to present its opinions and to provide information relevant to its
allegation.
18. States Parties shall seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral
agreements or arrangements to carry out or to enhance the effectiveness of
extradition.
Article 45. Transfer of sentenced persons
States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments or arrangements on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to
imprisonment or other forms of deprivation of liberty for offences established
in accordance with this Convention in order that they may complete their
sentences there.
Article 46. Mutual legal assistance
1. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual
legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in rela-
tion to the offences covered by this Convention.
2. Mutual legal assistance shall be afforded to the fullest extent possible
under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and arrangements of the requested
State Party with respect to investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings
in relation to the offences for which a legal person may be held liable in
accordance with article 26 of this Convention in the requesting State Party.
3. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article
may be requested for any of the following purposes:
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
(c) Executing searches and seizures, and freezing;
(d) Examining objects and sites;
(e) Providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations;
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and
records, including government, bank, financial, corporate or business records;
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities or
other things for evidentiary purposes;
(h) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons in the requesting
State Party;
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(i) Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law
of the requested State Party;
(j) Identifying, freezing and tracing proceeds of crime in accordance with
the provisions of chapter V of this Convention;
(k) The recovery of assets, in accordance with the provisions of chapter V
of this Convention.
4. Without prejudice to domestic law, the competent authorities of a
State Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to crimi-
nal matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe
that such information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully
concluding inquiries and criminal proceedings or could result in a request for-
mulated by the latter State Party pursuant to this Convention.
5. The transmission of information pursuant to paragraph 4 of this ar-
ticle shall be without prejudice to inquiries and criminal proceedings in the
State of the competent authorities providing the information. The competent
authorities receiving the information shall comply with a request that said in-
formation remain confidential, even temporarily, or with restrictions on its use.
However, this shall not prevent the receiving State Party from disclosing in its
proceedings information that is exculpatory to an accused person. In such a
case, the receiving State Party shall notify the transmitting State Party prior to
the disclosure and, if so requested, consult with the transmitting State Party. If,
in an exceptional case, advance notice is not possible, the receiving State Party
shall inform the transmitting State Party of the disclosure without delay.
6. The provisions of this article shall not affect the obligations under any
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, that governs or will govern, in whole or
in part, mutual legal assistance.
7. Paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article shall apply to requests made pursu-
ant to this article if the States Parties in question are not bound by a treaty of
mutual legal assistance. If those States Parties are bound by such a treaty, the
corresponding provisions of that treaty shall apply unless the States Parties agree
to apply paragraphs 9 to 29 of this article in lieu thereof. States Parties are
strongly encouraged to apply those paragraphs if they facilitate cooperation.
8. States Parties shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance pur-
suant to this article on the ground of bank secrecy.
9. (a) A requested State Party, in responding to a request for assistance
pursuant to this article in the absence of dual criminality, shall take into account
the purposes of this Convention, as set forth in article 1;
35
(b) States Parties may decline to render assistance pursuant to this article
on the ground of absence of dual criminality. However, a requested State Party
shall, where consistent with the basic concepts of its legal system, render
assistance that does not involve coercive action. Such assistance may be refused
when requests involve matters of a de minimis nature or matters for which the
cooperation or assistance sought is available under other provisions of this
Convention;
(c) Each State Party may consider adopting such measures as may be
necessary to enable it to provide a wider scope of assistance pursuant to this
article in the absence of dual criminality.
10. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the terri-
tory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for
purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in ob-
taining evidence for investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in rela-
tion to offences covered by this Convention may be transferred if the following
conditions are met:
(a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent;
(b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to such
conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.
11. For the purposes of paragraph 10 of this article:
(a) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall have the
authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless other-
wise requested or authorized by the State Party from which the person was
transferred;
(b) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall without delay
implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State Party
from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise
agreed, by the competent authorities of both States Parties;
(c) The State Party to which the person is transferred shall not require the
State Party from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition pro-
ceedings for the return of the person;
(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence
being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent
in the custody of the State Party to which he or she was transferred.
12. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in
accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this article so agrees, that person,
whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or
subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory
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of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts, omissions or
convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from
which he or she was transferred.
13. Each State Party shall designate a central authority that shall have the
responsibility and power to receive requests for mutual legal assistance and
either to execute them or to transmit them to the competent authorities for
execution. Where a State Party has a special region or territory with a separate
system of mutual legal assistance, it may designate a distinct central authority
that shall have the same function for that region or territory. Central authorities
shall ensure the speedy and proper execution or transmission of the requests
received. Where the central authority transmits the request to a competent
authority for execution, it shall encourage the speedy and proper execution of
the request by the competent authority. The Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall be notified of the central authority designated for this purpose at
the time each State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval of or accession to this Convention. Requests for mutual legal assistance
and any communication related thereto shall be transmitted to the central au-
thorities designated by the States Parties. This requirement shall be without
prejudice to the right of a State Party to require that such requests and com-
munications be addressed to it through diplomatic channels and, in urgent
circumstances, where the States Parties agree, through the International Crimi-
nal Police Organization, if possible.
14. Requests shall be made in writing or, where possible, by any means
capable of producing a written record, in a language acceptable to the requested
State Party, under conditions allowing that State Party to establish authenticity.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be notified of the language
or languages acceptable to each State Party at the time it deposits its instrument
of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention. In
urgent circumstances and where agreed by the States Parties, requests may be
made orally but shall be confirmed in writing forthwith.
15. A request for mutual legal assistance shall contain:
(a) The identity of the authority making the request;
(b) The subject matter and nature of the investigation, prosecution or
judicial proceeding to which the request relates and the name and functions of
the authority conducting the investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding;
(c) A summary of the relevant facts, except in relation to requests for the
purpose of service of judicial documents;
(d) A description of the assistance sought and details of any particular
procedure that the requesting State Party wishes to be followed;
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(e) Where possible, the identity, location and nationality of any person
concerned; and
(f) The purpose for which the evidence, information or action is sought.
16. The requested State Party may request additional information when
it appears necessary for the execution of the request in accordance with its
domestic law or when it can facilitate such execution.
17. A request shall be executed in accordance with the domestic law of
the requested State Party and, to the extent not contrary to the domestic law
of the requested State Party and where possible, in accordance with the pro-
cedures specified in the request.
18. Wherever possible and consistent with fundamental principles of
domestic law, when an individual is in the territory of a State Party and has to
be heard as a witness or expert by the judicial authorities of another State Party,
the first State Party may, at the request of the other, permit the hearing to take
place by video conference if it is not possible or desirable for the individual in
question to appear in person in the territory of the requesting State Party. States
Parties may agree that the hearing shall be conducted by a judicial authority of
the requesting State Party and attended by a judicial authority of the requested
State Party.
19. The requesting State Party shall not transmit or use information or
evidence furnished by the requested State Party for investigations, prosecutions
or judicial proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior
consent of the requested State Party. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the
requesting State Party from disclosing in its proceedings information or evi-
dence that is exculpatory to an accused person. In the latter case, the requesting
State Party shall notify the requested State Party prior to the disclosure and, if
so requested, consult with the requested State Party. If, in an exceptional case,
advance notice is not possible, the requesting State Party shall inform the
requested State Party of the disclosure without delay.
20. The requesting State Party may require that the requested State Party
keep confidential the fact and substance of the request, except to the extent
necessary to execute the request. If the requested State Party cannot comply
with the requirement of confidentiality, it shall promptly inform the requesting
State Party.
21. Mutual legal assistance may be refused:
(a) If the request is not made in conformity with the provisions of this
article;
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(b) If the requested State Party considers that execution of the request
is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential
interests;
(c) If the authorities of the requested State Party would be prohibited by
its domestic law from carrying out the action requested with regard to any
similar offence, had it been subject to investigation, prosecution or judicial
proceedings under their own jurisdiction;
(d) If it would be contrary to the legal system of the requested State Party
relating to mutual legal assistance for the request to be granted.
22. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on
the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.
23. Reasons shall be given for any refusal of mutual legal assistance.
24. The requested State Party shall execute the request for mutual legal
assistance as soon as possible and shall take as full account as possible of any
deadlines suggested by the requesting State Party and for which reasons are
given, preferably in the request. The requesting State Party may make reason-
able requests for information on the status and progress of measures taken by
the requested State Party to satisfy its request. The requested State Party shall
respond to reasonable requests by the requesting State Party on the status, and
progress in its handling, of the request. The requesting State Party shall
promptly inform the requested State Party when the assistance sought is no
longer required.
25. Mutual legal assistance may be postponed by the requested State
Party on the ground that it interferes with an ongoing investigation, prosecution
or judicial proceeding.
26. Before refusing a request pursuant to paragraph 21 of this article or
postponing its execution pursuant to paragraph 25 of this article, the requested
State Party shall consult with the requesting State Party to consider whether
assistance may be granted subject to such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary. If the requesting State Party accepts assistance subject to those con-
ditions, it shall comply with the conditions.
27. Without prejudice to the application of paragraph 12 of this article,
a witness, expert or other person who, at the request of the requesting State
Party, consents to give evidence in a proceeding or to assist in an investigation,
prosecution or judicial proceeding in the territory of the requesting State Party
shall not be prosecuted, detained, punished or subjected to any other restriction
of his or her personal liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or
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convictions prior to his or her departure from the territory of the requested
State Party. Such safe conduct shall cease when the witness, expert or other
person having had, for a period of fifteen consecutive days or for any period
agreed upon by the States Parties from the date on which he or she has been
officially informed that his or her presence is no longer required by the judicial
authorities, an opportunity of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in
the territory of the requesting State Party or, having left it, has returned of his
or her own free will.
28. The ordinary costs of executing a request shall be borne by the re-
quested State Party, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned. If
expenses of a substantial or extraordinary nature are or will be required to fulfil
the request, the States Parties shall consult to determine the terms and condi-
tions under which the request will be executed, as well as the manner in which
the costs shall be borne.
29. The requested State Party:
(a) Shall provide to the requesting State Party copies of government
records, documents or information in its possession that under its domestic law
are available to the general public;
(b) May, at its discretion, provide to the requesting State Party in whole,
in part or subject to such conditions as it deems appropriate, copies of any
government records, documents or information in its possession that under its
domestic law are not available to the general public.
30. States Parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements that would serve
the purposes of, give practical effect to or enhance the provisions of this article.
Article 47. Transfer of criminal proceedings
States Parties shall consider the possibility of transferring to one another
proceedings for the prosecution of an offence established in accordance with
this Convention in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests
of the proper administration of justice, in particular in cases where several
jurisdictions are involved, with a view to concentrating the prosecution.
Article 48. Law enforcement cooperation
1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with
their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the
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effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by this
Convention. States Parties shall, in particular, take effective measures:
(a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of communi-
cation between their competent authorities, agencies and services in order to
facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of
the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States Parties con-
cerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities;
(b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with
respect to offences covered by this Convention concerning:
(i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of
involvement in such offences or the location of other persons
concerned;
(ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from
the commission of such offences;
(iii) The movement of property, equipment or other
instrumentalities used or intended for use in the commission of
such offences;
(c) To provide, where appropriate, necessary items or quantities of sub-
stances for analytical or investigative purposes;
(d) To exchange, where appropriate, information with other States Parties
concerning specific means and methods used to commit offences covered by
this Convention, including the use of false identities, forged, altered or false
documents and other means of concealing activities;
(e) To facilitate effective coordination between their competent authori-
ties, agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other
experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between the
States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers;
(f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other
measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the
offences covered by this Convention.
2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall
consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on
direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such
agreements or arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of
such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the
States Parties may consider this Convention to be the basis for mutual law
enforcement cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention.
Whenever appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or
arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance the
cooperation between their law enforcement agencies.
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3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to re-
spond to offences covered by this Convention committed through the use of
modern technology.
Article 49. Joint investigations
States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements
or arrangements whereby, in relation to matters that are the subject of investi-
gations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings in one or more States, the compe-
tent authorities concerned may establish joint investigative bodies. In the ab-
sence of such agreements or arrangements, joint investigations may be
undertaken by agreement on a case-by-case basis. The States Parties involved
shall ensure that the sovereignty of the State Party in whose territory such
investigation is to take place is fully respected.
Article 50. Special investigative techniques
1. In order to combat corruption effectively, each State Party shall, to the
extent permitted by the basic principles of its domestic legal system and in
accordance with the conditions prescribed by its domestic law, take such meas-
ures as may be necessary, within its means, to allow for the appropriate use by
its competent authorities of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate,
other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of sur-
veillance and undercover operations, within its territory, and to allow for the
admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.
2. For the purpose of investigating the offences covered by this Conven-
tion, States Parties are encouraged to conclude, when necessary, appropriate
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements for using such special inves-
tigative techniques in the context of cooperation at the international level. Such
agreements or arrangements shall be concluded and implemented in full com-
pliance with the principle of sovereign equality of States and shall be carried out
strictly in accordance with the terms of those agreements or arrangements.
3. In the absence of an agreement or arrangement as set forth in para-
graph 2 of this article, decisions to use such special investigative techniques at
the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may, when
necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings
with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States Parties concerned.
4. Decisions to use controlled delivery at the international level may,
with the consent of the States Parties concerned, include methods such as
intercepting and allowing the goods or funds to continue intact or be removed
or replaced in whole or in part.
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Chapter V
Asset recovery
Article 51. General provision
The return of assets pursuant to this chapter is a fundamental principle of
this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure
of cooperation and assistance in this regard.
Article 52. Prevention and detection of transfers
of proceeds of crime
1. Without prejudice to article 14 of this Convention, each State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its domestic
law, to require financial institutions within its jurisdiction to verify the identity
of customers, to take reasonable steps to determine the identity of beneficial
owners of funds deposited into high-value accounts and to conduct enhanced
scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who
are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and their family
members and close associates. Such enhanced scrutiny shall be reasonably de-
signed to detect suspicious transactions for the purpose of reporting to compe-
tent authorities and should not be so construed as to discourage or prohibit
financial institutions from doing business with any legitimate customer.
2. In order to facilitate implementation of the measures provided for in
paragraph 1 of this article, each State Party, in accordance with its domestic law
and inspired by relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral
organizations against money-laundering, shall:
(a) Issue advisories regarding the types of natural or legal person to whose
accounts financial institutions within its jurisdiction will be expected to apply
enhanced scrutiny, the types of accounts and transactions to which to pay
particular attention and appropriate account-opening, maintenance and record-
keeping measures to take concerning such accounts; and
(b) Where appropriate, notify financial institutions within its jurisdiction,
at the request of another State Party or on its own initiative, of the identity of
particular natural or legal persons to whose accounts such institutions will be
expected to apply enhanced scrutiny, in addition to those whom the financial
institutions may otherwise identify.
3. In the context of paragraph 2 (a) of this article, each State Party shall
implement measures to ensure that its financial institutions maintain adequate
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records, over an appropriate period of time, of accounts and transactions involv-
ing the persons mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, which should, as a
minimum, contain information relating to the identity of the customer as well
as, as far as possible, of the beneficial owner.
4. With the aim of preventing and detecting transfers of proceeds of
offences established in accordance with this Convention, each State Party shall
implement appropriate and effective measures to prevent, with the help of its
regulatory and oversight bodies, the establishment of banks that have no physi-
cal presence and that are not affiliated with a regulated financial group. More-
over, States Parties may consider requiring their financial institutions to refuse
to enter into or continue a correspondent banking relationship with such insti-
tutions and to guard against establishing relations with foreign financial insti-
tutions that permit their accounts to be used by banks that have no physical
presence and that are not affiliated with a regulated financial group.
5. Each State Party shall consider establishing, in accordance with its
domestic law, effective financial disclosure systems for appropriate public offi-
cials and shall provide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Each State
Party shall also consider taking such measures as may be necessary to permit its
competent authorities to share that information with the competent authorities
in other States Parties when necessary to investigate, claim and recover proceeds
of offences established in accordance with this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall consider taking such measures as may be nec-
essary, in accordance with its domestic law, to require appropriate public offi-
cials having an interest in or signature or other authority over a financial ac-
count in a foreign country to report that relationship to appropriate authorities
and to maintain appropriate records related to such accounts. Such measures
shall also provide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance.
Article 53. Measures for direct recovery of property
Each State Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
(a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit another State Party
to initiate civil action in its courts to establish title to or ownership of property
acquired through the commission of an offence established in accordance with
this Convention;
(b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its courts to order
those who have committed offences established in accordance with this Conven-
tion to pay compensation or damages to another State Party that has been
harmed by such offences; and
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(c) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its courts or com-
petent authorities, when having to decide on confiscation, to recognize another
State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property acquired through the
commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 54. Mechanisms for recovery of property through
international cooperation in confiscation
1. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assistance pursuant
to article 55 of this Convention with respect to property acquired through or
involved in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this
Convention, shall, in accordance with its domestic law:
(a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent
authorities to give effect to an order of confiscation issued by a court of another
State Party;
(b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent
authorities, where they have jurisdiction, to order the confiscation of such
property of foreign origin by adjudication of an offence of money-laundering
or such other offence as may be within its jurisdiction or by other procedures
authorized under its domestic law; and
(c) Consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confisca-
tion of such property without a criminal conviction in cases in which the
offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other
appropriate cases.
2. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assistance upon a
request made pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 55 of this Convention, shall, in
accordance with its domestic law:
(a) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent
authorities to freeze or seize property upon a freezing or seizure order issued by
a court or competent authority of a requesting State Party that provides a
reasonable basis for the requested State Party to believe that there are sufficient
grounds for taking such actions and that the property would eventually be
subject to an order of confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of this article;
(b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent
authorities to freeze or seize property upon a request that provides a reasonable
basis for the requested State Party to believe that there are sufficient grounds for
taking such actions and that the property would eventually be subject to an
order of confiscation for purposes of paragraph 1 (a) of this article; and
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(c) Consider taking additional measures to permit its competent authori-
ties to preserve property for confiscation, such as on the basis of a foreign arrest
or criminal charge related to the acquisition of such property.
Article 55. International cooperation for
purposes of confiscation
1. A State Party that has received a request from another State Party
having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with this Conven-
tion for confiscation of proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other
instrumentalities referred to in article 31, paragraph 1, of this Convention
situated in its territory shall, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic
legal system:
(a) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of
obtaining an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, give effect
to it; or
(b) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it
to the extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by a court in the terri-
tory of the requesting State Party in accordance with articles 31, paragraph 1,
and 54, paragraph 1 (a), of this Convention insofar as it relates to proceeds of
crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31,
paragraph 1, situated in the territory of the requested State Party.
2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction
over an offence established in accordance with this Convention, the requested
State Party shall take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of
crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31,
paragraph 1, of this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be
ordered either by the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under
paragraph 1 of this article, by the requested State Party.
3. The provisions of article 46 of this Convention are applicable, mutatis
mutandis, to this article. In addition to the information specified in article 46,
paragraph 15, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain:
(a) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (a) of this article, a
description of the property to be confiscated, including, to the extent possible,
the location and, where relevant, the estimated value of the property and a
statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party sufficient to
enable the requested State Party to seek the order under its domestic law;
(b) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (b) of this article, a
legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation upon which the request is
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based issued by the requesting State Party, a statement of the facts and infor-
mation as to the extent to which execution of the order is requested, a statement
specifying the measures taken by the requesting State Party to provide adequate
notification to bona fide third parties and to ensure due process and a statement
that the confiscation order is final;
(c) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 2 of this article, a
statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party and a descrip-
tion of the actions requested and, where available, a legally admissible copy of
an order on which the request is based.
4. The decisions or actions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
article shall be taken by the requested State Party in accordance with and subject
to the provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or
multilateral agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in relation to
the requesting State Party.
5. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that
give effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws and
regulations or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
6. If a State Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article conditional on the existence of a relevant
treaty, that State Party shall consider this Convention the necessary and suffi-
cient treaty basis.
7. Cooperation under this article may also be refused or provisional
measures lifted if the requested State Party does not receive sufficient and timely
evidence or if the property is of a de minimis value.
8. Before lifting any provisional measure taken pursuant to this article,
the requested State Party shall, wherever possible, give the requesting State Party
an opportunity to present its reasons in favour of continuing the measure.
9. The provisions of this article shall not be construed as prejudicing the
rights of bona fide third parties.
Article 56. Special cooperation
Without prejudice to its domestic law, each State Party shall endeavour to
take measures to permit it to forward, without prejudice to its own investiga-
tions, prosecutions or judicial proceedings, information on proceeds of offences
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established in accordance with this Convention to another State Party without
prior request, when it considers that the disclosure of such information might
assist the receiving State Party in initiating or carrying out investigations, pros-
ecutions or judicial proceedings or might lead to a request by that State Party
under this chapter of the Convention.
Article 57. Return and disposal of assets
1.  Property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to article 31 or 55 of
this Convention shall be disposed of, including by return to its prior legitimate
owners, pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article, by that State Party in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention and its domestic law.
2. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures, in
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, as may be
necessary to enable its competent authorities to return confiscated property,
when acting on the request made by another State Party, in accordance with this
Convention, taking into account the rights of bona fide third parties.
3. In accordance with articles 46 and 55 of this Convention and para-
graphs 1 and 2 of this article, the requested State Party shall:
(a) In the case of embezzlement of public funds or of laundering of
embezzled public funds as referred to in articles 17 and 23 of this Convention,
when confiscation was executed in accordance with article 55 and on the basis
of a final judgement in the requesting State Party, a requirement that can be
waived by the requested State Party, return the confiscated property to the
requesting State Party;
(b) In the case of proceeds of any other offence covered by this Conven-
tion, when the confiscation was executed in accordance with article 55 of this
Convention and on the basis of a final judgement in the requesting State Party,
a requirement that can be waived by the requested State Party, return the
confiscated property to the requesting State Party, when the requesting State
Party reasonably establishes its prior ownership of such confiscated property to
the requested State Party or when the requested State Party recognizes damage
to the requesting State Party as a basis for returning the confiscated property;
(c) In all other cases, give priority consideration to returning confiscated
property to the requesting State Party, returning such property to its prior
legitimate owners or compensating the victims of the crime.
4. Where appropriate, unless States Parties decide otherwise, the re-
quested State Party may deduct reasonable expenses incurred in investigations,
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prosecutions or judicial proceedings leading to the return or disposition of
confiscated property pursuant to this article.
5. Where appropriate, States Parties may also give special consideration
to concluding agreements or mutually acceptable arrangements, on a case-by-
case basis, for the final disposal of confiscated property.
Article 58. Financial intelligence unit
States Parties shall cooperate with one another for the purpose of prevent-
ing and combating the transfer of proceeds of offences established in accordance
with this Convention and of promoting ways and means of recovering such
proceeds and, to that end, shall consider establishing a financial intelligence unit
to be responsible for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the competent
authorities reports of suspicious financial transactions.
Article 59. Bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements
States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements
or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation
undertaken pursuant to this chapter of the Convention.
Chapter VI
Technical assistance and information exchange
Article 60. Training and technical assistance
1. Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or
improve specific training programmes for its personnel responsible for prevent-
ing and combating corruption. Such training programmes could deal, inter alia,
with the following areas:
(a) Effective measures to prevent, detect, investigate, punish and control
corruption, including the use of evidence-gathering and investigative methods;
(b) Building capacity in the development and planning of strategic anti-
corruption policy;
(c) Training competent authorities in the preparation of requests for
mutual legal assistance that meet the requirements of this Convention;
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(d) Evaluation and strengthening of institutions, public service manage-
ment and the management of public finances, including public procurement,
and the private sector;
(e) Preventing and combating the transfer of proceeds of offences estab-
lished in accordance with this Convention and recovering such proceeds;
(f) Detecting and freezing of the transfer of proceeds of offences estab-
lished in accordance with this Convention;
(g) Surveillance of the movement of proceeds of offences established in
accordance with this Convention and of the methods used to transfer, conceal
or disguise such proceeds;
(h) Appropriate and efficient legal and administrative mechanisms and
methods for facilitating the return of proceeds of offences established in accord-
ance with this Convention;
(i) Methods used in protecting victims and witnesses who cooperate with
judicial authorities; and
(j) Training in national and international regulations and in languages.
2. States Parties shall, according to their capacity, consider affording one
another the widest measure of technical assistance, especially for the benefit of
developing countries, in their respective plans and programmes to combat
corruption, including material support and training in the areas referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article, and training and assistance and the mutual exchange
of relevant experience and specialized knowledge, which will facilitate inter-
national cooperation between States Parties in the areas of extradition and
mutual legal assistance.
3. States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent necessary, efforts to maxi-
mize operational and training activities in international and regional organiza-
tions and in the framework of relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements or
arrangements.
4. States Parties shall consider assisting one another, upon request, in
conducting evaluations, studies and research relating to the types, causes, effects
and costs of corruption in their respective countries, with a view to developing,
with the participation of competent authorities and society, strategies and action
plans to combat corruption.
5. In order to facilitate the recovery of proceeds of offences established
in accordance with this Convention, States Parties may cooperate in providing
each other with the names of experts who could assist in achieving that
objective.
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6. States Parties shall consider using subregional, regional and interna-
tional conferences and seminars to promote cooperation and technical assistance
and to stimulate discussion on problems of mutual concern, including the
special problems and needs of developing countries and countries with econo-
mies in transition.
7. States Parties shall consider establishing voluntary mechanisms with a
view to contributing financially to the efforts of developing countries and coun-
tries with economies in transition to apply this Convention through technical
assistance programmes and projects.
8. Each State Party shall consider making voluntary contributions to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for the purpose of fostering,
through the Office, programmes and projects in developing countries with a
view to implementing this Convention.
Article 61. Collection, exchange and analysis of
information on corruption
1. Each State Party shall consider analysing, in consultation with experts,
trends in corruption in its territory, as well as the circumstances in which
corruption offences are committed.
2. States Parties shall consider developing and sharing with each other
and through international and regional organizations statistics, analytical exper-
tise concerning corruption and information with a view to developing, insofar
as possible, common definitions, standards and methodologies, as well as infor-
mation on best practices to prevent and combat corruption.
3. Each State Party shall consider monitoring its policies and actual
measures to combat corruption and making assessments of their effectiveness
and efficiency.
Article 62. Other measures: implementation of the Convention
through economic development and technical assistance
1. States Parties shall take measures conducive to the optimal implemen-
tation of this Convention to the extent possible, through international coopera-
tion, taking into account the negative effects of corruption on society in general,
in particular on sustainable development.
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2. States Parties shall make concrete efforts to the extent possible and
in coordination with each other, as well as with international and regional
organizations:
(a) To enhance their cooperation at various levels with developing coun-
tries, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the latter to prevent and
combat corruption;
(b) To enhance financial and material assistance to support the efforts of
developing countries to prevent and fight corruption effectively and to help
them implement this Convention successfully;
(c) To provide technical assistance to developing countries and countries
with economies in transition to assist them in meeting their needs for the
implementation of this Convention. To that end, States Parties shall endeavour
to make adequate and regular voluntary contributions to an account specifically
designated for that purpose in a United Nations funding mechanism. States
Parties may also give special consideration, in accordance with their domestic
law and the provisions of this Convention, to contributing to that account a
percentage of the money or of the corresponding value of proceeds of crime or
property confiscated in accordance with the provisions of this Convention;
(d) To encourage and persuade other States and financial institutions as
appropriate to join them in efforts in accordance with this article, in particular
by providing more training programmes and modern equipment to developing
countries in order to assist them in achieving the objectives of this Convention.
3. To the extent possible, these measures shall be without prejudice to
existing foreign assistance commitments or to other financial cooperation
arrangements at the bilateral, regional or international level.
4. States Parties may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or
arrangements on material and logistical assistance, taking into consideration the
financial arrangements necessary for the means of international cooperation
provided for by this Convention to be effective and for the prevention, detec-
tion and control of corruption.
Chapter VII
Mechanisms for implementation
Article 63. Conference of the States Parties to the Convention
1. A Conference of the States Parties to the Convention is hereby estab-
lished to improve the capacity of and cooperation between States Parties to
achieve the objectives set forth in this Convention and to promote and review
its implementation.
52
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the Con-
ference of the States Parties not later than one year following the entry into
force of this Convention. Thereafter, regular meetings of the Conference of the
States Parties shall be held in accordance with the rules of procedure adopted
by the Conference.
3. The Conference of the States Parties shall adopt rules of procedure
and rules governing the functioning of the activities set forth in this article,
including rules concerning the admission and participation of observers, and the
payment of expenses incurred in carrying out those activities.
4. The Conference of the States Parties shall agree upon activities, pro-
cedures and methods of work to achieve the objectives set forth in paragraph 1
of this article, including:
(a) Facilitating activities by States Parties under articles 60 and 62 and
chapters II to V of this Convention, including by encouraging the mobilization
of voluntary contributions;
(b) Facilitating the exchange of information among States Parties on
patterns and trends in corruption and on successful practices for preventing and
combating it and for the return of proceeds of crime, through, inter alia, the
publication of relevant information as mentioned in this article;
(c) Cooperating with relevant international and regional organizations
and mechanisms and non-governmental organizations;
(d) Making appropriate use of relevant information produced by other
international and regional mechanisms for combating and preventing corrup-
tion in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of work;
(e) Reviewing periodically the implementation of this Convention by its
States Parties;
(f) Making recommendations to improve this Convention and its
implementation;
(g) Taking note of the technical assistance requirements of States Parties
with regard to the implementation of this Convention and recommending any
action it may deem necessary in that respect.
5. For the purpose of paragraph 4 of this article, the Conference of the
States Parties shall acquire the necessary knowledge of the measures taken by
States Parties in implementing this Convention and the difficulties encountered
by them in doing so through information provided by them and through such
supplemental review mechanisms as may be established by the Conference of
the States Parties.
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6. Each State Party shall provide the Conference of the States Parties
with information on its programmes, plans and practices, as well as on legisla-
tive and administrative measures to implement this Convention, as required by
the Conference of the States Parties. The Conference of the States Parties shall
examine the most effective way of receiving and acting upon information, in-
cluding, inter alia, information received from States Parties and from competent
international organizations. Inputs received from relevant non-governmental
organizations duly accredited in accordance with procedures to be decided upon
by the Conference of the States Parties may also be considered.
7. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 to 6 of this article, the Conference of the
States Parties shall establish, if it deems it necessary, any appropriate mechanism
or body to assist in the effective implementation of the Convention.
Article 64. Secretariat
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the
necessary secretariat services to the Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention.
2. The secretariat shall:
(a) Assist the Conference of the States Parties in carrying out the activities
set forth in article 63 of this Convention and make arrangements and provide
the necessary services for the sessions of the Conference of the States Parties;
(b) Upon request, assist States Parties in providing information to the
Conference of the States Parties as envisaged in article 63, paragraphs 5 and 6,
of this Convention; and
(c) Ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of relevant
international and regional organizations.
Chapter VIII
Final provisions
Article 65. Implementation of the Convention
1. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures, including legisla-
tive and administrative measures, in accordance with fundamental principles of
its domestic law, to ensure the implementation of its obligations under this
Convention.
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2. Each State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than those
provided for by this Convention for preventing and combating corruption.
Article 66. Settlement of disputes
l. States Parties shall endeavour to settle disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention through negotiation.
2. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention that cannot be settled through
negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of those States
Parties, be submitted to arbitration. If, six months after the date of the request
for arbitration, those States Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the
arbitration, any one of those States Parties may refer the dispute to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice by request in accordance with the Statute of the Court.
3. Each State Party may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance
or approval of or accession to this Convention, declare that it does not consider
itself bound by paragraph 2 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be
bound by paragraph 2 of this article with respect to any State Party that has
made such a reservation.
4. Any State Party that has made a reservation in accordance with para-
graph 3 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 67. Signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval and accession
1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature from 9 to
11 December 2003 in Merida, Mexico, and thereafter at United Nations Head-
quarters in New York until 9 December 2005.
2. This Convention shall also be open for signature by regional economic
integration organizations provided that at least one member State of such organi-
zation has signed this Convention in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. A regional economic integration
organization may deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval
if at least one of its member States has done likewise. In that instrument of
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ratification, acceptance or approval, such organization shall declare the extent of
its competence with respect to the matters governed by this Convention. Such
organization shall also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the
extent of its competence.
4. This Convention is open for accession by any State or any regional
economic integration organization of which at least one member State is a Party
to this Convention. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. At the time of its accession, a regional
economic integration organization shall declare the extent of its competence
with respect to matters governed by this Convention. Such organization shall
also inform the depositary of any relevant modification in the extent of its
competence.
Article 68. Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the
date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession. For the purpose of this paragraph, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to
those deposited by member States of such organization.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention after the deposit of the
thirtieth instrument of such action, this Convention shall enter into force on
the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or organization of the
relevant instrument or on the date this Convention enters into force pursuant
to paragraph 1 of this article, whichever is later.
Article 69. Amendment
1. After the expiry of five years from the entry into force of this Con-
vention, a State Party may propose an amendment and transmit it to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereupon communicate the
proposed amendment to the States Parties and to the Conference of the States
Parties to the Convention for the purpose of considering and deciding on the
proposal. The Conference of the States Parties shall make every effort to achieve
consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted
and no agreement has been reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort,
require for its adoption a two-thirds majority vote of the States Parties present
and voting at the meeting of the Conference of the States Parties.
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2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their
competence, shall exercise their right to vote under this article with a number
of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this
Convention. Such organizations shall not exercise their right to vote if their
member States exercise theirs and vice versa.
3. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article
is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States Parties.
4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article
shall enter into force in respect of a State Party ninety days after the date of the
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of an instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval of such amendment.
5. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those
States Parties which have expressed their consent to be bound by it. Other States
Parties shall still be bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier
amendments that they have ratified, accepted or approved.
Article 70. Denunciation
1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such denunciation shall be-
come effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the
Secretary-General.
2. A regional economic integration organization shall cease to be a Party
to this Convention when all of its member States have denounced it.
Article 71. Depositary and languages
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated depositary
of this Convention.
2. The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being
duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this
Convention.
